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Introduction
The story of the financial crisis of 2007/2008 is also a story of bank regulation. Com-
mentators from academia and policy institutions have identified an inappropriate
regulation of banks and capital markets as one of the main factors that contributed
to the transformation of the U.S. subprime crisis into the global financial crisis with
all its devastating consequences. Clearly, the regulation of banks and capital markets
is one of the most important issues in today’s post-crisis world. The present work
contains five essays that contribute to the literature on bank regulation. The first
three chapters deal with the effects of model-based, risk-weighted capital regulation
as specified in the Basel II/Basel III regulatory framework. In Chapter 4, we exam-
ine how political factors affect bailout decisions in the German savings bank sector.
Chapter 5 uses a panel of 26 countries and investigates how the removal of entry
barriers for foreign banks affects economic outcomes, and how it interacts with the
efficiency of the domestic banking sector at the time of liberalization.
CHAPTER 1.1 A major innovation of the Basel II framework was the introduc-
tion of model-based capital regulation. For the first time, large banks were allowed
to use their internal risk models in order to determine capital charges for credit risk.
In this way—the hope was—a better alignment between capital charges and actual
asset risk could be achieved, which would lead to a better allocation of resources and
reduced incentives for regulatory arbitrage. However, even before its implementation
several aspects of the new approach were heavily criticized. One of the main crit-
icisms was that model-based regulation would exacerbate the pro-cyclicality of the
financial system: As risk estimates are responsive to economic conditions, they are
1This chapter is based on joint work with Rainer Haselmann and Paul Wachtel.
1
likely to increase in a downturn, which means that capital requirements for credit
risk will increase when economic conditions deteriorate. To the extent that banks
are unable or unwilling to raise new equity, they will be forced to deleverage, for
example by cutting back lending activities. As this could mean a restriction in firms’
access to funds, the initial downturn might be exacerbated.
In this chapter, we empirically examine how the introduction of asset-specific,
risk-weighted capital charges affected banks’ lending behavior and firms’ access
to funds in a recession. Specifically, we exploit the gradual introduction of the
Basel II internal ratings-based approach (IRB) by large German banks in order to
test whether model-based capital regulation has exacerbated the pro-cyclicality of
the financial system. While German banks started to introduce the IRB approach
in early 2007, it was not feasible for them to transfer all their assets to the new
approach at the same time. In September 2008, when the collapse of the investment
bank Lehman Brothers exogenously increased credit risk in the German economy,
banks introducing IRB had transferred only a portion of their loan portfolios to the
new approach. Exploiting this within-bank variation in the regulatory approach,
and the fact that many firms borrow from several IRB banks at the same time, we
are able to test whether, in response to the Lehman collapse, loans under IRB—for
which capital charges are responsive to economic conditions—were adjusted in a dif-
ferent way compared with loans under the traditional approach, for which capital
charges do not respond to economic conditions. Importantly, this setup allows us
to control for both bank-level and firm-level heterogeneity. We find that loans to
the same firm decline by about 3.5 percent more when the loan is part of an IRB
portfolio as compared with a portfolio using the traditional regulatory approach.
Since banks tend to reduce especially large IRB credit exposures during the reces-
sion, firms relying on IRB loans experience an even stronger reduction in aggregate
borrowing (5 to 10 percent larger) as compared with firms relying on loans under
the traditional approach. Overall, the findings in this chapter confirm the claim that
model-based capital regulation has exacerbated the pro-cyclicality of the financial
system. Although Basel III includes several tools that are meant to address this
issue (see Chapter 2), it continues to rely on model-based regulation, leaving the
basic mechanism behind our findings unchanged.
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CHAPTER 2.2 Following the financial crisis of 2007/2008, the regulator acknowl-
edged pro-cyclical features of the Basel II framework and implemented several tools
to mitigate this problem. As one such tool, the Basel III framework includes a coun-
tercyclical capital buffer (CCB) that aims to increase the resilience of the banking
sector by absorbing shocks arising from financial and economic stress. The idea be-
hind the CCB is simple: Banks should build up additional capital buffers in times
of excessive credit growth, which can then be released when economic conditions
deteriorate. In this context, a key task for the regulator is to determine whether
credit growth is excessive in the sense that there is a build-up of vulnerabilities in
the banking sector that could potentially lead to a crisis. If this is the case, the CCB
should be activated, which would on the one hand slow down excessive credit growth
and smooth the credit cycle, and, on the other hand, increase the resilience of the
banking sector.
This chapter was written in close collaboration with policy makers during a
traineeship at the European Central Bank (ECB). Importantly, it does not aim to
evaluate whether a CCB is able to adequately address the problem of pro-cyclicality
documented in Chapter 1. Rather, we develop a tool for the detection of vulner-
abilities in the banking sector that is meant to guide policy makers’ decisions on
the setting of CCB rates, a multivariate early warning model relying on private
credit variables and other macro-financial and banking sector indicators. For this,
we use data for 23 EU member states covering the period between 1982 and 2012.
We find that, in addition to credit variables, other domestic and global financial
factors such as equity and house prices as well as banking sector variables help to
predict vulnerable states of the economy in EU member states. The models we an-
alyze demonstrate good out-of-sample predictive power, signaling the Swedish and
Finnish banking crises of the early 1990s at least six quarters in advance. Based on
these findings, we suggest that policy makers take a broad approach when deciding
on CCB rates. What remains to be shown is to what extent the CCB is able to
address the inherent pro-cyclicality of model-based capital regulation.
CHAPTER 3.3 Apart from its inherent problem of pro-cyclicality, Basel II-type
2This chapter is based on joint work with Carsten Detken, Tuomas Peltonen, and Willem
Schudel. It has been published in the ECB Working Paper Series (No. 1604).
3This chapter is based on joined work with Rainer Haselmann and Vikrant Vig.
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model-based capital regulation has been criticized for being much too complex and
intransparent. In particular, as banks have to estimate tens of thousands of param-
eters in order to determine risk-weighted assets, it has become almost impossible for
regulators to keep track of all these estimations. As a measure of riskiness, risk-
weighted capital ratios have come under pressure: An increasing number of investors
prefers to rely on traditional, unweighted capital ratios when assessing the solvency
of a bank. The trust in regulatory risk weights is deteriorating, which raises the
question whether model-based capital regulation has failed to meet its objective of
creating a safer and more efficient banking system.
In this chapter, we examine how the Basel II reform affected lending and fi-
nancial stability. Using data from the German credit register, and employing a
difference-in-difference identification strategy, we empirically investigate how the in-
troduction of model-based capital regulation affected the quantity and the composi-
tion of bank lending. We find that, following the reform, banks that introduced the
internal ratings-based (IRB) approach increased their lending relative to banks that
remained under the traditional approach, as the move to IRB was associated with a
considerable reduction in capital requirements for credit risk. Moreover, loans under
IRB exhibit a higher sensitivity to model-based PDs as compared with loans under
the traditional approach. Interestingly, however, we find that—for IRB loans—risk
models systematically underpredict actual default rates by about 0.5 to 1 percent-
age points. There is no such systematic prediction error in PDs for loans under the
traditional approach. Our findings suggest that, counter to the stated objectives,
model-based risk weights have weakened the link between PDs and actual defaults.
We conclude that the reform has failed to meet the objective of a better alignment
between capital charges and actual asset risk.
CHAPTER 4.4 The year 2014 will bring a historic change for the regulation of
banks in the European Union, as the ECB takes over the supervision of the largest
and most significant banks from national supervisors. Among other things, this
change creates a larger distance between banks and regulators. On the one hand, this
may mean a loss of knowledge, if one believes that national supervisors are closer to
local banks and hence have a better understanding of their business models. On the
4This chapter is based on joined work with Rainer Haselmann, Thomas Kick, and Vikrant Vig.
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other hand, previous experiences have shown that national regulators often refrain
from tough regulatory actions as they fear a competitive disadvantage for “their”
banks as compared with banks from other countries. Hence, greater distance may
actually lead to better supervision.
In this chapter, we contribute to the debate on the optimal proximity between
banks and politicians or regulators. Specifically, we investigate how political factors
affect public bailout policies in the German savings bank sector. German savings
banks are interconnected by a state level association that operates a safety net for
these banks. In case of distress, this association injects funds or restructures the
respective bank. Alternatively, if politicians want to avoid a formal distress case and
a potential restructuring of the bank, they can use taxpayers’ money to support the
distressed bank. As they often function as a chairman of the savings bank—hence
exerting significant control over the bank—they could have an incentive to do so if
political circumstances allow it. For a sample of 148 distress events, we find that
indeed politicians’ interests and ideology have a significant impact on their decision
to bail out distressed banks. The probability that a politician injects taxpayers’
money into a distressed bank is 30 percent lower in the year before an election as
compared with the years after an election. High competition in the electoral process
reduces the probability of a public bailout by 15 percent. We also show that ideology
affects bailout decisions: Capital injections are 17 percent less likely if the politician
is a member of the German conservative party (CDU). Further, politicians tend to
refrain from capital injections if their community is highly indebted. Banks that are
bailed out by politicians experience less restructuring and perform worse in the years
following the event compared with banks that are bailed out by the savings bank
association. Moreover, we do not observe a better macroeconomic performance of
counties in which the bank distress event was resolved by the owner as compared with
the association. The fact that bailout decisions are often driven by personal interests
of the politicians involved provides an argument for a larger distance between banks
and politicians or regulators that decide on bailouts. Hence, our results provide
support for the move towards a unified banking supervision in the European Union.
CHAPTER 5.5 In many countries, the banking sector is one of the most heavily
5This chapter is based on joined work with Rainer Haselmann, Amit Seru, and Vikrant Vig.
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regulated industries, due to its importance for an efficient allocation of resources
and overall economic growth and stability. In particular, many governments tried
to exert a certain amount of control over their financial systems, for example by
imposing ceilings on interest rates or capital flows, by owning or micromanaging
large parts of the banking system, or by restricting entry to the financial sector,
especially for foreign banks (see Beim and Calomiris 2001). The late 20th and the
early 21st century, however, witnessed a move away from such financial repression,
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—as part of the so-
called Washington Consensus—promoted financial liberalization in many member
states. Whether this liberalization was actually beneficial for the countries is still
subject to considerable debate.
In this chapter, we look at banking sector liberalization in 26 countries and inves-
tigate how the removal of entry barriers for foreign banks affected economic outcomes.
We argue that the nature of the financial structure (supply of financing) impacts a
country’s industry structure through its influence on the allocation of credit to firms
and industries. We exploit the variation in the efficiency of the domestic banking
sector at the time of liberalization to identify large changes in the nature of the sup-
ply of financing in an economy due to the entry of foreign banks. Foreign—relatively
arm’s length—capital largely crowds out domestic lending in markets with relatively
inefficient banks after liberalization. In contrast, there is an increase in the aggregate
supply of credit in countries with relatively efficient domestic banks following such
an event. We use this changed mix of financing across economies and show that the
nature of the supply of financing significantly impacts the allocation of credit. There
is a higher growth rate and lower growth volatility for industry sectors in markets
with relatively more efficient domestic banks following liberalization. These results
are driven by more credit flowing to industries that are reliant on external financing
and more credit flowing to smaller firms. In contrast, industry growth is lower and
growth volatility is higher in countries with relatively inefficient domestic banks fol-
lowing liberalization. Particularly small firms are harmed in these countries. Thus,
the timing of liberalization of credit markets interacts with the efficiency of the in-
cumbent domestic banking sector, and the changed nature of the supply of financing
it induces has implications on the allocation of credit and economic growth.
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Chapter1
Pro-Cyclical Capital Regulation and
Lending
1.1 Introduction
The design of banks’ capital charges has long been one of the most important and
controversial issues in discussions of bank regulation.1 Prior to the financial crisis,
much of the effort to improve regulation was concentrated on the microprudential goal
of a better alignment of capital charges with banks’ actual asset risk. Although this
idea was already present in the Basel I agreement of 1988, Basel II went a step further
by introducing the concept of internal ratings-based (IRB) capital requirements.
Under the IRB approach, the amount of capital a bank has to hold for a given loan
is a function of the model-based, estimated risk of that loan. Many of the world’s
larger banks are now using their own rating models to determine capital charges for
individual credit risks.2
There is an argument that linking capital charges to asset risk may exacerbate
business cycle fluctuations (see Dan´ıelsson et al. 2001, Kashyap and Stein 2004, Re-
pullo and Suarez 2012). Specifically, capital requirements will increase in a downturn
if measures of asset risk are responsive to economic conditions, while at the same
1See Peltzman (1970), Koehn and Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988), Blum and
Hellwig (1995), Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001), Morrison and White (2005), or Acharya (2009).
An early review of the literature is provided by Bhattacharya, Boot, and Thakor (1998).
2Over 100 countries have implemented the agreement, with more than half using the more
advanced methodology for individual credit risks (see Financial Stability Institute 2010).
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time bank capital is likely to be eroded by losses. Capital constrained banks that
are unable or unwilling to raise new equity in bad times will be forced to deleverage
by cutting back lending activities, hence exacerbating the initial downturn.3 In this
paper, we causally identify the effect of asset-specific, risk-based capital charges on
banks’ lending behavior and firms’ aggregate borrowing around the financial crisis
in Germany. Hence, we estimate the magnitude of the pro-cyclical effects of model-
based capital regulation on lending during a downturn.
While the pro-cyclicality of Basel II has been widely discussed in the academic
as well as in the policy literature,4 three issues beset empirical identification of the
effects on lending. First, the assessment of asset-specific risk and the lending decision
of a bank are endogenous. If a bank increases lending to a firm, the firm’s leverage
increases, and this will increase the model-based estimation of credit risk. Thus,
the relationship between bank lending decisions and firm credit risk may suffer from
reverse causality. Second, economic downturns are likely to affect both a firm’s loan
demand and the evaluation of its credit risk by banks. Therefore, it is essential to
disentangle a shock to a firm’s loan demand from a potential loan supply shock.
Third, economic downturns are likely to have a differential impact on banks. Thus,
it is difficult to determine whether a change in bank lending is driven by the pro-
cyclicality of capital regulation or the way the bank is affected by the recession shock.
The latter concern is an important identification challenge, since larger German
banks introduced the IRB approach while most smaller banks continue to use the
traditional standard approach (SA) to determine capital charges.5 If large banks
are affected differently by a downturn, as compared with small banks, it is difficult
to disentangle the effect of capital regulation on lending from other bank-specific
factors.
3Admati et al. (2012) show that even if raising capital is possible, bank shareholders are likely
to prefer reducing assets over raising new capital in order to fulfill regulatory requirements.
4See Borio, Furfine, and Lowe (2001), Lowe (2002), Goodhart, Hofman, and Segoviano (2004),
Gordy and Howells (2006), Rochet (2008), or Repullo, Saurina, and Trucharte (2010). Brunnermeier
(2009) and Hellwig (2009) discuss how pro-cyclical features of the regulation contributed to the
financial crisis.
5In the SA capital requirements do not depend on asset risk or economic conditions and are
constant over time (see Section 1.2.1 for details). Exceptions are cases where borrowers have external
credit ratings, as the SA allows for the use of these ratings to determine capital requirements.
However, the German market for corporate bonds is very small; hence, very few companies have
an external rating. We exclude a small number of SA loans to these companies to ensure that all
loans under the SA in our sample are subject to a fixed capital charge.
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We overcome all these identification issues by exploiting the institutional arrange-
ments surrounding the introduction of the Basel II Accords in Germany in 2007 (see
Bundesbank 2006 for details) and the richness of the data from the German credit
registry. Specifically, once Basel II was introduced, banks started to use their own
internal risk models to determine the regulatory capital for their loan portfolios (IRB
banks) or remained under the old regime (SA banks). For IRB institutions, the reg-
ulator separately certified the internal model for each loan portfolio within the bank,
before the IRB approach could be used to determine capital charges. Since this
certification process took several years, IRB banks had only a portion of their loan
portfolios transferred to the IRB approach at the time of the Lehman collapse in
September 2008. Hence, they were using the new IRB approach to determine capital
charges for some loan portfolios and the traditional SA for other portfolios when the
financial crisis occurred.
We take advantage of this variation of the regulatory approach within IRB banks
to identify the effect of pro-cyclical capital regulation on lending. While the crisis
event resulted in an unexpected increase in credit risk in Germany, it had an impact
on the capital charges of the IRB loan portfolios only.6 The capital charges on SA
loan portfolios within IRB banks were not affected by this event. German firms
usually borrow from more than one bank and, as it turns out, many firms have
relationships with banks that are using different regulatory approaches to determine
capital charges. Thus, we are able to examine the effect of the regulatory approach
holding constant the firm-specific determinants of loan demand. On the supply side,
the gradual introduction of IRB meant that many firms had loans from large (IRB)
banks that were in some instances subject to the IRB approach to determine capital
charges and in other instances using the SA. By comparing the relative change in
lending to firms that take a loan from at least two different IRB institutions—one
where the particular loan is in a business segment that is using the IRB approach
and another where the loan is in a business segment that is still using the SA—we
can systematically control for bank heterogeneity.7
6The average probability of default (PD) in our sample increased by 3.5 percent over the crisis
period. Correspondingly—as the PD is a key factor in the determination of capital charges under
the IRB approach—capital requirements rose by 0.54 percentage points on average.
7The identification strategy to isolate loan supply shocks from firm demand shocks by focusing
on borrowing by a given firm from different banks is based on Khwaja and Mian (2008) and has
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Our identification strategy provides us an unbiased estimate of the pro-cyclicality
effect as long as there is no relationship between the order in which IRB banks
shifted their loan portfolios toward the new regulatory approach (IRB) and the
banks’ decision to adjust these loans in response to a crisis. There are two potential
determinants of the order in which loan portfolios are shifted toward IRB within
banks. First, the regulator requires that the bank has a sufficient amount of data
to calibrate a meaningful credit risk model for a certain portfolio before it is shifted
to IRB (i.e., banks have to first transfer business segments where they are relatively
active). Second, if they were free to choose, banks would have an incentive to shift
the least risky portfolios to the new approach first (since the reduction in capital
charges is the highest for these portfolios). We find that less risky loans as well as
loans in business segments where the bank is more active are adjusted less over the
crisis. This means that any bias would work against finding a significant impact
of the regulatory approach. Moreover, banks had to announce the order in which
loan portfolios would be transferred toward IRB years before the outbreak of the
financial crisis.8 Hence, they were unable to react to the crisis by changing the order
of portfolios that are moved to the new approach.
We find that capital regulation has a strong and economically meaningful impact
on the cyclicality of lending. Loans to the same firm by different IRB banks are
reduced by 3.7 percent more over the crisis event when internal ratings (IRB) instead
of fixed risk weights (SA) are used to determine capital charges. These findings are
robust to the inclusion of bank and firm fixed effects in first differenced data. Further,
there is no difference in the adjustment of loans using the SA provided from IRB
banks or loans from SA banks to the same firm. Both of the above results illustrate
that our findings are not driven by bank heterogeneity.
We are also able to identify the effect of the Basel II capital regulations on the
pro-cyclicality of the aggregate supply of loans to firms. That is, we examine whether
the adoption of the IRB approach makes it more difficult for firms to borrow from any
source. On the one hand, it could be that a firm with IRB loans that were reduced
been applied by Jime´nez et al. (2013a).
8Banks and the regulator had to agree on an implementation plan that specified an order
according to which loan portfolios were transferred to IRB (see Bundesbank 2005). German banks
that introduced the new approach submitted these plans to the regulator in 2006. Note that no
individual loans could be shifted and that there could be no reversal of this choice.
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during the crisis can offset the effect by increasing its borrowing from banks using
the standard approach. On the other hand, if banks tend to ration especially large
loans, the magnitude of the pro-cyclical effect on aggregate firm borrowing could be
even larger. If this is the case, then the new capital regulations have important and,
perhaps, undesirable macroeconomic implications.
The effects on aggregate firm borrowing are difficult to identify because there is
only one observation per firm (borrowing from all of its banking relationships).9 To
surmount the problem, we restrict the sample to firms that have loans from IRB
banks where some loans are under IRB to determine capital charges while others
are still under the SA. We show that aggregate loan supply to a firm is reduced
more during the crisis when the share of its loans from IRB institutions subject to
IRB capital charges is greater. Specifically, we find that a firm that borrowed only
with IRB loans experienced a reduction in total loans that is about 5 to 10 percent
larger than the reduction for a firm that borrowed only with loans under the SA.
During economic downturns, it seems to be difficult for firms to offset reductions
in lending from one bank by increasing borrowing from other banks. We find only
weak evidence that firms that had more IRB loans experienced greater increases in
capital costs. This suggests that IRB banks adjusted loan quantities rather than
loan conditions as a reaction to the crisis.
Exploiting the cross-sectional heterogeneity of bank capital ratios before the crisis
allows us to further nail down the channel through which capital regulation affects
lending. IRB banks with a low equity ratio had a small buffer to absorb increases
in capital charges induced by an increase in credit risk. Therefore, the IRB effect
documented above should be particularly pronounced for these banks. We find that—
among IRB banks—those institutions with a lower than median initial capital ratio
prior to the crisis reduce their IRB loans by 2.9 percent more, relative to those with
a higher than median capital ratio.
In additional tests we find that IRB banks reduce loans to which they have a large
exposure relatively more. In particular, IRB banks reduce the IRB loans to which
they have a larger than median exposure by 9.7 percent more than their smaller
IRB loans. They also reduce loans more to those firms that experienced a higher
9This means that it is not possible to use firm fixed effects to hold firm demand constant.
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deterioration of model-based credit risk estimates during the crisis. In both instances
this supports our claim that banks had to deleverage in order to fulfill higher capital
requirements. They do so by reducing particularly those loans for which they can
save the most in required capital: I.e., larger and riskier loans.
Our paper is the first to provide these direct empirical estimates of how the
pro-cyclicality inherent in the model-based approach to capital regulation affects
the supply of loans to firms. Previous studies used numerical simulations on hypo-
thetical or real-world portfolios (Carling et al. 2002, Corco´stegui et al. 2002, Lowe
and Segoviano 2002, Kashyap and Stein 2004, Saurina and Trucharte 2007, Francis
and Osborne 2009, Andersen 2011) or analyzed the overall effect of business cycle
fluctuations on banks’ capital buffers (Ayuso, Pe´rez, and Saurina 2004, Lindquist
2004, Jokipii and Milne 2008). While these studies find that the bank capital buffers
fluctuate counter-cyclically, they cannot causally quantify how pro-cyclical capital
regulation affects the supply of loans to firms. There are two recent papers that
examine the effect of changes in capital requirements on bank lending. First, and
most closely related to our own paper, Jime´nez et al. (2013b) examine the effect of
dynamic provisioning rules on bank lending in Spain. Exploiting variation across
banks, they show that lowering capital requirements when economic conditions de-
teriorate helps banks to maintain their supply of credit. Our paper uses within-bank
variation to examine the effect of risk-based capital regulation on lending in the
context of a shock to credit risk. Second, Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wiedalek (2012)
exploit a policy experiment in the United Kingdom and show that regulated banks,
as compared with non-regulated banks, reduce lending in response to tighter cap-
ital requirements. Our loan-level data allow us to more directly address issues of
firm-level and bank-level heterogeneity.
Our findings are in line with theoretical evidence on the pro-cyclicality of risk-
based capital regulation, such as the dynamic equilibrium model of Repullo and
Suarez (2012), which shows that increasing capital charges in a downturn can lead to
a severe reduction in the supply of credit. Earlier, Thakor (1996) argued that small
increases in risk-based capital requirements lead to large reductions in aggregate
lending.10 Also, policy analysts have argued that the Basel II model-based approach
10Berger and Udell (1994) provide empirical evidence that the introduction of Basel I exacerbated
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would increase the pro-cyclicality of bank capital (e.g., Borio, Furfine, and Lowe
2001, Goodhart, Hofman, and Segoviano 2004, and Gordy and Howells 2006).
Our paper also relates to the broader literature analyzing the impact of banks’
liquidity or capital shocks on loan supply (Bernanke 1983, Bernanke, Lown, and
Friedman 1991, Kashyap and Stein 2000). Peek and Rosengren (1995a,b) and Gam-
bacorta and Mistrulli (2004) find evidence to support the concern that low-capitalized
banks are forced to cut their loan supply during a recession. Peek and Rosengren
(1997, 2000) go a step further by showing that capital shocks to Japanese banks in
the 1990s induced them to cut back lending in the United States and that the result-
ing loan supply shock negatively affected real economic activity. For the recent crisis,
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen (2011), Iyer et al. (2013),
Kahle and Stulz (2013), and Paravisini et al. (2013) document a credit crunch. Our
paper combines these different strands of the literature by showing that a tightening
of capital requirements caused by pro-cyclical regulation affected lending in Germany
after the Lehman collapse and that this had severe consequences for firms’ overall
access to funds.
Our findings illustrate how microprudential and macroprudential goals of banking
sector regulation might conflict with one another.11 On the one hand, the reduction in
lending we document is due to capital charges that are based on improved evaluation
of credit risk. In terms of safety of the individual bank, it might make sense to extend
fewer loans when economic conditions deteriorate. Following this logic, Repullo and
Suarez (2012) suggest that the business cycle side effects of Basel II may have a
payoff in the long-term solvency of the banking system. On the other hand, as
banks simultaneously restrain their lending, firms’ access to funds becomes restricted,
and such restriction might negatively affect firm-level investment and exacerbate
the cyclical shock. In order to evaluate the welfare effects of pro-cyclical capital
regulation one would have to evaluate both its impact on the long-term safety of
the banking sector and its effect on credit supply in economic downturns. While we
cannot make a statement on the former, our findings help to quantify the latter.
a credit crunch in the United States by inducing banks to shift into assets with lower capital charges.
11See Galati and Moessner (2012) for a survey of the literature on macroprudential regulation.
Recent contributions from the academic side include Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008), Brun-
nermeier et al. (2009), Hellwig (2010), Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein (2011), and Acharya et al.
(2012).
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Basel III tries to account for both sides of the trade-off described above: While it
continues to rely on risk-based regulation and the incentives such regulation provides
for banks, macroprudential policy instruments like the countercyclical capital buffer
were introduced with the explicit goal of smoothing credit supply over the cycle. Our
conjectures are provided in the conclusion (Section 1.6). There, we question whether
a countercyclical capital buffer would have been useful in the presence of a severe
unexpected shock to credit risk such as the one analyzed here.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 1.2 we describe
our data set and explain both the structure of the Basel regulations and the German
institutional framework. Section 1.3 develops our empirical framework and explains
our identification method. Section 1.4 presents our main results. Further robustness
checks are in Section 1.5. The last section concludes and discusses the implications
of the results.
1.2 Institutional background and data
In this section we outline the framework governing the determination of capital
charges. We begin with an explanation of the relevant aspects of the Basel II agree-
ment and the arrangements for its introduction in Germany. We then describe our
underlying data set and present descriptive statistics.
1.2.1 Introduction of risk-weighted capital charges
The original Basel agreement (Basel I) introduced risk-based capital charges for the
first time in 1988. First, bank assets were assigned to several risk groups (referred to
as buckets) that received different risk weights. Second, regulatory capital require-
ments were defined in terms of risk-weighted assets, which were calculated as the
total amount of each asset multiplied by its risk weight. For example, AAA-rated
sovereign debt had a risk weight of 0 percent (i.e., no regulatory capital was required
for such holdings), while all corporate loans had the same risk weight, 100 percent
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1988). A drawback of this regulatory
framework was that banks had an incentive to hold the riskiest assets within each
risk group, as these provided the highest yield while being subject to the same capital
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charges as less risky assets in the same bucket.12 Therefore, an important motive for
the introduction of Basel II capital standards was the wish of regulators to establish
a stronger link between capital charges and the actual risk of each asset.
Basel II assigns an individual risk weight to each loan so that the capital charge
reflects the underlying risk of the loan. Minimum capital requirements form the
basis of the first of three pillars of the regulatory framework and allow banks to
choose among two broad methodologies to calculate their capital charges for credit
risk (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006).13 First, the standard approach
(SA) is similar to the old Basel I framework and automatically assigns a risk weight
of 100 percent to corporate loans if the borrower has no external rating. If a firm’s
debt is rated by an external agency, the rating can be used to determine capital
charges for loans to the firm. In Germany, the corporate bond market is extremely
small, and therefore only very few firms have external bond ratings. We exclude
from our sample SA loans to firms with ratings.14 Therefore, all SA loans considered
in our analysis are automatically assigned a risk weight of 100 percent independent
of the riskiness of the loan.
Second, if banks fulfill certain conditions and disclosure requirements they can
opt for the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach that relies on the banks’ own risk
estimates to determine risk weights for assets.15 IRB requires the estimation of four
parameters to determine the risk weight of a loan: The probability of default (PD),
the loss given default, exposure at default, and the effective maturity of the loan.
The higher the estimate for any of these parameters, the higher the risk weight that
is attributed to the loan. In the advanced internal ratings-based approach, the bank
provides estimates for all of them, while in the basic internal ratings-based approach
the bank estimates the only PD, and standard values are assumed for the others.16
12The effects of Basel I on bank behavior are analyzed in Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision (1999).
13Minimum capital requirements under Basel II are designed to address credit risk, operational
risk, and market risk. The other two pillars of Basel II are a better supervisory review and a
stronger focus on market discipline.
14Only 149 firms in our sample have an external bond rating. These firms constitute 0.1 percent
of all firms in our sample, or 2.1 percent of the firms used in our main identification test (Test 3,
see Section 1.3).
15See Solvabilita¨tsverordnung (2006), §§ 56-59 for the requirements that banks have to fulfill to
be eligible for IRB.
16We do not distinguish between the advanced and basic internal ratings-based approaches in
our empirical analysis, because the risk weight depends on the loan’s PD in both cases.
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No matter whether a bank applies SA or IRB, the Basel agreement requires that
aggregate capital charges must be no lower than 8 percent of risk-weighted assets.
Since the organizational efforts as well as the administrative expenses for the
introduction of the new approach are high, the main determinant of a bank’s decision
to opt for IRB is its size. Large banks have the ability to distribute the administrative
costs over a larger number of loans. Moreover, banks are incentivized to become IRB
institutions by the fact that capital requirements are substantially lower under IRB
than under SA (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006, p. 12).17 Since
banks that decide to become IRB institutions may have an incentive to report low
PDs for their loan portfolios in order to economize on regulatory capital charges, the
introduction of IRB is closely monitored by the regulator. The regulator requires that
the PDs used for the determination of capital charges are the same as the ones that
the bank uses in order to determine loan conditions (e.g., the interest rate). Thus, if
a bank were to consistently report smaller PDs in order to save on regulatory capital,
the bank would eventually hurt itself by mispricing its loans.
For our analysis the crucial difference between the two approaches is that capital
charges are endogenous to credit risk with IRB but not with SA. For loans under
SA, risk weights are determined when the loan is made and do not change. For loans
under IRB, the risk weights are determined by the PD, which can change as the
firm’s underlying condition changes. The internal risk models used by German banks
estimate PDs at each point in time rather than taking an average over the business
cycle. Thus, during an economic downturn PDs are likely to increase, implying
higher capital charges if the bank is using IRB. The pro-cyclicality of capital charges
under Basel II is one of its most controversial features. In this paper we analyze
the effects of pro-cyclical capital charges on banks’ lending behavior. The analysis
depends on our ability to distinguish the effect of pro-cyclical capital charges from
other determinants of lending behavior. Our identification approach exploits the
gradual introduction of IRB by German banks.
The introduction of IRB is a highly regulated process that is laid out in the Solv-
17At the beginning of our sample period, the mean risk weight for loans from IRB banks was
43.7 percent: I.e., a loan with a face value of e100 increased risk-weighted assets by only e43.70
on average (see Panel B of Table 1.1), while under Basel I the same loan increased risk-weighted
assets by e100. Thus, IRB institutions experienced a substantial reduction in required capital for
corporate lending following the reform.
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abilita¨tsverordnung (2006), §56. In order to deal with the operational complexity of
introducing new rating models, banks do not apply the new approach to all loans
at once; rather, they agree on a gradual implementation plan with the regulator.18
The phased roll-out of IRB means that during the transition, which typically lasts
for several years, banks will have both IRB and SA loans in their portfolios. Fur-
thermore, the regulator requires banks to introduce IRB not for individual loans but
for the entire loan portfolio of a given business unit that can be evaluated with a
given internal rating model. Once a rating model has been put in place, the capital
charges for all loans in the business unit arising from existing or new customers are
determined with the consistent use over time of the same rating model.19 Thus, loans
in certain business units or asset classes have to be shifted all at once, so that it is
not possible for the bank to strategically shift individual loans from one approach to
the other.
The implementation plan specifies an order according to which IRB is applied to
the different business units (loan portfolios) within the bank. The regulator requires
banks to start by implementing IRB for those business units that have sufficient data
on past loan performance available to calibrate a PD model. Consequently, banks
have started with loan portfolios in industry segments where they are relatively
active. Further, the bank and the regulator agree on the implementation plan for
business units and the timing of the roll-out years before the actual introduction.
The German banks that adopted IRB had submitted their implementation plans to
the regulator in 2006. Hence, they were not able to react to the financial crisis by
changing the order of loan portfolios that were transferred to IRB or by applying the
standard approach to IRB portfolios after loan PDs deteriorated. At the outset of
our data sample in 2008Q1 the phase-in of business units using IRB was underway.
Thus, capital charges for IRB banks were determined by the internal ratings-based
approach for some parts of the loan portfolio and by the standard approach for
18See Solvabilita¨tsverordnung (2006), §§ 64-67 for details on the implementation plan. Banks
adopting the new approach must show on application that at least 50 percent of their risk-weighted
assets will be calculated on the basis of IRB (entrance threshold). Furthermore, the implementation
plan has to specify how the bank will achieve 80 percent IRB coverage within two and half years
after the introduction (regulatory reference point) and 92 percent IRB coverage five years after the
introduction (exit threshold).
19See Solvabilita¨tsverordnung (2006) §57,3.
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other parts. We exploit this within-bank variation for our identification strategy as
explained in Section 1.3.
1.2.2 Data and descriptive statistics
Our principal source of data is the German credit registry compiled by the Deutsche
Bundesbank. As part of its supervisory role, the central bank collects data each
quarter on all outstanding loans of at least e 1.5 million. The data set includes
information on the lender’s and the borrower’s identity, the amount of the loan out-
standing, the regulatory approach used by the bank, the probability of default (PD),
and the risk-weighted assets corresponding to the respective loan.20 We combine
these data with annual information from bank balance sheets obtained from the
Bundesbank’s BAKIS database.
Our sample includes 1,825 commercial banks, state banks and cooperative banks.21
We restrict the analysis to those commercial loans for which we are able to determine
the regulatory approach used at the beginning of our sample period in 2008.22 We
consider a loan to be an IRB loan if the bank adopted the approach for the loan
in either the first or second quarter of 2008.23 To control for potential differences
between IRB banks and SA banks that might have an impact on lending, we sepa-
rate our sample into those banks using the internal ratings-based approach during
our sample period and those banks not using it. As can be seen in Panel A of Ta-
ble 1.1, there are 1,784 SA banks and 41 IRB banks in our sample. On average,
IRB banks had adopted the new approach for 62 percent of their loans at the onset
of our sample period in early 2008 (Share IRB). As expected, IRB banks are much
larger and have lower equity ratios than SA banks. Regarding profitability, mea-
20The loan registry does not report additional information about loan terms such as the interest
rate and maturity of the loan.
21We exclude loans from finance companies, stock brokerage firms, and other special purpose
institutions.
22Although Basel II in Germany was introduced in January 2007, detailed information on the
regulatory approach applied to a certain loan as well as PD estimates that we need for our analysis
became available to the regulator only in 2008.
23As the implementation period for the internal ratings-based approach may last for up to five
years it is possible that certain loans that we classify as SA loans are switched to IRB at a later
point during our sample period. The opposite case, however, cannot occur since IRB banks are not
allowed to switch IRB loans back to SA. Loans switched to IRB at later point in time would—if
anything—prevent us from finding a significant impact of the regulatory approach on lending as
they simply add noise.
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sured by ROA, there are no substantial differences between the two groups. There
are relatively more commercial banks among the group of IRB banks, while most
cooperative banks continue to use the standard approach. These differences between
SA and IRB banks pose potential problems for identification as the two groups might
have been affected differently by the crisis event (e.g., owing to different degrees of
internationalization or differences in capitalization). Our estimation strategy allows
us to systematically address these important identification issues.
Descriptive statistics for the loan data are shown in Panel B of Table 1.1. Overall,
our sample contains 182,966 loans to 107,025 distinct firms for the period from the
first quarter of 2008 through the third quarter of 2011. The size of the average loan
in our sample is e 16.1 million. Although there are many more SA banks than IRB
banks, the total number of loans extended is approximately the same for each group
as IRB banks have many more loans on average. Of the 182,966 loans, 49.5 percent
are granted by IRB banks and 33.6 percent are subject to the internal ratings-based
approach. There are more loans from IRB banks than loans that are subject to the
internal ratings-based approach because IRB banks had not yet shifted all their loan
portfolios to the new approach at the onset of our sample period (see Section 1.2.1).24
As noted earlier, our empirical approach will examine lending behavior in the
context of a specific crisis event, the Lehman failure in September 2008. That is,
our variable of interest will be the difference between (the log of) average lending in
the post-crisis and pre-crisis periods. Average loan balances fell by almost 4 percent
over the crisis period. The average PD reported by banks to the regulator before the
crisis was 4.1 percent and increased to 7.8 percent over the crisis.25 For IRB loans an
increase in PD translates into an increase in the risk-weighted assets (RWAs) of the
loan (i.e. the loan amount multiplied with its risk weight). The average ratio of RWAs
to loans was 43.7 percent before the crisis but increased by 6.7 percent over the crisis.
Hence, an increase in PD results in a disproportionally large increase in the ratio
24Specifically, our sample contains 90,500 loans from IRB banks. Of these loans, 61,417 are
subject to IRB, while the remaining 29,083 are still subject to the standard approach.
25According to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), PD estimates should reflect the
probability of a default event for the loan over the next 12 months. Note that we have information
on changes in PD for 64,880 of the 182,966 loans in our sample. These are more than the 61,417
IRB loans in our sample, as the regulator asks IRB institutions to report PDs also for SA loans in
cases where they estimated PDs for internal purposes.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics
Panel A: Bank-level variables
1,784 SA banks 41 IRB banks
Mean S. D. Mean S. D.
Share IRB 0 0 0.620 0.371
Total assets in e mn (pre-event) 1,080 2,580 138,000 307,000
Bank equity ratio (pre-event) 0.067 0.051 0.046 0.029
Bank ROA (pre-event) 0.006 0.012 0.006 0.010
Bank Type
... Commercial 8.7% — 58.5% —
... State 24.4% — 31.7% —
... Cooperative 66.8% — 9.8% —
Panel B: Loan-level variables
Obs. Mean S.D.
Loan size in e mn (pre-event) 182,966 16.1 38.4
D(IRB bank) 182,966 0.495 0.500
D(IRB loan) 182,966 0.336 0.472
Change in log lending 182,966 -0.038 0.456
PD (pre-event) 64,880 0.041 0.160
Change in PD 64,880 0.037 0.145
RWAs/loans (pre-event) 53,278 0.437 0.448
Change in RWAs/loans 53,278 0.067 0.461
Panel C: Firm-level variables
Firms Mean S.D.
Firm assets in e mn (pre-event) 7,778 153.4 347.9
Firm ROA (pre-event) 7,778 0.063 0.093
Firm leverage ratio (pre-event) 7,778 0.133 0.141
Firm PD (pre-event) 7,136 0.016 0.022
Total firm loans in e mn (pre-event) 107,025 22.7 67.5
Change in log of total firm loans 107,025 –0.078 0.399
Firm capital cost (pre-event) 4,977 0.0829 0.0712
Change in firm capital cost 4,977 –0.0011 0.0201
Panel D: Identifying observations
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
Firms 20,740 10,496 7,167
Observations 93,370 49,492 27,620
a) ... of which from SA bank 44,423 35,852
... of which from IRB bank 48,947 13,640
b) ... of which SA loans 9,226
... of which IRB loans 18,394
Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the groups of SA and IRB banks. An IRB bank is defined
as a bank that uses the internal ratings-based approach for some loans during our sample period,
whereas an SA bank is defined as a bank that uses the Basel II standard approach in all its lending
relationships. Panel B shows summary statistics for all loans of commercial, state, and cooperative
banks for which we are able to determine the regulatory approach used at the beginning of our
sample period. Panel C shows summary statistics for the matched sample of 7,778 firms for which
we are able to obtain firm balance sheet information. Moreover, it includes information on aggregate
loans of the 107,025 firms in our sample. Panel D shows the number of identifying observations in
our three main tests. Test 1 requires that the firm has at least one loan from an SA bank and at
least one loan from an IRB bank or at least two loans from distinct IRB banks, a condition that
holds for 20,740 distinct firms with 93,370 loans. Test 2 requires that the firm has an SA loan from
both an SA bank and an IRB bank or from two distinct IRB banks. Test 3 requires that the firm
has both an SA loan and an IRB loan from an IRB bank (see Section 1.3 for details).
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of RWAs to loans. Regulatory capital requirements are 8 percent of risk-weighted
assets; accordingly, capital charges for IRB loans increased by 0.54 percentage points
on average (6.7 percent × 8 percent). By definition, capital charges for SA loans are
not affected by changes in default probabilities.
We also match our loan data with accounting information for German firms from
the Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database to obtain more detailed firm-level informa-
tion. The Bundesbank credit register and the Amadeus accounting information were
hand-matched by company name and location. Matches were made for 7,778 firms.
Descriptive statistics for firms in the matched sample are provided in Panel C of
Table 1.1. The average firm in the matched sample is rather large, with total assets
of e 153.4 million. Further control variables are the firm’s pre-event profitability
(measured by its ROA) and leverage (defined as total debt over total assets). We
use a credit risk model developed by Fo¨rstemann (2011) that applies firm balance
sheet information in order to calculate firm-specific PDs that are similar to estimates
obtained from Moody’s RiskCalc model.26 In Section 1.4.2, we investigate how ag-
gregate firm loans change over the crisis. Total firm loans were e 22.7 million prior to
the crisis and declined by 7.8 percent on average following the event.27 Remarkably,
the decline in total firm loans is about twice the size of the decline in the average
loan. Following the crisis event banks reduce particularly those loans to which they
have a large exposure. Finally, firm capital costs are defined as aggregate interest
expenses over total loans. The overall interest rate for the average firm was about
8.3 percent in early 2008 and did not change much over the crisis, although the
standard deviation of 2 percent for the change variable suggests that there was some
variation across firms.28
26See Fo¨rstemann (2011) for details. Estimates from the credit risk model are smaller than loan-
specific PDs reported by banks on average, as the credit risk models rely exclusively on accounting
information.
27We calculate total firm loans by aggregating all the firm’s loans in our sample.
28As our capital cost measure is a rather crude approximation we exclude implausible observa-
tions, in particular those observations where the absolute change in capital costs over the crisis was
greater than 5 percentage points. Results in the empirical section do not depend on the choice off
the cutoff point and are robust to using a higher cutoff.
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1.2.3 Graphical analysis of the impact of the financial crisis
on banks’ capital charges
Before we present our methodology for identifying changes in loan supply, we provide
a graphical analysis of the impact of the financial crisis on banks’ capital charges for
IRB loans. Figure 1.1 shows that a slowdown in German GDP growth began before
2007. However, a severe contraction followed the Lehman shock in 2008Q3, resulting
in negative GDP growth rates until 2010Q1. We are interested in the impact of this
severe real shock on bank capital charges on IRB loans.
Figure 1.1: The crisis shock and the German economy.
This figure shows the year-over-year growth rate of GDP in Germany. The dashed vertical
line indicates the crisis event in September 2008. (Source: Data from the German Federal
Statistical Office.)
As documented in the descriptive statistics above, the crisis slowdown was asso-
ciated with a rise in capital charges per euro lent for IRB loans. The average ratio of
RWAs to loans rose by about 6.7 percent for the IRB loans which translates into an
increase in capital charges of 0.54 percentage points. Panel A of Figure 1.2 illustrates
how aggregate IRB loans and the associated RWAs evolved during the crisis event.29
29Aggregate RWAs are calculated as the sum of the outstanding loan amounts multiplied by
their respective risk weights. Recall that our sample includes all lending relationships that existed
in the second quarter of 2008, so relationships that originated after the crisis event are not included
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Total RWAs are relatively constant throughout the period (they rise slightly after
the crisis event until the second quarter of 2009 and decrease slightly thereafter). In
contrast, the aggregate volume of IRB loans drops sharply after the crisis event as
banks reduce their IRB lending exposure. This observation is consistent with the
increase in the risk weight for the average loan documented above. The right graph
shows the ratio of total RWAs to the total amount of loans; the increase in risk
weights is also present on aggregate. The ratio increases sharply until the second
quarter of 2009. Subsequently, it declines for about a year and then levels off.30
The figure shows that banks have to hold more capital for the same amount of
IRB loans following the crisis event. This pattern illustrates the pro-cyclical effect
of capital charges: During a recession the bank has to reduce its lending in order to
keep capital charges constant. The subsequent drop in the ratio of RWAs to loans
can most likely be explained by adjustments in banks’ loan portfolios: As banks were
forced to deleverage in order to fulfill capital requirements, they reduced particularly
those loans whose risk weights increased most over the crisis. In order to provide
evidence for this interpretation, we show the evolution of total RWAs under the
assumption that banks do not adjust the quantity of their loan portfolios. To do so,
we calculate a hypothetical series of RWAs by multiplying the observed risk weight
for each loan in each period by the loan amount in 2008Q3, and then aggregate these
amounts in each quarter. Since we cannot observe risk weights for loans that were
canceled or matured before the end of our sample period, we consider only loans that
existed throughout the entire sample period.31 The results of this exercise are shown
in Panel B of Figure 1.2. The right graph shows the ratio of the hypothetical RWAs
series to the total amount of loans in 2008Q3. Its development over time illustrates
that if banks had not adjusted their IRB loan portfolios following the crisis shock,
the RWAs/loans ratio would have continued to rise throughout the period.
Figure 1.2 offers strong evidence of a pro-cyclical effect of risk-weighted capital
charges on banks’ loan supply. To rule out the possibility that this effect is driven
by banks’ heterogeneity or changes in firms’ loan demand, we will introduce our
in the aggregate series.
30The ratio of aggregate RWAs to aggregate loans is somewhat lower than the average ratio of
RWAs to loans (see Table 1.1), as larger loans tend to have lower risk weights.
31Note that the exclusion of loans that were canceled or not rolled over by banks is likely to bias
against finding an increase in the RWAs/loans ratio.
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identification methodology in Section 1.3.
Panel A
Panel B
Figure 1.2: Total risk-weighted loans and total loans.
Panel A shows how total risk-weighted loans and total loans evolve over time. The series
include only those lending relationships that existed prior to the crisis event; i.e., we do
not include lending relationships that were originated after the crisis shock. The left graph
shows the development of total loans and total risk-weighted assets for these loans. The
right graph depicts the ratio of total risk-weighted assets to total loans. Panel B shows
how total risk-weighted assets and total loans would have evolved over time for a constant
portfolio of loans. We include all loans that exist throughout the entire sample period and
calculate the risk weight for each loan at each point in time. We then calculate hypothetical
risk-weighted loans in a given period by multiplying the loan amount of 2008Q3 with
the risk weight for the respective period. In a final step we aggregate the calculated
risk weighted loans in each period and divide it by the (constant) amount of total loans
in 2008Q3 to obtain the ratio of total risk-weighted loans to total loans for a constant
portfolio of loans. The left graph shows the aggregate series. The right graph shows the
ratio between the two.
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1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Identifying changes in loan supply
Our identification strategy exploits the gradual introduction of IRB as described
in Section 1.2.1. Loans in our sample fall into one of the following three groups
(see Figure 1.3). First, all loans provided by SA banks remain under the standard
approach. Thus, the required capital charges of these loans do not depend on their
credit risk.32 Second, loans by IRB banks can be subject to IRB if the loan is part
of a portfolio that had been moved to the new approach at the onset of our sample
period. Third, loans by IRB banks that had not yet been moved to IRB remain
under the standard approach. The distinction between these three classes of loans
provides the foundation of our identification strategy.
We start by examining changes in lending by SA and IRB banks in the context of
the crisis event. Following Khwaja and Mian (2008), we consider how lending by IRB
banks changed in comparison with lending by SA banks to the same firm (Test 1).
The within-firm comparison is important because firm-specific loan demand is likely
to be affected by the event. We define a variable Share IRB that is equal to the
percentage share of all loans of the bank that are subject to the IRB approach (i.e.,
it takes the value zero for SA banks). Alternatively, we use a dummy variable to
indicate whether or not an institution has opted for IRB. Thus, Test 1 is based on
firms that have at least two loans—one loan from an SA bank and one loan from an
IRB bank, or two loans from distinct IRB banks.33 Formally, we estimate:
∆log(loans)ij = αi + β × Share IRBj +X ′ijγ + ij (1.1)
The dependent variable is the change over the crisis event in the logarithm of loans
from bank j to firm i. In order to avoid problems of serial correlation we collapse
our quarterly data into single pre- and post-event time periods by taking time-
series averages of loans (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).34 Thus, there is
32As stated in Section 1.2, there are no SA loans with an external rating in our sample.
33Our sample contains 20,740 firms that have at least one loan from an SA bank and one loan
from an IRB bank or two loans from distinct IRB banks. Overall, these firms have 93,370 loans,
which separate into 44,423 SA loans and 48,947 IRB loans (Table 1.1, Panel D).
34We could also estimate Equation (1.1) without time-collapsing the data if we replace the firm
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Figure 1.3: Institutional setup and identification.
This figure illustrates how we use multiple bank relationships of the same firm for identification in the empirical analysis. Suppose a firm has
three loans: One IRB loan from an IRB bank, one SA loan from an IRB bank, and one SA loan from an SA bank. In Test 1 we include all loans
to firms that have at least one loan from an SA bank and one loan from an IRB bank or at least two loans from distinct IRB banks; hence all
the firm’s loans would be included. Test 2 includes only SA loans and investigates whether there is a difference between SA loans from SA banks
and SA loans from IRB banks. Hence, SA loan 2 and SA loan 3 would be included in this specification. Finally, in Test 3 we use only loans from
IRB banks and test whether these banks—for the same firm—reduce their IRB loans more than their SA loans. In the example, this test would
use IRB loan 1 and SA loan 2 for identification of the coefficients.
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one observation per firm-bank relationship. The equation includes firm fixed effects
αi. In particular this means that identification of our coefficient of interest—β, the
coefficient on the share of IRB loans within a bank—comes only from variation within
the same firm. Our test shows whether the same firm, borrowing from two different
banks, experiences a larger decline in lending from banks that use IRB for a larger
share of their loans. Control variables Xij include pre-event size, capitalization and
profitability of the bank, a set of dummy variables indicating the bank’s type, and
the share of bank j’s loans in firm i’s two-digit SIC industry sector. To account for
potential correlation among changes in loans from the same bank we cluster standard
errors at the bank level in all our regressions.
Interpreting β from Equation (1.1) as the impact of credit risk-specific capital
charges on lending behavior might be problematic if banks that provide more IRB
loans differ systematically from banks that provide more (or only) SA loans. We
have shown already that IRB institutions tend to be systematically larger, have
lower capital ratios, and are more likely to be privately owned (Table 1.1, Panel A).
Thus, our main concern is that IRB banks were also internationally more active and
therefore more affected by the global crisis. Clearly, if IRB institutions generally
experienced a larger crisis shock than SA institutions, this could explain why banks
with larger shares of IRB loans reduced their lending significantly more than banks
with lower shares.35 However, as we explained before IRB banks did not introduce
the IRB approach for all loans at the same time. Consequently, not all their loan
portfolios were subject to potentially higher capital charges following the recession.
To address concerns regarding the banks’ heterogeneity, we exploit this feature by
introducing two additional tests.
First, we test whether IRB banks’ SA loans and SA institutions’ loans are affected
differently by the crisis event. Neither the SA institutions’ capital charges nor those
for IRB banks’ SA loans are affected by an increase in firms’ credit risk. Thus, by
comparing the lending reaction of SA banks’ SA loans with IRB banks’ SA loans, we
can test whether the IRB effect estimated in Test 1 is driven by bank heterogeneity.
fixed effects with firms times quarter fixed effects. Results from this specification are qualitatively
very similar.
35Equation (1.1) includes bank size, capital ratio, and ownership as control variables and hence
also directly controls for the influence of these variables on banks’ lending behavior.
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For Test 2 we use a subsample restricted to firms that obtain at least two SA loans
from separate institutions that differ in the share of IRB loans they hold in their
aggregate loan portfolio (see Figure 1.3 for an illustration).36 We then estimate
Equation (1.1) for this subsample of loans.37 If we find β to be close to zero in Test 2,
we conclude that the treatment group and the control group are not systematically
different from each other and that the effect identified in Test 1 is indeed due to the
choice of the regulatory approach rather than the characteristics of the banks.
Second, we can test for the IRB effect within the group of IRB banks only and
thereby systematically control for bank heterogeneity. For Test 3 (see also Figure 1.3)
we restrict the sample to firms that borrow from more than one IRB bank. In
particular, we require that the firm has at least one IRB loan and at least one SA
loan from different IRB institutions.38 Formally, we estimate:
∆log(loans)ij = αi + αj + δ ×D(IRB loan)ij +X ′ijγ + ij (1.2)
where D(IRB loan) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the loan is subject
to the IRB approach. In contrast to Tests 1 and 2 we include bank fixed effects αj
in addition to firm fixed effects αi to systematically control for bank heterogeneity.
This means that identification in Equation (1.2) is based on within-bank variation
(compare with Jime´nez et al. 2013a). The test shows whether the same firm—
borrowing from two different IRB banks—experiences a larger decline in lending for
loans that use the IRB as compared with the standard approach
1.3.2 Selection of IRB portfolios
Test 3 provides us with an unbiased estimate of δ as long as the choice of the loan
portfolios whose capital charges are determined by IRB within IRB banks at the
36In our sample 10,496 firms have at least one SA loan from an SA bank and at least one SA
loan from an IRB bank or two SA loans from distinct IRB banks. These firms have a total of 49,492
SA loans, of which 35,852 are from SA banks and 13,640 are from IRB banks (Table 1.1, Panel D).
37Again, we use the dummy variable D(IRB bank) instead of Share IRB in an alternative
specification. Essentially, this means that we examine the relative change in lending to firms that
have at least one SA loan from an SA bank and another SA loan from an IRB bank.
38In our sample 7,159 firms have at least one IRB and one SA loan from two different IRB
institutions. These firms have a total of 27,620 loans: 9,226 SA loans and 18,394 IRB loans
(Table 1.1, Panel D).
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outset of our sample period is not endogenous to a bank’s decision to adjust these
loans in a different way from other loans as a response to a crisis. We rule out
concerns that this results in an absolute upward bias of δ, for two reasons. First, if
the regulator allows a bank to decide on the order in which loan portfolios are shifted
toward IRB, the bank would have an incentive to select the least risky portfolios first
(the least risky portfolios would yield the lowest average PDs, and for these portfolios
the reduction in capital charges due to the shift to IRB would be the greatest). We
observe, however, that banks tend to reduce the outstanding amount of the least risky
portfolios relatively less over a crisis. Thus, this selection concern would rather cause
a bias against finding an IRB effect in Test 3. Second, the regulator requires banks
to start with loan portfolios for which they have sufficient data in order to calibrate
meaningful PD models (see Section 1.2.1). In doing so, the regulator respects the
structure of banks’ internal loan portfolios (which are generally based on industry
classifications).39 Consequently, at IRB banks, the classification of a given loan as
IRB or SA at the beginning of our sample period depends on whether or not the loan
is in a business segment where the bank is relatively active. Thus, our results would
be biased if banks reduced loan portfolios in segments where they are more active
relatively more over the crisis. In the latter empirical analysis we will show that this
is not the case; if anything, in business segments where they are more active, banks
reduce portfolios relatively less over the crisis. To sum up, any bias resulting from
the selection of loan portfolios within IRB banks would be against finding an IRB
effect in Test 3.
We can substantiate our argument by empirically testing for the determinants of
the IRB/SA loan classification within IRB banks at the onset of our sample period.
In Table 1.2, we show estimates of a probit model to examine the role of loan-specific
as well as portfolio-specific determinants of the observed IRB/SA classification. The
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is subject to IRB.
To measure a bank’s activity in a given business segment, we sum the bank’s loans
to firms within the respective two-digit SIC industry sector and divide them by all
loans in our sample to firms within this industry sector (Loan share). Column 1
shows that Loan share is an important determinant for the IRB/SA classification
39See Bundesbank (2005) for details.
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Table 1.2: Classification of IRB/SA loans in 2008Q1
Dependent variable: D(IRB loan)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Loan share 1.899*** 3.645**
(0.474) (1.790)
Portfolio PD –1.194 –6.713
(2.671) (6.465)
Log loans (pre-event) 0.072 0.048
(0.053) (0.038)
Log firm assets (pre-event) 0.081 0.067
(0.064) (0.060)
Firm ROA (pre-event) 0.631 0.607
(0.409) (0.403)
Firm Leverage (pre-event) –0.080 –0.080
(0.109) (0.089)
Firm PD (pre-event) 0.485 0.758
(1.929) (1.908)
Bank dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 87,725 87,725 87,725 10,405 10,405
Pseudo R-squared 0.343 0.340 0.343 0.573 0.575
The table shows results for simple probit regressions. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the
loan from bank j to firm i is subject to IRB and equal to zero if the loan is subject to the standard
approach. The regressions include only loans from IRB banks. Robust standard errors adjusted for
clustering at the bank level are reported in parentheses. Note: * indicates statistical significance
at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
within an IRB bank at the outset of our sample. In line with the argument from
above, loan portfolios in segments where the bank is more active were shifted first
toward IRB within IRB institutions. In order to measure the risk of a given loan
portfolio, we calculate the average firm-specific PD in each two-digit SIC industry
sector (Portfolio PD). While the average risk of a loan portfolio enters the probit
model negatively, the coefficient is not significant. In columns 3 and 4 we test for loan-
specific determinants of the IRB/SA classification. Neither the loan size nor the firm
balance sheet variables, such as firm size, ROA, leverage, or PD, significantly affect
the observed IRB/SA selection within IRB banks. When we include all explanatory
variables at the same time (column 5), Loan share is the only significant determinant
for the classification of loan portfolios. Therefore we will include this variable in our
main empirical tests, in order to observe whether the selection may account for a
bias.
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1.4 Empirical results
1.4.1 Loan-specific risk weights and lending
In this section we present results for Tests 1 to 3 described above. As noted, the
dependent variable for these tests is the change in the log of lending over the crisis
period. Specifically, we collapse all available quarterly data for a given loan into pre-
and post-crisis event periods and look at the difference. All regressions are estimated
with firm fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the firm’s demand
for credit. Results for the three tests are shown in Table 1.3.
We start by estimating Equation (1.1) to see whether, over the crisis, a given
firm borrowing from different banks experienced a larger reduction in loans from
banks with a high fraction of IRB loans in their portfolios (Test 1).40 Column 1 of
Table 1.3 indicates that the larger the share of IRB loans within a bank, the more
the bank reduces its lending relative to a bank with a lower share of IRB loans to
the same firm. Since firm-specific credit demand shocks get absorbed by the firm
fixed effects, the coefficient reflects differences in banks’ credit supply. It is likely that
banks were affected differently by the financial crisis, and therefore we add bank-level
control variables in the estimates shown in column 2. The coefficient for Share IRB
is smaller but still significant. We can directly address potential selection concerns
resulting from the order in which loan portfolios were shifted toward IRB by including
the relative size of a loan portfolio (Loan share) as a control variable. The coefficient
on Loan share is positive but not significant. If anything, in response to the crisis
event banks tend to adjust loans and hence loan portfolios less drastically in business
segments where they are relatively active. Thus, the classification of loans to IRB
portfolios would bias our estimates against finding a significant effect of the choice
of the regulatory approach on changes in lending following the crisis.
In column 3 we replace the variable Share IRB with D(IRB bank), a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if a bank decided to become an IRB institution and
zero otherwise. Thus, we consider the relative change in lending for a firm that has at
least one lending relationship with an SA institution and one with an IRB institution.
40Technically, a loan is included as long as the firm is borrowing from two or more institutions
where the share of IRB loans differs (see Section 1.3).
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Table 1.3: Lending and regulatory approach
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
∆log(loans) ∆log(loans) ∆log(loans) ∆log(loans) ∆log(loans) ∆log(loans) ∆log(loans) ∆log(loans) ∆log(loans) Exit Exit
Share IRB –0.081*** –0.053** –0.054** –0.043
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.038)
D(IRB bank) –0.032** –0.030
(0.016) (0.023)
D(IRB loan) –0.039*** –0.040** –0.021* 0.044 0.027
(0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.035) (0.028)
Loan share 0.133 0.111 0.390** 0.374* 0.145 0.078 0.163 –0.005
(0.091) (0.089) (0.193) (0.197) (0.143) (0.089) (0.167) (0.348)
Log bank assets (pre-event) –0.011** –0.011** –0.007 –0.007 –0.018 –0.042***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.013)
Bank equity ratio (pre-event) –0.273 –0.171 –0.179 –0.157 0.540 –0.018
(0.376) (0.397) (0.433) (0.435) (1.264) (1.195)
Bank ROA (pre-event) –0.003 –0.003 0.016 0.016 –0.107** 0.047
(0.017) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.052) (0.080)
D(state bank) 0.007 0.010 0.034* 0.037* –0.018 –0.069*
(0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.045) (0.038)
D(cooperative bank) 0.009 0.014 0.030 0.033* –0.038 –0.097**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.039)
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES
Observations 93,370 93,370 93,370 49,492 49,492 49,492 27,620 27,620 27,620 27,620 27,620
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.44 0.44
The table shows the relationship between the decline in loan size during the recent financial crisis and the regulatory approach used by the bank. We take the
crisis shock in late 2008 as an event and collapse all quarterly data for a given loan into a single pre- and post-crisis period. Data are restricted to (a) loans
that are larger than e 1.5 million (b) loans from commercial, state, or cooperative banks that are subject to the Basel II capital regulation (c) loans that have
an observation in both the pre- and the post-crisis period. The dependent variable in columns 1 to 9 is the difference in log(loans) between the pre- and the
post-crisis period. The dependent variable in columns 10 and 11 is a dummy that is equal to 1 if a loan that existed in the second quarter of 2008 ceased to
exist following the crisis shock. In columns 1 to 3 we use observations for firms that have at least one loan from an SA bank and one loan from an IRB bank
or loans from at least two distinct IRB banks and test whether banks with larger shares of IRB loans reduce lending to the same firm more over the crisis
(Test 1). In columns 4 to 6 the sample is restricted to SA loans and includes only firms that have at least one SA loan from an SA bank and at least one
SA loan from an IRB bank or SA loans from at least two distinct IRB banks (Test 2). Finally, columns 7 to 11 include only loans from IRB banks and only
firms that have at least one SA loan and at least one IRB loan from an IRB bank (Test 3). All regressions include firm fixed effects in order to control for
unobserved heterogeneity in firms’ demand for credit. Columns 9 and 11 additionally include bank fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity across
banks. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank level are reported in parentheses. Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level,
** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table 1.4: Lending and regulatory approach—OLS
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
∆log(loans) ∆log(loans) ∆log(loans) ∆log(loans) ∆log(loans) ∆log(loans) ∆log(loans) ∆log(loans) ∆log(loans) Exit Exit
Share IRB –0.058*** –0.030* –0.030 –0.034
(0.020) (0.017) (0.034) (0.026)
D(IRB bank) –0.025* –0.024
(0.014) (0.015)
D(IRB loan) –0.050*** –0.025** –0.025* 0.069* 0.028
(0.016) (0.010) (0.013) (0.040) (0.040)
Loan share 0.198 –0.224 –0.231 0.354 0.224 0.205 0.211 –0.295 –0.312 0.569** 0.432
(0.196) (0.200) (0.198) (0.225) (0.216) (0.201) (0.253) (0.229) (0.236) (0.218) (0.296)
Log bank assets (pre-event) –0.010** –0.004 –0.003 –0.010*** –0.005** –0.005** –0.016 0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013)
Bank equity ratio (pre-event) –0.296 –0.341 –0.330 –0.246 –0.371 –0.350 0.471 0.025 0.796
(0.301) (0.239) (0.244) (0.355) (0.228) (0.220) (0.812) (0.541) (1.283)
Bank ROA (pre-event) –0.000 0.007 0.007 0.012 0.005 0.005 –0.104** –0.007 –0.016
(0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.038) (0.026) (0.114)
D(state bank) 0.014 0.007 0.009 0.030* 0.026** 0.028** –0.024 –0.008 –0.110**
(0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.037) (0.023) (0.043)
D(cooperative bank) 0.011 0.018 0.022 0.023 0.034*** 0.037*** –0.035 –0.003 –0.134**
(0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.017) (0.058)
Constant 0.213** 0.074 0.053 0.193*** 0.092* 0.080 0.394 –0.048 0.694*
(0.104) (0.078) (0.075) (0.073) (0.056) (0.058) (0.317) (0.190) (0.403)
Bank FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES
Observations 93,370 182,966 182,966 49,492 121,549 121,549 27,620 90,500 90,500 90,500 90,500
R-squared 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.038 0.059
The table shows the same tests as in Table 1.3, using OLS instead of the FE estimation. As before, we collapse our sample into single pre- and post-intervention
time periods and use the change in log(loans) for a bank-firm relationship as the dependent variable. Columns 1, 4 and 7 restrict the sample to firms with
multiple lending relationships as in Table 1.3, so that we are able to compare the coefficients from the FE estimation with the coefficient from the OLS
regression. As OLS does not rely on identification within the same firm, we include also firms with only one lending relationships (or with only IRB loans or
only SA loans) in columns 2 and 3, 5 and 6 and 8 to 11. In all specifications we control for bank size, capitalization, profitability and type as well as the bank’s
market share within the firm’s two-digit SIC sector. Columns 9 and 11 additionally include bank fixed effects. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering
at the bank level are reported in parentheses. Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Again, we find a significant relative reduction in lending from IRB compared with SA
institutions. The IRB effect is also economically meaningful: If we apply the estimate
from column 3, IRB banks reduce their lending by 3.1 percent more than banks that
have only SA loans.41 These findings indicate that tailoring capital requirements to
the risk of each individual asset based on an internal rating system increases the
pro-cyclicality of lending.
Next, we turn to Test 2, where our sample includes SA loans made by both SA
and IRB institutions. There are 10,496 firms that obtain SA loans from at least two
different banks where the share of IRB loans differs.42 Test 2 will show us whether
IRB banks reduce their lending uniformly or differentiate between IRB and SA loans.
If the regulatory approach chosen for a specific loan was the driving force behind
our findings for Test 1, the estimate of β in Equation (1.1) for this sample of SA
loans should be zero. If banks that introduced IRB were more severely hit by the
financial crisis and this outcome drove our findings for Test 1, we should find a
negative significant coefficient.
Results for Test 2 are shown in Table 1.3, columns 4 to 6. The share of IRB
loans is significant when we do not control for bank characteristics (column 4). This
implies that IRB institutions reduced their lending over the crisis more than SA
institutions. However, this difference is driven by observable bank characteristics
that are correlated with the choice of becoming an SA or an IRB institution. Once
we control for these characteristics, the Share IRB coefficient is not significantly
different from zero (column 5). This finding is also robust to using a dummy variable
indicating an IRB institution instead of the variable Share IRB (column 6). As
before, firm fixed effects absorb any firm-specific credit demand shocks and ensure
that we are comparing changes in lending to a given firm. The comparison of Tests 1
and 2 supports our claim that it is indeed the regulatory approach that is responsible
for the stronger reduction of loans from IRB banks.
To remove any remaining concern that our findings are driven by bank hetero-
geneity, we identify the effect of risk-specific capital charges on lending within IRB
banks. Identification within IRB banks is possible, as these institutions had not yet
41The effect is equal to exp(β)− 1 (Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980).
42These are all firms with at least two SA loans that are not only from SA institutions.
34
switched all their loan portfolios to IRB before the crisis. Thus, the IRB banks have
loans under IRB as well as loans under SA. Further, there are firms that have an
IRB loan from one bank and an SA loan from another IRB bank. For Test 3, we
restrict the sample to loans from IRB banks and investigate whether these banks
reduced their IRB loans more than their SA loans during our sample period. Iden-
tification in the regression with firm fixed effects requires that the firm has at least
one SA loan from an IRB bank and at least one IRB loan from an IRB bank. Our
sample contains 7,159 firms with 27,620 loans that fulfill this condition (Table 1.1,
Panel D). Results for Test 3 are reported in columns 7 to 9 of Table 1.3 and show
a significantly negative coefficient for the IRB loan dummy. The effect is robust
to the inclusion of bank-level control variables in column 8 and also economically
significant: Within the same firm, loans for which IRB is used are reduced by about
3.9 percent more than loans for which the SA approach is used. Since Test 3 is on the
loan level, we can systematically account for bank heterogeneity by including bank
fixed effects (column 9). We still find a significant effect of the regulatory approach
on changes in lending to the same firm.43 This provides evidence that the regulatory
approach used for a certain loan has a strong and economically meaningful influence
on the extent to which the loan was “crunched” during the recent crisis. Increases in
risk weights during economic downturns force capital-constrained banks that use the
internal ratings-based approach to deleverage in order to fulfill their capital require-
ments (recall Figure 1.2). Results for Test 3 indicate that they do so by reducing the
very assets that caused the increase in capital requirements: Loans that are subject
to IRB. Loans that are subject to the standard approach, on the other hand, are
relatively less affected.
Our findings so far focus on changes in the loan volume of existing lending rela-
tionships, which we call the intensive margin. We can also test whether IRB banks
are more likely to end an existing relationship entirely if the loan is subject to IRB as
compared with SA, the extensive margin. In columns 10 and 11 of Table 1.3 the de-
pendent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 for loans that existed in the second
43The estimation strategy in column 9 is similar to the one developed by Jime´nez et al. (2013a):
While they use quarterly data and include time × firm and time × bank fixed effects, we collapse
our data on the time dimension and therefore include firm and bank fixed effects (see Khwaja and
Mian 2008).
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quarter of 2008 but that ceased to exist at some point following the crisis shock. The
coefficient for D(IRB loan) is positive, but insignificant, indicating that the effect
of the regulatory approach is less pronounced on the extensive as compared with
the intensive margin of lending. This is consistent with a finding by Jime´nez et al.
(2013b), who argue that the somewhat moderated effect on the extensive margin
is due to a time lag, since lending relationships end only when all loans—including
those with a longer maturity—are fully repaid.
In Table 1.4 we replicate regressions from Table 1.3 using an ordinary least squares
(OLS) specification without firm fixed effects. The main advantage of reporting OLS
results is that it allows us to include firms that have only one bank relationship.
We begin with OLS estimates that use only those firms that were included in the
regressions in Table 1.3 to make our findings comparable (columns 1, 4, and 7). The
coefficients remain relatively stable and are comparable to the coefficients from the
fixed effects regressions in Table 1.3. Thus, firm loan demand does not appear to
differ for firms borrowing from IRB or SA banks (or for IRB or SA loans within IRB
banks). We next include single-relationship firms and firms that borrow only from
SA institutions in columns 2, 5, and 8 of the table. For Test 1, the coefficient for the
IRB variable (Share IRB) remains significant but increases from –0.058 to –0.030.
The effect of the regulatory approach seems to be less pronounced for single-bank
firms. Single-relationship firms are less able to replace IRB loans if lending terms
deteriorate.44 Results for Test 3 point in the same direction: The coefficient for the
IRB loan dummy increases from –0.050 in column 7 to –0.025 in column 8. For
Test 2, the OLS specification does not find a significant difference between banks
using the standard approach and banks using the IRB approach and hence confirms
the finding from the fixed effects estimation. Finally, if we use Exit instead of the
change in lending as a dependent variable, the coefficient for the IRB loan dummy
is weakly significant in column 10, but becomes insignificant when bank fixed effects
are added in column 11. Overall, the impression from Table 1.3 that the effect of the
regulatory approach is moderated on the extensive margin is confirmed in Table 1.4.
44In Section 1.4.2 we will investigate whether firms’ loan costs actually increased over the crisis.
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1.4.2 Capital regulation and firms’ overall access to funds
In the previous section we showed that—compared to SA loans—IRB loans were
reduced relatively more over the crisis and that this effect was independent of any
firm or bank characteristics. It is a priori unclear how this result would affect firms’
overall access to funds. On the one hand, the OLS results with all firms showed
that the reduction in the quantity of IRB loans is smaller for firms with a single
banking relationship. That is, firms with multiple relationships may have some
ability to compensate with other lending relationships (i.e., increase lending with SA
loans when banks adjust their IRB loans). On the other hand, if larger loans are
reduced relatively more, the magnitude of the documented pro-cyclical effect could
be considerably larger at the aggregate firm level as compared with the individual
loan level. In this section we turn our attention directly to the overall access to
funds by firms. Did firms relying on IRB loans experience a stronger reduction
in loan supply? The question is central for evaluating the real economic effects of
capital charges based on credit-specific risks. In this section we examine how the
regulatory approach used for loans affects the aggregate supply of loans to a firm
and the average borrowing costs for the firm.
Importantly, firms that borrow (mostly) from IRB or SA banks might also differ
in their loan demand over the crisis (e.g., owing to size differences). As we examine
the change in firms’ total outstanding loans during the crisis period, we have only
one observation per firm and hence cannot include firm fixed effects. The variation
in the IRB/SA loan classification within IRB banks during this period allows us to
directly address this issue. Specifically, we restrict the sample to firms that have
both SA loans and IRB loans from IRB banks and define a variable Share (IRB-
IRB loans) as the share of a firm’s loans from IRB banks that are subject to the
internal ratings-based approach. Firms in this subsample should be relatively similar,
and this additional variable allows us to investigate whether—among these firms—
those with a larger share of IRB loans experience a greater reduction in aggregate
loans over the crisis.45
45Aggregate loans also include loans from SA banks that are not taken into account for the
definition of the variable Share (IRB-IRB loans). However, loans from IRB banks account for
85.4 percent of total loans for the average firm in the restricted sample. The remainder of 14.6 per-
cent loans from SA banks simply adds noise and thus prevents us from finding a significant impact
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Using the matched firm sample for which we have balance sheet information, we
are able to estimate the following firm-level equation:
∆log(total firm loans)i = β × Share (IRB-IRB loans)i +X ′iγ + i (1.3)
The dependent variable is the difference in the logarithm of a firm’s total loans over
the crisis. As in the loan-level regressions we collapse our data into single pre-event
and post-event time periods by taking time averages of a firm’s total loans. The
coefficient of interest is β, which shows how Share (IRB-IRB loans) , the share of a
firm’s loans from IRB banks that are subject to the internal ratings-based approach,
affects the change in the firm’s total loans over the crisis. Firm-level control variables
include the logarithm of the firm’s pre-shock total assets, the firm’s pre-shock ROA,
and the firm’s pre-shock leverage defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets.
Additionally, we control for differences across a firm’s lenders by including weighted
averages of the lending banks’ characteristics (i.e., pre-shock logarithm of assets,
equity ratio, and ROA).46 Finally, standard errors in the firm-level regressions are
clustered by firms’ main lender.
Total loans for the average firm declined by 7.8 percent over the crisis event
(Table 1.1, Panel C). The reduction on the firm level is larger than the reduction
for the average loan (–3.8 percent; Table 1.1, Panel B), suggesting that larger loans
are reduced relatively more over the crisis.47 We proceed by estimating Share (IRB
loans), the effect of the firm-level share of IRB loans on aggregate loans outstanding
for all 107,025 sample firms (column 1 of Table 5.8).48 Firms receiving larger shares
of IRB loans prior to the crisis experienced larger reductions in total borrowing
following the recession. The coefficient remains highly significant and even increases
in magnitude if we include variables that control for bank-level characteristics of
a firm’s lenders (column 2). Further, the effect is robust to the inclusion of firm-
level control variables in the matched sample of 7,778 firms (columns 3 and 4).
of the share of a firm’s loans from IRB banks that are subject to IRB on changes in total firm loans.
46We use the amount that the firm borrows from a certain bank divided by the total loans of
the firm prior to the crisis as a weight to calculate firm-level bank characteristics.
47See Section 1.5.2 for a detailed examination of this issue.
48This sample includes single-relationship firms as well as firms that have only SA loans or only
IRB loans. For these firms, Share (IRB loans) is equal to zero or 1, respectively.
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Importantly, the impact of the regulatory classification of a firm’s loans on changes
in the firm’s aggregate loans is economically meaningful. For example, the coefficient
in column 2 implies that a firm borrowing only IRB loans experienced a reduction
in total loans that is on average 5.4 percent larger than the reduction for a firm that
borrowed only SA loans. This magnitude increases to 10.7 percent in the matched
sample where we control for firm level characteristics (column 4). Note that this
magnitude is larger than the previously identified effect on the loan level (between
2.1 and 4.9 percent for Test 3). The reason for this is that large IRB loans are
reduced the most following the crisis event (see Section 1.5.2 for details). A stronger
reduction of larger IRB loans relative to SA loans results in a disproportionally large
reduction of a firm’s total loans if these loans are mostly classified as IRB.
To address potential differences in loan demand by firms that borrow from SA and
IRB institutions, we restrict the sample to firms that have both SA and IRB loans
from IRB banks.49 Reducing the sample in this way allows us to mitigate concerns
regarding firm demand, since the classification of each loan depends on the bank-
specific implementation plan as outlined in Section 1.2. Estimating Equation (1.3),
we identify a significant impact of the share of a firm’s loans from IRB banks that
are subject to IRB on changes in firms’ aggregate lending (Table 5.8, column 5).
Again, the result is robust to the inclusion of weighted bank-level characteristics as
well as firm-level characteristics in a matched sample (columns 6 to 8). In order to
assess the economic magnitude of the coefficient we compare the firms at the 25th
and the 75th percentile of the distribution for Share (IRB-IRB loans) .50 Based on
the coefficient in column 6, the firm that has relatively more IRB loans experiences
a reduction in total loans that is 4.5 percent larger than the reduction for the firm
that has relatively more SA loans. It is worth noting that this result provides strong
evidence for a causal effect of the regulatory classification of loans within IRB banks
on aggregate firm loans following the crisis. While we consider only firms that borrow
from different IRB banks in this test, we can identify a significant difference in
aggregate firm borrowing that depends on how many of the firm’s loans had already
49Note that these are precisely the 7,159 firms that we use for identification in Test 3 (Sec-
tion 1.4.1).
50The firm at the 25th percentile has 42.6 percent IRB loans while the firm at the 75th percentile
has 81.7 percent IRB loans. The variable takes values between but excluding zero and one as we
require that firms in this test have both SA loans and IRB loans from IRB banks.
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Table 1.5: Firm-level outcomes
Dependent variable: ∆ log(total firm loans) Dependent variable: ∆ capital cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Share (IRB loans) –0.051*** –0.056*** –0.086*** –0.113*** 0.0020*** 0.0017
(0.015) (0.018) (0.024) (0.029) (0.0008) (0.0011)
Share (IRB-IRB loans) –0.099* –0.117** –0.097** –0.078* 0.0011 0.0015
(0.057) (0.050) (0.043) (0.040) (0.0062) (0.0061)
Log bank assets (pre-event) 0.006*** 0.003* 0.003** –0.003 –0.0001 –0.0001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Bank equity ratio (pre-event) 0.641* –0.334 –1.509* –0.537 –0.0380 0.2400
(0.335) (0.510) (0.913) (2.001) (0.0452) (0.2697)
Bank ROA (pre-event) –0.005 –0.019 –0.054 0.022 –0.0017 –0.0067
(0.016) (0.024) (0.074) (0.088) (0.0019) (0.0114)
Log firm assets (pre-event) –0.008 –0.008 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.0006* 0.0003 –0.0027 –0.0025
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Firm ROA (pre-event) –0.062 –0.070 –0.134 –0.128 –0.0013 –0.0015 0.0312* 0.0319*
(0.059) (0.059) (0.138) (0.138) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0183) (0.0180)
Firm leverage ratio (pre-event) –0.102*** –0.109*** –0.230** –0.188 –0.0075*** –0.0062*** –0.0065 –0.0096
(0.035) (0.035) (0.115) (0.114) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0115) (0.0111)
Constant –0.060*** –0.214*** 0.020 –0.021 –0.118*** –0.125*** –0.545*** –0.475*** –0.0072* 0.0006 0.0366* 0.0308
(0.004) (0.041) (0.071) (0.083) (0.031) (0.044) (0.101) (0.100) (0.0040) (0.0034) (0.0216) (0.0227)
Observations 107,025 107,025 7,778 7,778 7,159 7,159 1,575 1,575 4,977 4,977 1,273 1,273
R-squared 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.012 0.003 0.006 0.026 0.028 0.006 0.010 0.0044 0.0055
This table reports firm-level results for the full sample of 107,025 firms and for a matched sample that includes up to 7,778 firms. As before we collapse our
data into single pre- and post-crisis time periods. The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of a firm’s total amount of loans in columns 1 to
8 and the change in a firm’s capital cost (defined as interest paid over total loans) in columns 9 to 12. The variable Share (IRB Loans) gives the share of a
firm’s loans that are subject to IRB. The variable Share (IRB-IRB loans) gives the share of a firm’s loans received from IRB banks that are subject to IRB.
For tests that include this variable the sample is restricted to firms that have at least one IRB loan and at least one SA loan from an IRB bank: I.e., firms for
which the variable Share (IRB-IRB loans) takes values unequal to 0 or 1. We gradually include firm-level and weighted bank-level control variables. Robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the main bank level are reported in parentheses. Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the
5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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been transferred into IRB portfolios before the crisis event. This suggest that firms
are unable to compensate for the reduction in IRB lending by switching to SA loans.
Finally, we investigate whether the regulatory classification of loans had an im-
pact only on lending quantities or also on the price of lending. Since the documented
increase in risk-weighted assets induced an increase of the capital charges for a given
euro lent out, banks might also react by increasing the interest rate charged on IRB
loans. While we cannot do this analysis on the loan level (since the German credit
register does not report interest rates), we can link changes in the ratio of aggregate
interest expense to loans from firms’ balance sheets and income statements to their
share of IRB loans before the crisis. Regression results are presented in columns 9
to 12 of Table 5.8. Column 9 shows that firms obtaining a larger share of IRB loans
experience a greater increase in capital cost over the crisis. This effect, however,
vanishes once we include (weighted) bank-level controls in column 10. In columns 11
and 12 we reduce the sample to firms that have both SA and IRB loans from IRB
banks in order to account for potential differences in firm demand (see above). The
coefficient for the IRB variable in the reduced sample, Share (IRB-IRB loans), is
insignificant in both regressions. Overall, we find only weak evidence that firms
that obtain more IRB loans experience greater increases in capital costs over the
crisis. Our results suggest that banks mostly reacted to the crisis event by adjusting
the amounts of IRB loans outstanding in order to deleverage and fulfill regulatory
requirements.
1.5 Further evidence: The impact of bank, loan,
and firm characteristics
In Section 1.4.1 we showed that after the crisis shock banks reduced lending on IRB
loans more than on SA loans. We argued that the underlying cause of this finding
is that IRB loans require banks to increase their regulatory capital if PDs increase
during a recession, whereas changes in the PD of SA loans have no effect on banks’
regulatory capital requirements. Thus, we expect a stronger reaction to the crisis
event (a) by banks with a low capital ratio before the recession; (b) for large IRB
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loans that have a substantial impact on capital charges when their PD deteriorates;
and (c) for loans whose PD increases relatively more than others. In this section we
present evidence for these three relationships.
1.5.1 The lending reaction of IRB banks: The role of bank
equity
Hellwig (2010) argues that banks reduced buffers over minimum capital requirements
to a bare minimum in an attempt to “economize on equity” prior to the crisis and
that there was only limited scope for raising additional equity during the crisis. Thus,
we would expect that banks that have lower capital ratios and are hence closer to the
regulatory minimum will react more when capital requirements increase because of
the crisis. We test this by creating a dummy variable that separates the IRB banks
into those with a lower than median and those with a higher than median pre-shock
equity ratio and estimate the following equation:
∆log(loans)ij = β1 × Share IRBj + β2 ×D(low equity)j (1.4)
+ β3 × Share IRBj ×D(low equity)j +X ′jγ + ij
In an alternative specification we include an interaction between banks’ initial equity
ratio and the variable Share IRB instead of the interaction with the dummy variable.
In principle, it would be possible to include firm fixed effects in this equation to
control for firm-specific credit demand shocks as before. However, such a specification
requires that each firm has at least four banking relationships in order to identify the
coefficients.51 As the results from OLS and fixed effects regressions in Section 1.4.1
are very similar, we estimate Equation (1.4) with OLS.
Results are reported in Table 1.6. The significantly negative coefficient for the
interaction term in column 1 indicates that the effect of the regulatory approach is
51For example, if the firm had only two loans, one from an IRB bank with low equity according
to the dummy variable, and one SA bank with high equity, it would be impossible to say whether
a potential difference in the change in lending of these banks was due to the regulatory approach
or the capitalization of the banks. In order to clearly identify the effects, one would require the
firm to have at least one loan from an IRB bank with low capital, one loan from an IRB bank with
high capital, one loan from an SA bank with low capital and one loan from an SA bank with high
capital.
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Table 1.6: Bank capitalization, regulatory approach, and lending
Dependent variable: ∆ log(loans)
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share IRB × D(low equity) –0.207** –0.064
(0.081) (0.102)
Share IRB × bank equity ratio (pre-event) 1.897* –1.048
(1.121) (1.368)
D(IRB loan) × D(low equity) –0.046**
(0.020)
D(IRB loan) × bank equity ratio (pre-event) 2.117*
(1.057)
Share IRB –0.016 –0.104** –0.009 0.016
(0.014) (0.045) (0.023) (0.047)
D(IRB loan) –0.017 –0.102***
(0.012) (0.030)
Constant 0.132** 0.096 0.071 0.062 0.141 0.121
(0.065) (0.080) (0.064) (0.063) (0.162) (0.181)
Bank controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 182,966 182,966 121,549 121,549 90,500 90,500
R-squared 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003
These regressions examine the impact of the regulatory approach on the change in lending for banks
of differing levels of capitalization. As before, our quarterly data are collapsed into single pre- and
post-crisis time periods and the dependent variable is the change in log(loans) for a bank-firm
relationship. We include all loans in columns 1 and 2 (Test 1), only SA loans in columns 3 and
4 (Test 2), and only loans from IRB banks in columns 5 and 6 (Test 3). The Dummy(low equity)
has the value 1 for banks with equity ratios below the median and zero otherwise. It is interacted
with the share of IRB loans within the bank in columns 1 and 3 and with the IRB loan dummy
in column 5. Alternatively, we include an interaction between the bank’s initial equity ratio and
the respective IRB variable in columns 2, 4, and 6. Bank control variables are the same as in
previous tables. All variables that are included in interactions terms are also included on their own.
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank level are reported in parentheses. Note:
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
more pronounced for those IRB banks that had below median capital ratios prior
to the crisis. Similarly, the positive coefficient for the interaction in column 2 shows
that the negative effect of a higher share of IRB loans within the bank is mitigated by
a higher pre-shock capitalization of the bank. This is consistent with our argument
since banks with a high share of IRB loans and low capitalization are likely to
experience larger increases in risk-weighted capital requirements and to react more
strongly. Again, Test 2 and Test 3 show that this result is driven by the regulatory
approach. While we do not find significant differences across banks in the sample of
SA loans (columns 3 and 4), columns 5 and 6 show that among IRB banks the IRB
loans from banks with relatively little equity are reduced the most over the crisis.
The higher the initial capitalization of the bank, the less pronounced the relatively
stronger reduction of IRB loans as compared to SA loans.
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1.5.2 The lending reaction of IRB banks: The role of loan
size
Next, we investigate whether the size of a loan has an influence on how it is affected
during the crisis. For example, increases in risk weights for larger loans result in
larger increases in required capital and hence banks are likely to respond more. For
this purpose we calculate the bank’s exposure to each loan by dividing the loan
amount prior to the crisis by the bank’s pre-shock total assets. An identical increase
in risk weights would translate into a larger increase in required capital for loans to
which the bank has a higher exposure. The same argument is true if we take the
absolute size of the loan instead of the relative exposure of the bank as a criterion.
We then generate two dummy variables taking the value 1 if the exposure of the
bank to a certain loan is larger than the median of our sample or if the loan is larger
than the median loan in our sample, and zero otherwise.
We replace the equity variables in Equation (1.4) with the exposure and loan size
dummies and show the results in Table 1.7. Column 1 shows that banks reduced
loans relatively more over the crisis when they had a large exposure prior to the
crisis, and that this is particularly true for banks with a high share of IRB loans
that are vulnerable to increases in risk weights. The same result is obtained if we
use loan size instead of relative exposure as shown in column 2: Banks with higher
shares of IRB loans reduce larger loans relatively more. Also, columns 3 and 4 show
that among SA loans relatively larger loans are reduced relatively more. However,
as before there is no significant difference between banks with different shares of
IRB loans. Finally, columns 5 and 6 report results for Test 3. Among the sample of
loans from IRB banks, loans to which the bank has a higher exposure are reduced
relatively more, and this is especially true of IRB loans for which increases in risk
weights translate into higher capital requirements for the bank.
1.5.3 The lending reaction of IRB banks: The role of firm
risk
In this section we investigate the influence of firm risk on bank lending. So far we have
shown that firms’ PDs increase during a recession and therefore capital requirements
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Table 1.7: Loan cross-section
Dependent variable: ∆ log(loans)
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share IRB × D(high exposure) –0.133*** –0.045
(0.039) (0.044)
Share IRB × D(large loan) –0.180*** –0.050
(0.061) (0.044)
D(IRB loan) × D(high exposure) –0.115**
(0.045)
D(IRB loan) × D(large loan) –0.133***
(0.045)
Share IRB –0.012 0.086** –0.022 0.018
(0.021) (0.039) (0.024) (0.034)
D(IRB loan) –0.013 0.066**
(0.011) (0.027)
D(high exposure) –0.143*** –0.113*** –0.181***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.042)
D(large loan) –0.111*** –0.114*** –0.150***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.018)
Constant 0.818*** 0.020 0.585*** 0.070 1.142*** 0.121
(0.093) (0.063) (0.060) (0.045) (0.226) (0.163)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 182,966 182,966 121,549 121,549 90,500 90,500
R-squared 0.020 0.043 0.009 0.025 0.023 0.049
These regressions examine whether the impact of the regulatory approach differs across loan char-
acteristics. As before, our quarterly data are collapsed into single pre- and post-crisis time periods
and the dependent variable is the change in log(loans) for a bank-firm relationship. We include
all loans in columns 1 and 2 (Test 1), only SA loans in columns 3 and 4 (Test 2) and only loans
from IRB banks in columns 5 and 6 (Test 3). We calculate a bank’s exposure to a certain loan
by dividing its amount by the bank’s total assets prior to the crisis and separate our sample into
those loans where the exposure of the bank is lower than median and those where it is higher than
median. The resulting dummy variable is interacted with the share of IRB loans within the bank in
columns 1 and 3 and with the IRB loan dummy in column 5. Alternatively, we generate a dummy
that takes the value 1 for loans that are larger than the median loan in our sample and interact
it with the respective IRB variables in columns 2, 4, and 6. Robust standard errors adjusted for
clustering at the bank level are reported in parentheses. Note: * indicates statistical significance
at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
increase for IRB loan portfolios. For the empirical analysis we assumed that increased
PDs affect all IRB loans uniformly. However, a recession hits firms heterogeneously.
The capital requirements would increase most for those firms whose PD increases the
most. Relating changes in the PD to changes in lending is, however, problematic.
A bank’s lending decision has a direct impact on firms’ leverage, and this again is a
key determinant of a firm’s PD. Therefore we need to find a firm characteristic that
is likely to predict future changes in PD but is not directly affected by the banks’
lending decision.
Our measure of a firm’s likelihood of experiencing an increase in its PD is its
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pre-shock profitability, measured by its ROA in 2007/2008. Current profitability is
an important predictor of the firm’s future PD, and it will be observed by the bank’s
analysts. We are able to obtain data on firm ROA from a matched firm sample with
a total of 17,332 loans to 4,906 firms that borrow from at least two banks with a
different share of IRB loans.
In Panel A of Table 1.8 we start with estimates of Equation (1.1) for the matched
firm sample, which comprises about 20 percent of the original sample. The coefficient
for the IRB variable is –0.045, which is very close to the estimate with the full sample
(Table 1.3, column 2), indicating that our matched subsample is representative. Firm
fixed effects are included and absorb firm-specific shocks to credit demand as before.
We are able to include firm fixed effects because we are making comparisons across
firms and not across banks or across loans. We are therefore able to split our sample
into firms of different riskiness. We divide the sample into firms with a lower than
median ROA and firms with a higher than median ROA and run the same regression
on each subsample. As expected, the coefficient for the IRB variable is smaller for
firms that are relatively less profitable prior to the crisis (column 2). It is larger and
insignificant for the more profitable firms, as shown in column 3. Similar results are
obtained if we use the loan-level instead of the bank-level IRB variable. Within the
same firm, IRB loans are reduced more than SA loans, especially if the firm has a
relatively low ROA prior to the crisis.52
In Panel B of Table 1.8 we split the sample according to firms that experienced a
negative change and those that experienced a positive change in PD during the crisis.
As discussed above, this test is likely to suffer from endogeneity bias. Nevertheless,
to demonstrate the plausibility of our categorization by pre-crisis ROA in Panel A,
we also show results based on the actual change in PD. Since banks do not report
PDs together with SA loans, we need to generate model-based PDs. We therefore use
a credit risk model developed by Fo¨rstemann (2011) that applies firm balance sheet
52Unfortunately, there are not enough firms in the matched sample that have at least one SA
loan and one IRB loan from an IRB bank, which would be the pre-condition for Test 3. Similarly,
there are not enough firms that have SA loans from both SA banks and IRB banks in the matched
sample. To circumvent this problem columns 4 to 6 also include SA loans from SA banks and test
whether the regulatory approach used for a certain loan has an impact on how the loan is affected
by the crisis. Bank-level control variables are included in all regressions to account for systematic
differences across banks.
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Table 1.8: Firm cross-section
Panel A: Firm ROA
Dependent variable: ∆ log(loans)
Test 1 Test 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All firms Low ROA High ROA All firms Low ROA High ROA
Share IRB –0.045** –0.063** –0.022
(0.023) (0.030) (0.026)
D(IRB loan) –0.032** –0.043** –0.018
(0.013) (0.020) (0.019)
Bank controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 17,332 8,718 8,614 14,460 7,130 7,330
R-squared 0.362 0.361 0.364 0.324 0.321 0.329
Panel B: Change in firm PD
Dependent variable: ∆ log(loans)
Test 1 Test 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All firms PD up PD down All firms PD up PD down
Share IRB –0.046** –0.062*** –0.031
(0.022) (0.024) (0.028)
D(IRB loan) –0.033** –0.041*** –0.028
(0.013) (0.015) (0.018)
Bank controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 16,154 8,018 8,136 13,445 6,646 6,799
R-squared 0.369 0.389 0.380 0.330 0.348 0.343
This table reports results for a matched sample of up to 17,332 loans to 4,906 firms for which we
are able to obtain balance sheet information and that borrow from at least one SA bank and one
IRB bank or at least two distinct IRB banks (Test 1) or that have at least one SA loan and one
IRB loan (Test 3). As before, our quarterly data are collapsed into single pre- and post-crisis time
periods and the dependent variable is the change in log(loans) for a bank-firm relationship. All
regressions include firm fixed effects and the bank-level control variables from above. In Panel A,
we separate our sample of firms into those with a lower than median pre-shock ROA and those
with a higher than median pre-shock ROA and estimate Equation (1.1) (columns 1 to 3) and
Equation (1.2) (Test 3) on each subsample. Similarly, Panel B divides our sample into firms for
which the probability of default increased over the crisis and firms for which it decreased and runs
separate regressions on each subsample. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the bank
level are reported in parentheses. Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at
the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
information in order to calculate firm-specific PDs.53 As in the ROA regressions, we
split the sample into firms where the PD increased over the crisis and firms where it
decreased.
The results in Panel B are very similar to the results in Panel A: While banks
with a higher share of IRB loans reduce lending to the same firm relatively more,
this result seems to be driven by firms for which the PD increased over the crisis
53See Section 1.2.2 for details.
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(column 2). The coefficient for firms with a decrease in PD is smaller in absolute
terms and insignificant. A similar result is obtained for the loan-level IRB variable
in columns 4 to 6.
In summary, our results show that the effect of a reduction of lending by IRB
banks or a reduction of IRB loans is especially pronounced for IRB institutions with
a low level of equity. Furthermore, IRB banks tend to ration loans that are large and
also loans to firms that are likely to experience an increase in PD. These findings
provide further support for our claim and underline the transmission channel through
which the introduction of internal ratings affects banks’ loan supply.
1.6 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper we overcome complex identification issues and estimate how capital
regulation based on individual asset risk affects bank lending. We employ the grad-
ual introduction of Basel II in Germany as a laboratory and use the recession shock
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 as an event that in-
creased credit risk in the German market for corporate loans. Our main finding is
that the pro-cyclicality of capital charges based on individual asset risk has a sig-
nificant effect on the lending behavior of banks as well as a considerable effect on
firms’ aggregate ability to borrow. For a given firm, loans by different IRB banks
are reduced by 3.7 percent more when internal ratings (IRB) instead of fixed risk
weights (SA) are used to determine capital charges. Since banks tend to ration large
IRB loan exposures relatively more, the effect is even stronger on the aggregate firm
level: Firms that had only IRB loans prior to the crisis experienced a reduction in
total loans that was 5 to 10 percent larger than the reduction for firms that had only
SA loans.
Our findings have important policy implications for the design of bank capital
regulation. The new Basel III framework includes measures that are meant to address
the problem of pro-cyclicality. Most important, Basel III introduces a countercyclical
capital buffer that requires banks to build up additional capital reserves in times
of excessive credit growth which can be used to satisfy capital requirements when
economic conditions deteriorate. Our findings could be interpreted as justification
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for such a measure. However, countercyclical capital buffers reduce pro-cyclicality
only if the supervisor has sufficient foresight about future economic conditions.54
By definition, the regulator cannot anticipate unexpected shocks to credit risk (e.g.,
shocks that originate abroad such as the one analyzed in this paper) and therefore
cannot always pre-empt such shocks by setting buffer rates accordingly. Furthermore,
Basel III introduces capital conservation buffers. While these buffers are not per se
anti-cyclical, they are meant to address the problem of pro-cyclicality by reducing
the pressure on banks to deleverage when economic conditions deteriorate. However,
they also do not solve the basic problem of pro-cyclical capital requirements, as their
release has severe consequences for banks, and markets might not accept lower capital
ratios when economic conditions deteriorate.55 One solution to the problem of pro-
cyclicality would be the introduction of a simple leverage ratio. While this would
solve the problem of pro-cyclicality, the link between capital charges and actual asset
risk would vanish.56
Asset-risk-specific capital regulation, the most important feature of both Basel II
and Basel III, has an inherent problem of pro-cyclicality. Our results show for the
first time that pro-cyclical capital charges under the model-based approach affect
both bank lending and firms’ access to funds. Moreover, in our view the measures
introduced in the Basel III framework are insufficient to fully address this problem.
To make a final judgment regarding the efficiency of risk-based capital requirements
requires further research on the costs and benefits of this regulatory approach.
54In particular, the buffer works only if the credit-to-GDP ratio (or any other measure the
supervisor might use in order to define “excessive credit growth”) is a sufficient statistic for future
economic conditions.
55Capital conservation buffers are buffers on top of the minimum capital requirements. Once
the bank’s capital ratio is below the sum of the minimum requirement and the capital conservation
buffer, it faces restrictions on dividend payments. These restrictions remain in place until the buffer
is replenished.
56In Europe, a leverage ratio will tentatively be introduced in 2017. However, its currently
discussed level, 3 percent of total (unweighted) assets, is rather low, so that it would serve only as
a backstop against excessive leverage. Risk-based capital requirements would remain the binding
ones in most cases.
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Chapter2
Setting Countercyclical Capital Buffers
Based on Early Warning Models: Would it
Work?
2.1 Introduction
Being faced with the longest and most severe financial crisis in decades, policy makers
around the globe have actively searched for policy tools which could help to prevent
or at least reduce the intensity of future financial crises. A tool that is an integral
part of the Basel III regulations and the EU Capital Requirements Directive (CRD
IV) is the countercyclical capital buffer (CCB), which has been proposed by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) at the Bank of International Settlements
(BIS).
The CCB aims to increase the resilience of the banking system in case of a
financial crisis by ensuring that banks set aside capital in times of “aggregate growth
in credit [...] associated with a build-up of systemic risk”, which can be “drawn down
during stressed periods” (EU 2013). In order to promote international consistency
in setting CCB rates, the BCBS has developed a methodology based on the ratio
of aggregate credit to GDP (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2010). The
CRD IV, while acknowledging the importance of credit growth and the credit-to-GDP
ratio, specifies that buffer rates should also account for “other variables relevant to
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the risks to financial stability” (EU 2013).1 This provides the motivation for this
paper: We assess the usefulness of credit and other macro-financial variables for
the prediction of banking sector vulnerabilities in a multivariate framework, hence
enabling a more informed decision on the setting of CCB rates.
The BCBS guidelines are based on an analysis that uses a sample of 26 countries
from all over the world, for which the credit-to-GDP gap (defined as the deviation
of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-term trend) performs as the best single
indicator in terms of signaling a coming financial crisis. However, from the evi-
dence presented by the BCBS it is not clear whether the credit-to-GDP gap provides
a warning signal that is early enough to account for the 12 months implementa-
tion period for raising the capital buffers specified in the CRD IV regulation.2 In
other words, the credit gap may be an early warning indicator that is not early
enough for policy implementation purposes.3 Moreover, the guidelines (or the work
by Drehmann, Borio, and Tsatsaronis 2011) do not directly compare the predictive
power of the credit-to-GDP gap to that of other potentially relevant variables related
to risks to financial stability (as stated in the CRD IV) in a multivariate framework.
Acknowledging the potentially very large implications that this policy has for the
international banking sector, our paper aims to address these non-trivial omissions.
The main findings of the paper are the following: First, we find that global vari-
ables and especially global credit variables are strong predictors of macro-financial
1In particular, the CRD IV specifies that the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-
term trend should serve as “a common starting point for decisions on buffer rates by the relevant
national authorities, but should not give rise to an automatic buffer setting or bind the designated
authority. The buffer shall reflect, in a meaningful way, the credit cycle and the risks due to excess
credit growth in the Member State and shall duly take into account specificities of the national
economy” (EU 2013).
2According to Article 126(6) of the CRD IV, “when a designated authority sets the counter-
cyclical buffer rate above zero for the first time, or when thereafter a designated authority increases
the prevailing countercyclical buffer rate setting, it shall also decide the date from which the in-
stitutions must apply that increased buffer for the purposes of calculating their institution specific
countercyclical capital buffer. That date may be no later than 12 months after the date when the
increased buffer setting is announced [in accordance with paragraph 8]. If the date is less than 12
months after the increased buffer setting is announced, that shorter deadline for application shall
be justified by exceptional circumstances”.
3Several other potential shortcomings of the credit-to-GDP gap have been discussed in the
literature. For example, Edge and Meisenzahl (2011) argue that gap measures are sensitive to the
exact specification of the trending variable, in particular with regards to end-of-sample estimates
of the credit-to-GDP ratio. For other critical views on the reliability or suitability of the credit-to-
GDP gap in the context of the CCB, see for example Repullo and Saurina (2011) and Seidler and
Gersl (2011).
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vulnerability, providing good signals when used as single variables and demonstrat-
ing consistent and significant effects in multivariate logit models. Domestic credit-
to-GDP also affects the probability of being in a vulnerable state, even though the
effect is clearly smaller than that of global credit variables. However, despite the
importance of credit variables, we also find evidence suggesting that other variables
play a salient role in predicting vulnerable states of the economy.4 For example,
domestic house price growth and global equity growth are positively associated with
macro-financial vulnerabilities. Moreover, we find that banking sector variables ex-
ert significant effects: Strong banking sector profitability may incur excessive risk-
taking, leading to increased vulnerability, while a high banking sector capitalization
decreases the probability of entering a vulnerable state. This result is potentially
important for policy makers involved in setting the CCB, as it reinforces the notion
that higher CCB rates and bank capital ratios overall reduce the likelihood of finan-
cial vulnerability. As such, our findings suggest that even though credit variables
are near-essential in early warning models, other macro-financial and banking sector
variables are important covariates to control for and to improve the predictive power
of these models. Moreover, as a validation of our analysis, we find a good out-of-
sample performance of the models in predicting the vulnerable states preceding the
financial crises in Finland and Sweden in the early 1990s as well as those in Italy
and the U.K. in the mid-1990s.
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways: First, we apply
state-of-the-art modeling techniques from the early warning system (EWS) literature
to see whether they could be useful for decisions on countercyclical capital buffers in
EU countries. In line with the forthcoming legislation for the CCB, the models are
calibrated so that they aim to predict a vulnerable state of the economy (or banking
sector), i.e., a build-up of system-wide risk that, with a suitable trigger, could turn
into a banking crisis. In practice, we analyze the out-of-sample predictive abilities of
a variety of models for those states of the economy that have preceded earlier banking
4See also Drehmann and Juselius (2013), who find that the debt service ratio performs well as
a supplementary early warning indicator to credit variables for horizons up to two years prior to
banking crises. The authors also find that the debt service ratio prior to economic slumps is related
to the size of subsequent output losses. Moreover, Hahm, Shin, and Shin (2013) find that growth
of banks’ non-core liabilities is an indicator for a lending boom and a source of vulnerability to a
crisis.
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crises by twelve to seven quarters. This would, hopefully, allow a timely build-up
of the CCB. Following the methodological approach of Frankel and Rose (1996) and
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), the analysis is conducted in a multivariate
logit model framework using data for 23 EU Member States spanning over the period
from 1982Q2 to 2012Q3, where we complement the credit variables with several
domestic macro-financial and banking sector variables, and following e.g. Frankel
and Rose (1996) and Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013), also include global variables in
our models in order to account for potential spillover effects. In a similar fashion as
Alessi and Detken (2011), Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013) and Sarlin (2013), the models
are evaluated using a framework that takes into account a policy makers’ preferences
between type I (missing a crisis) and type II errors (false alarms of crises). Moreover,
the paper focuses exclusively on EU countries, including the largest possible sample
(limited by data availability) instead of focusing on a few large economies as is
common in the literature.
Second, given the importance of the credit variables in the CRD IV regulatory
framework, we use the same BIS database on credit as the BCBS and evaluate
their salience in predicting vulnerable states of the economy, both in univariate and
multivariate frameworks. Hence, we build on the work of Drehmann, Borio, and
Tsatsaronis (2011), who use a univariate signal extraction methodology (see also
Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart 1998) to find that the credit-to-GDP gap provides
the best early warning signals for the build-up of capital buffers. Finally, we employ
different definitions of banking crises (Babecky et al. 2012; Laeven and Valencia
2008, 2012; Reinhart and Rogoff 2008, 2011) as well as several other variations of
the analysis to assess the robustness of the main results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We present our data set in
Section 2.2 and introduce the methodology in Section 2.3. Estimation results and
robustness analysis are presented in Section 2.4, while Section 2.5 is reserved for our
concluding remarks.
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2.2 Data
This section introduces the data used for our study. We begin with the identification
of vulnerable states, i.e., the dependent variable in the study, based on banking crises
in the European Union. We then proceed by introducing the independent variables
used in the empirical analysis. Finally, we present some descriptive statistics on the
development of key variables around banking sector crises in the sample countries.
2.2.1 Definition of vulnerable states
The paper develops an early warning model that attempts to predict vulnerable
states of the economy from which—given a suitable trigger—banking crises could
emerge. Thus, we are not trying to predict banking crises per se, even though we
need to identify these crises in order to determine the vulnerable states. Specifically,
we define a vulnerable state as the period twelve to seven quarters before the onset
of a banking crisis. The time horizon accounts for the CCB announcement period of
twelve months that is specified in the CRD IV (EU 2013, Art. 126, 6), and for a time
lag required to impose such a policy. At the same time, extending the horizon too
far into the past may weaken the link between observed variation in the independent
variables and the onset of banking crises. To account for this, we provide a number
of alternative time horizons in the robustness section.
In order to identify banking crises, we use the dataset which has been compiled
by Babecky et al. (2012) as part of a data collection exercise by the European Sys-
tem of Central Banks (ESCB) Heads of Research Group (labeled as HoR database
hereafter). This quarterly database contains information on banking crises in EU
countries between 1970Q1 and 2012Q4.5 The crisis index takes a value of 1 when a
banking crisis occurred in a given quarter (and a value of 0 when no crisis occurred).
The HoR database aggregates information on banking crises from “several influential
papers”, including (in alphabetical order): Caprio and Klingebiel (2003); Detragiache
and Spilimbergo (2001); Kaminsky (2006); Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); Laeven
and Valencia (2008, 2010, 2012); Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2011); and Yeyati and
Panizza (2011). The crisis indices from these papers have subsequently been cross-
5Croatia, which joined the EU on 1 July 2013, has not yet been included in the database.
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checked with the ESCB Heads of Research before inclusion into the database. A list
of the banking crisis dates for our sample countries based on this dataset is provided
in Panel A of Table 2.1. In the robustness section, we test the robustness of the re-
sults by regressing the benchmark model on banking crisis data provided by Laeven
and Valencia (2012) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011).
We set the dependent variable to 1 between (and including) twelve to seven
quarters prior to a banking crisis as identified by the ESCB HoR database and to
0 for all other quarters in the data. In order to overcome crisis and post-crisis bias
(see e.g. Bussie`re and Fratzscher 2006), we omit all country quarters which either
witnessed a banking crisis or which fall within six quarters after a banking crisis.
2.2.2 Macro-financial and banking sector variables
The panel dataset used in the analysis contains quarterly macro-financial and bank-
ing sector data spanning over 1982Q2-2012Q3 for 23 EU member states. The data is
sourced through Haver Analytics and originally comes from the BIS, Eurostat, IMF,
ECB, and OECD.6 Panel A of Table 2.1 provides an overview of the data availability
for our main variables, while Panel B summarizes the variables included in our study.
Following Drehmann, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2011), we first include variables
measuring the supply of credit to the private sector. We use the “long series on total
credit and domestic bank credit to the private non-financial sector” compiled by the
BIS. This data includes “borrowing from non-financial corporations, households and
non-profit institutions serving households. [...] In terms of lenders, the new total
credit series aims to capture all sources independent of the country of origin or type
of lender [...] [while] the coverage of financial instruments includes loans and debt
securities such as bonds and securitised loans” (see Dembiermont, Drehmann, and
6In particular, the individual series stem from the following original sources: Data on total
credit to the private non-financial sector is obtained from the BIS and—for those countries where
BIS data is not available—from Eurostat. Information on nominal GDP growth and inflation rates
comes from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). Data on stock prices is obtained from
the OECD, while data on house prices is provided by the BIS. Banking sector variables are obtained
from two sources: The OECD provides relatively long series on banking sector capitalization and
profitability on an annual basis that we use in the empirical analysis. Additionally, for illustrative
purposes, we use a shorter series of banking sector capitalization in Figure 2.3 that is available
on a quarterly basis and which is obtained from the ECB’s Balance Sheet Items (BSI) statistics.
Finally, quarterly data on the 10-year government bond yield and the 3-months interbank lending
rate (money market rate) are obtained from the OECD.
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Table 2.1: Data availability and descriptive statistics
Panel A: Data availability Credit Variables Other Variables HoR Banking Crises
Austria 1982Q1-2012Q3 1986Q4-2012Q3 2008Q4
Belgium 1982Q2-2012Q3 1982Q1-2012Q3 2008Q3-2008Q4
Czech Republic 1994q2-2012Q2 — 1998Q1-2002Q2
Denmark 1982Q2-2012Q3 1992Q2-2012Q3 1987Q1-1993Q4, 2008Q3-ongoing
Estonia 2005Q1-2012Q2 2005Q2-2012Q2 –
Finland 1982Q2-2012Q3 1987Q2-2012Q3 1991Q1-1995Q4
France 1982Q2-2012Q3 1992Q2-2012Q3 1994Q1-1995Q4, 2008Q1-2009Q4
Germany 1982Q2-2012Q2 1991Q2-2011Q4 2008Q1-2008Q4
Greece 2003Q1-2012Q2 2003Q1-2012Q2 2008Q1-ongoing
Hungary 1997Q1-2012Q3 2002Q1-2012Q2 2008Q3-2009Q2
Ireland 1999Q1-2012Q3 1999Q1-2010Q4 2008Q1-ongoing
Italy 1982Q2-2012Q3 1990Q3-2012Q2 1994Q1-1995Q4
Lithuania 2005Q1-2012Q2 2005Q1-2012Q2 2009Q1-2009Q4
Luxembourg 2004Q2-2012Q3 2004Q2-2010Q4 2008Q2-ongoing
Malta 2006Q2-2012Q2 — –
Netherlands 1982Q2-2012Q2 1982Q1-2011Q4 2008Q1-2008Q4
Poland 1997Q1-2012Q3 2003Q1-2012Q3 –
Portugal 1982Q2-2011Q4 1998Q2-2011Q4 –
Slovakia 2005Q2-2012Q2 — –
Slovenia 2005Q3-2012Q2 — –
Spain 1982Q2-2012Q3 1995Q2-2012Q3 1982Q2-1985Q3
Sweden 1982Q2-2012Q3 1986Q2-2012Q3 1990Q3-1993Q4, 2008Q3-2008Q4
United Kingdom 1982Q2-2012Q3 1988Q2-2012Q2 1991Q1-1995Q2, 2007Q1-2007Q4
Panel B: Descriptive statistics Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dom. Credit Growth (qoq) 1220 0.0228 0.0196 -0.0318 0.0989
Dom. Credit Growth (yoy) 1220 0.0926 0.0662 -0.0690 0.3579
Dom. Credit Gap 1220 0.1149 0.1186 -0.1570 0.4550
Dom. Credit Growth (4q MA) 1220 0.0232 0.0166 -0.0173 0.0897
Dom. Credit Growth (6q MA) 1220 0.0232 0.0154 -0.0122 0.0813
Dom. Credit Growth (8q MA) 1220 0.0233 0.0150 -0.0099 0.0805
Dom. Credit to GDP Ratio 1220 1.2756 0.4259 0.4426 2.4829
Dom. Credit to GDP Gap 1220 0.0346 0.0796 -0.1788 0.3249
Dom. Credit Growth - GDP Growth 1220 0.0081 0.0171 -0.0508 0.0715
Glo. Credit Growth (qoq) 1220 0.0152 0.0086 -0.0048 0.0335
Glo. Credit Growth (yoy) 1220 0.0614 0.0289 -0.0113 0.1095
Glo. Credit Gap 1220 0.0597 0.0431 -0.0101 0.1593
Glo. Credit Growth (4q MA) 1220 0.0154 0.0071 -0.0028 0.0274
Glo. Credit Growth (6q MA) 1220 0.0156 0.0069 -0.0021 0.0280
Glo. Credit Growth (8q MA) 1220 0.0158 0.0065 0.0005 0.0274
Glo. Credit to GDP Ratio 1220 0.7557 0.1193 0.5778 0.9933
Glo. Credit to GDP Gap 1220 0.0158 0.0285 -0.0420 0.0676
Glo. Credit Growth - Glo. GDP Growth 1220 0.0022 0.0235 -0.0492 0.0671
GDP Growth 919 0.0123 0.0088 -0.0232 0.0437
Inflation 919 0.0242 0.0166 -0.0108 0.1078
Equity Price Growth 919 0.0240 0.1199 -0.3759 0.3051
House Price Growth 919 0.0172 0.0289 -0.0735 0.1204
Banking Sector Capitalization 756 0.0507 0.0161 0.0238 0.1088
Banking Sector Profitability 756 0.0066 0.0040 -0.0142 0.0292
Gov. Bond Yield 862 0.0575 0.0237 0.0220 0.1385
Money Market Rate 862 0.0460 0.0292 0.0010 0.1643
Global GDP Growth 919 0.0117 0.0229 -0.0585 0.0616
Global Equity Price Growth 919 0.0135 0.0675 -0.3344 0.1122
Global House Price Growth 919 0.0066 0.0162 -0.0389 0.0539
Panel A shows the availability of credit and other variables as well as the crisis dates for the 23
countries in our sample. Credit variables are obtained from the BIS database for total credit to
the private non-financial sector (see Dembiermont, Drehmann, and Muksakunratana 2013) and
from Eurostat for those countries where the BIS data is not available. Other macro-financial and
banking sector variables are obtained from various sources, including the BIS, IMF, and OECD.
The crisis definitions are from the ESCB Heads of Research database described in Babecky et al.
(2012). Panel B shows descriptive statistics for the credit as well as the other variables. Credit
variables are available for a longer period of time in most countries, which is why the number of
observations is larger for them.
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Muksakunratana 2013 for a description of the database). To our knowledge, the BIS
credit series offers the broadest definition of credit provision to the private sector,
while having been adjusted for data gaps and structural breaks.
We include four different measurements of credit in our models, accounting for
credit growth and leverage, both at the domestic and at the global level. Credit
growth is entered as a percentage (annual growth), while leverage is measured by
the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio (using nominal GDP data) from its long-
term backward-looking trend (using a backward-looking Hodrick-Prescott filter with
a smoothing parameter λ of 400,000) as proposed by the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision (2010) Consultative Document.7 Global credit variables have been
computed using a GDP-weighted average of the variable in question for several coun-
tries, including the United States, Japan, Canada, and all European countries which
are in this study (see also Alessi and Detken 2011). In addition, we include four sets
of interaction terms in the same fashion as Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013), namely
the product of the domestic variables, the product of the global variables and that
between the domestic and the global credit variables. The results using different
variations of the credit variables are discussed in Section 2.4.8
In order to test the importance of credit variables in a comparative fashion as
well as to analyze the potential importance of other factors, we include a number of
additional variables in our study. These variables are available for fewer observations
than the credit variables, which is why the number of observations in the full model
differs from the number of observations in models that include only credit variables.9
Variables are selected based on the existing literature and on data availability. In or-
7Recommendations in the BCBS Consultative Document are based on a paper by Borio et al.
(2010), who find that trends calculated with a λ of 400,000 perform well in picking up the long-term
development of private credit. In particular, a λ of 400,000 is consistent with the assumption of
credit cycles being four times longer than business cycles if one follows a rule developed by Ravn
and Uhlig (2002), which states that the optimal λ of 1,600 for quarterly data should be adjusted
by the fourth power of the observation frequency ratio (i.e., if credit cycles are four times longer
than business cycles, λ should be equal to 44 × 1, 600 ≈ 400, 000).
8In Section 2.4.1 we evaluate how individual credit variables perform in the prediction of banking
sector vulnerabilities. In this section, we look at several other transformations of the credit variables,
including the credit gap (defined as the deviation of private credit from its long-term trend), the
credit-to-GDP ratio, several credit growth moving averages, and a variable defined as the difference
between credit growth and nominal GDP growth. We evaluate all these variables on the domestic
as well as on the global level.
9Estimating credit models on the reduced sample yields results that are very similar to the ones
for the full sample.
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der to account for the macroeconomic environment and monetary stance, we include
nominal GDP growth (domestic and global) and CPI inflation rates. Furthermore,
following Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), we include data on equity and residential house
prices, both domestically and globally (using the same methodology to calculate the
global variables as in the case of the credit variables), focusing on annual growth
rates. Finally, to control for banking sector profitability and solvency, we include
aggregate bank capitalization (calculated by the ratio of equity over total assets)
and aggregate banking sector profitability (defined as net income before tax as a
percentage of total assets), which has e.g. been suggested by Barrell et al. (2010).
As we are estimating binary choice models using panel data, non-stationarity
of independent variables could be an issue (Park and Phillips 2000). We perform
panel unit root tests suggested by Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) as well as univariate
unit root tests developed by Dickey and Fuller (1979) in order to analyze the time
series properties of the variables of interest. In the panel unit root test, the null
hypothesis that all cross-sections contain unit roots can be rejected at least at the
10 percent level for all series except for the credit-to-GDP gap and global credit
growth.10 We complement the panel unit root analysis by using the Dickey and
Fuller (1979) test country-by-country, and can reject the null hypothesis of a unit
root for the credit-to-GDP gap at least at the 10 percent level for all countries
except for Estonia, Lithuania and Greece. Furthermore, in the country-by-country
unit root tests, we can reject the null hypothesis for the global credit-to-GDP gap
at least at the 10 percent level for all countries except for Estonia and Lithuania,
while for global credit growth the null hypothesis can be rejected for all countries.
This implies that sample periods for individual countries seem to affect unit root
test results. Overall, the transformations done to the original variables, the results
from the unit root tests and general economic theory make us confident that we have
addressed potential non-stationarity concerns for the variables of interest.
10Alternatively, we perform a Fisher-type test by running a Dickey and Fuller (1979) test by
cross-section and then combining the p-values from these tests to produce an overall test statis-
tic. The null hypothesis that all cross-sections contain unit roots can be rejected at least at the
10 percent level for all series except for the credit-to-GDP gap and the global credit-to-GDP gap.
58
2.2.3 Development of key variables
Before entering the discussion of the main results, we shortly present some descriptive
statistics, which provide the context of our main argument of moving beyond credit
variables when predicting macro-financial vulnerabilities. Figure 2.1 presents the
average development of the six main variables of interest over time before and after
the onset of a banking crisis. For the purpose of predicting crises, one would hope
to find an indicator variable that (on average) peaks (or bottoms out, or at least
changes direction) a number of quarters before a crisis, so that it can be used as a
signal. In the current case of predicting a vulnerable state of the economy which
precedes a potential banking crisis, we would be interested in variables that change
direction a bit earlier before the onset of a crisis (i.e., two to three years before the
crisis), so that policy makers can use this time to increase the resilience of banks.
In this context, we observe that among the six variables depicted here, the credit-
to-GDP gap shows one of the least clear pictures in terms of signaling a coming crisis.
On average, the credit gap increases slowly prior to a banking crisis and only starts
falling about one year into the crisis. Yet, this does not need to be a very surprising
development, as this variable is a ratio and therefore requires the numerator to grow
more slowly (or decrease faster) than the denominator in order for the variable to
decrease in value. The BCBS itself concedes that the credit-to-GDP trend may
not capture turning points well (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2010).
Consequently, the ratio will not fall unless credit falls faster than GDP, something
which is not at all certain during banking crises. Still, it shows that purely from a
descriptive perspective, any signal derived from the credit gap needs to come from
the level of this variable (i.e., a threshold value), not from changes in its development.
Unlike the credit gap, credit growth (as depicted in % year-on-year growth) does
appear to hit a peak about two years before the onset of a banking crisis, even though
its fall only becomes clear during the last pre-crisis year. A similar development
can be observed in nominal GDP growth and equity price growth figures. These
variables do peak before a crisis (on average), but the signal that a crisis is coming
only becomes evident shortly before the crisis happens. This makes it difficult,
at least from a descriptive point of view, to extract any strong signal from these
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a) b)
c) d)
e) f)
Figure 2.1: Development of key variables around banking crises
The figure depicts the development of selected key variables around banking crises within the sample
countries. The start date of a banking crisis is indicated by the vertical line, while the solid line
shows the development in the median country and the dashed lines represent the countries at the
25th and the 75th percentile, respectively.
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variables. By some margin, residential house price growth outperforms the other
domestic variables in terms of signaling ‘power’ in this descriptive exercise. In our
sample, the growth rate of residential house prices tends to peak about 3 years before
a crisis happens on average, starting a clear descent (although prices are still rising)
that lasts into the crisis where growth stalls. Based on this evidence, we would
conclude that residential house prices would be a useful tool (at least much more
useful than the other variables shown here) for decisions on the CCB, as it passes
the early warning requirement (one year of implementation plus one or two quarters
of publication lag) with verve. So, at least from a descriptive standpoint, it is clear
that it makes sense to gauge the developments of different macro-financial variables
to predict or signal coming crises. Whether this result holds in a more rigorous
comparative (multivariate) framework will be discussed in the subsequent analysis.
2.3 Methodology
In this section we introduce the methodology used in the empirical analysis. We
start by introducing the logistic regressions used in our multivariate framework.
Thereafter, we explain how we evaluate individual indicators’ and model predictions’
usefulness for policy makers.
2.3.1 Multivariate models
In order to assess the predictive abilities of credit, macro-financial and banking sector
variables in a multivariate framework, we estimate logistic regressions of the following
form:
Prob(yit = 1) =
eαi+X
′
itβ
1 + eαi+X
′
itβ
(2.1)
where Prob(yit = 1) denotes the probability that country i is in a vulnerable state
where a banking crisis could occur seven to twelve quarters ahead of quarter t. As
described in Section 2.2.1, we set the dependent variable to 1 twelve to seven quarters
before the onset of a banking crisis in the respective country and to 0 otherwise. As
independent variables, the vector Xit includes credit and macro-financial variables on
the domestic and on the global level as well as domestic banking sector variables (see
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Section 2.2.2 for a precise definition of the variables). The estimations also include a
set of country dummy variables αi in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity
at the country level (country fixed effects).11,12 Finally, we use robust standard errors
clustered at the quarterly level in order to account for potential correlation in the
error terms that might arise from the fact that global variables are identical across
countries in a given quarter.13
The analysis is conducted as much as possible in a real-time fashion, meaning
that only information that is available at a particular point in time is used. As such,
all de-trended variables have been calculated using backward trends, thereby only
using information that was available up to that point. Furthermore, the explanatory
variables have been lagged by one quarter, also to account for endogeneity bias
through simultaneity. We are well aware that this simple procedure cannot crowd
out all endogeneity-related bias, but we note that the dependent variable itself is an
early warning variable. The time horizon for which this variable is equal to 1 has
been chosen in the context of our exercise and has not been exogenously determined.
Therefore, we consider endogeneity to be a somewhat smaller problem in this study.
Nevertheless, we have tested our models for different specifications of the dependent
variable, both in terms of the pre-crisis period chosen (12-1/20-13 quarters before
the onset of a crisis) and the definition and data source of banking crises in the
robustness section.
11There is an argument for omitting these dummies from the estimations as they automatically
exclude all countries without a crisis from the estimation, hence introducing selection bias (see
e.g. Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache 1998 and Davis and Karim 2008). However, not including
them also induces bias, namely omitted variable bias caused by unit effects. As it is unlikely
that financial crises are homogeneously caused by identical factors (see also Candelon, Urbain, and
Van den Berg 2008) and as a Hausman test indicates unit heterogeneity, we have decided to include
unit dummy variables in our estimations. Results for pooled models (without country dummies)
are available upon request. Coefficients in these models are of course different, but carry the same
sign in virtually all models that we have estimated.
12In principle, we could have included time dummies in addition to country dummies in order to
account for heterogeneity in crisis probabilities over time. However, we decided against the inclusion
of these dummies for two reasons: First, only quarters where at least one country experiences a
banking crisis could be used for identification in such a specification. As our sample includes many
quarters where none of the countries experienced a crisis the inclusion of time dummies would
significantly reduce our sample size. Second, the focus in our paper is on the prediction of future
banking crises. Specifically, we aim to develop an early warning model that policy makers can use
for the detection of vulnerabilities in the banking sector. While time dummies might improve the
ex post fit of a model, they are of little use for out-of-sample forecasting since they are not known
ex ante (see e.g. Schularick and Taylor 2012).
13Alternatively, we cluster standard errors at the country level, which results in smaller estimates
in particular for the global variables.
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2.3.2 Model evaluation
Banking crises are (thankfully) rare events in the sense that most EU countries
have encountered none or only one over the past two decades. Still, when they oc-
cur, banking crises tend to be very costly, both directly through bailouts and fiscal
interventions and indirectly through the loss of economic output that oftentimes
(particularly in systemic banking crises) tends to follow these crises. Thus, policy
makers have a clear incentive to be able to detect early enough potential signs of
vulnerabilities that might precede banking crises in order to take measures to prevent
further building up of vulnerabilities or to strengthen the resilience of the banking
sector. Yet, at the same time, policy makers may not want to be signaling crises
when in fact they do not happen afterwards. Doing so may (a) reduce the credibil-
ity of their signals, weakening decision-making and damaging their reputation, and
(b) needlessly incur costs on the banking sector, endangering credit supply. As a
consequence, policy makers also have an incentive to avoid false alarms, i.e., they do
not want to issue warnings when a crisis is not imminent. As pointed out by Alessi
and Detken (2011), an evaluation framework for an early warning model needs to
take into account policy makers’ relative aversion with respect to type I errors (not
issuing a signal when a crisis is imminent) and type II errors (issuing a signal when
no crisis is imminent).
The evaluation approach in this paper is based on the so-called ‘signaling ap-
proach’ that was originally developed by Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998),
and extended by Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2000), Alessi and Detken (2011),
Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013) and Sarlin (2013). In this framework, an indicator
issues a warning signal whenever its value in a certain period exceeds a threshold τ ,
defined by a percentile of the indicator’s country-specific distribution. Similarly, a
multivariate probability model issues a warning signal whenever the predicted prob-
ability from this model exceeds a threshold τ ∈ [0, 1], again defined as a percentile
of the country-specific distribution of predicted probabilities. In this way, individual
variables and model predictions for each observation j are transformed into binary
predictions Pj that are equal to 1 if the respective thresholds are exceeded for this
observation and 0 otherwise. Predictive abilities of the variables and the models
63
can then be evaluated by comparing the signals issued by the respective variable or
model to the actual outcome Cj for each observation.
14 Each observation can be
allocated to one of the quadrants in the contingency matrix depicted in Table 2.2:
A period with a signal by a specific indicator can either be followed by a banking
crisis twelve to seven quarters ahead (TP) or not (FP). Similarly, a period without a
signal can be followed by a banking crisis twelve to seven quarters ahead (FN) or not
(TN). Importantly, the number of observations classified into each category depends
on the threshold τ .
Table 2.2: Contingency matrix
Actual class Cj
1 0
Predicted class Pj
1
True positive False positive
(TP) (FP)
0
False negative True negative
(FN) (TN)
The table shows the relationship between model prediction and actual outcomes. Observations are
classified into those where the indicator issues a warning that is indeed followed by a banking crises
twelve to seven quarters ahead (TP), those where the indicator issues a warning that is not followed
by a crisis (FP), those where the indicator issues no warning and there is no crises seven to twelve
quarters ahead (TN), and those where the indicator issues no warning although there is a crisis
coming (FN).
In order to obtain the optimal threshold τ one needs to take the policy maker’s
preferences vis-a`-vis type I errors (missing a crisis, T1(τ) = FN/(TP +FN) ∈ [0, 1])
and type II errors (issuing a false alarm, T2(τ) = FP/(FP + TN) ∈ [0, 1]) into
account. This can be done by defining a loss function that depends on the two types
of errors as well as the policy maker’s relative preference for either type. The optimal
threshold is then the one that minimizes the loss function. Taking into account the
relative frequencies of crises P1 = P (Cj = 1) and tranquil periods P2 = P (Cj = 0),
the loss function is defined as follows:15
L(µ, τ) = µP1T1(τ) + (1− µ)P2T2(τ), (2.2)
14Cj is equal to 1 if the country experiences a banking sector crisis twelve to seven quarters
ahead of the respective period and 0 otherwise.
15As pointed out by Sarlin (2013), policy makers should be concerned about the absolute num-
ber of misclassification rather than the share of misclassifications in relation to class size (i.e.,
unweighted type I and type II errors). Therefore, a failure to account for the relative frequency of
crisis episodes and tranquil periods—as in previous studies—results in a bias on the weighting of
type I and type II errors in the loss function.
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where µ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the policy maker’s relative preference between type I and
type II errors. A µ larger than 0.5 indicates that the policy maker is more averse
against missing a crisis than against issuing a false alarm, which—in particular fol-
lowing the recent financial crisis—is a realistic assumption in our view.
Using the loss function L(µ, τ), the usefulness of a model can be defined in two
ways. First, following the idea of Alessi and Detken (2011) and as in Sarlin (2013),
the absolute usefulness is defined as:
Ua = min(µP1, (1− µ)P2)− L(µ, τ). (2.3)
Note that Ua computes the extent to which having the model is better than having no
model. This is because a policy maker can always achieve a loss ofmin(µP1, (1−µ)P2)
by either always issuing a signal (in which case T1(τ) = 0) or never issuing a signal
(in which case T2(τ) = 0). The fact that P1 is significantly smaller than P2 in
our sample (i.e., there are relatively few vulnerable states preceding banking crises)
implies that, in order to achieve a high usefulness of the model, a policy maker needs
to be more concerned about the detection of vulnerable states potentially preceding
banking crises in comparison to the avoidance of false alarms.16 Otherwise, with a
suboptimal performing model, it would easily pay off for the policy maker to never
issue a signal given the distribution of vulnerable states and tranquil periods (see
Sarlin 2013 for a detailed discussion of this issue).
A second measure, the relative usefulness Ur, is computed as follows (see Sarlin
2013):
Ur =
Ua
min(µP1, (1− µ)P2) (2.4)
The relative usefulness Ur reports Ua as a percentage of the usefulness that a policy
maker would gain from a perfectly performing model.17 The relative usefulness is
our preferred performance indicator as it allows the comparison of models for policy
makers with different values for the preference parameter µ.
In addition to assessing the relative and absolute usefulness of a model, we also
16The share of observations that is followed by a banking crisis twelve to seven quarters ahead—
P1—is approximately equal to 10 % in our sample.
17A perfectly performing indicator would achieve T1 = T2 = 0, implying L = 0. Consequently,
Ua would reduce to min(µP1, (1− µ)P2).
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employ receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves and the area under the ROC
curve (AUROC) as these are also viable measures for comparing performance of
early warning models. The ROC curve shows the trade-off between the benefits and
costs of a certain threshold τ . When two models are compared, the better model
has a higher benefit (TP rate (TPR) on the vertical axis) at the same cost (FP
rate (FPR) on the horizontal axis).18 Thus, as each FP rate is associated with a
threshold, the measure shows performance over all thresholds.19 In this paper, the
size of the AUROC is computed using trapezoidal approximations. The AUROC
measures the probability that a randomly chosen vulnerable state is ranked higher
than a tranquil period. A perfect ranking has an AUROC equal to 1, whereas a coin
toss has an expected AUROC of 0.5.
2.4 Empirical results
In this section we present the empirical results. We first explore the usefulness of
credit variables for the identification of vulnerable states of the banking sector, and
proceed by extending the framework to a multivariate model including other macro-
financial and banking sector indicators. Thereafter, we evaluate the out-of-sample
performance of the estimated models and—finally—present some robustness checks.
2.4.1 Estimation and evaluation
As the CRD IV regulations emphasize the role of credit variables for setting the
countercyclical capital buffer rate—in particular the role of credit growth and the
credit-to-GDP gap—we start by evaluating the usefulness of these variables for the
18The TPR (also called sensitivity) gives the ratio of periods where the model correctly issues a
warning to all periods where a warning should have been issued, formally TPR = TP/(TP +FN).
The FPR (also called specificity) gives the ratio of periods where the model wrongly issues a signal
to all periods where no signal should have been issued, formally FPR = FP/(FP +TN). An ideal
model would achieve a TPR of one (no missed crises) and a FPR of zero (no false alarms).
19The measure can also be interpreted as showing the performance over all preference parameters
µ of the policy maker: The lower the threshold τ , the more aggressive is the policy maker in making
crisis calls as almost all signals are above the threshold. Hence, a low τ corresponds to a policy
maker with a strong aversion against type I errors, i.e., a policy maker with a strong preference
for correctly calling all crises. Equivalently, the larger the threshold τ the more conservative is
the policy maker in making crisis calls. Therefore, a high τ corresponds to a policy maker with a
strong aversion against type II errors, i.e., a policy with a strong preference for the avoidance of
false alarms.
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identification of vulnerable states within the EU banking sector.
Individual indicators
First, we evaluate the usefulness of domestic credit variables by using a simple signal-
ing approach. Using a preference parameter of µ equal to 0.9, Panel A of Table 2.3
reports the optimal threshold for several credit variable indicators.20 Given the op-
timal threshold, the table also shows the number of observations in each quadrant
of the matrix depicted in Table 2.2, the percentage of type 1 and type 2 errors, as
well as several performance measures, such as the absolute and the relative useful-
ness, the adjusted noise-to-signal (aNtS) ratio21, the percentage of vulnerable states
correctly predicted by the indicator (% Predicted), the probability of a vulnerable
state conditional on a signal being issued (Cond Prob) and the difference between
the conditional and the unconditional probability of a vulnerable state (Diff Prob).
Among the domestic indicators, indeed, the credit-to-GDP gap performs best in
the sense that it generates the highest relative usefulness.22 This indicator issues a
signal whenever the credit-to-GDP gap is above the 40th percentile of its country-
specific distribution and achieves 25.6 % of the usefulness a policy maker would
gain from a perfectly performing model. The indicator correctly calls 81.3 % of the
vulnerable states and displays an adjusted noise-to-signal ratio of 0.678. Conditional
on a signal being issued, the probability of a vulnerable state is 16.8 %, which is
4.7 % higher than the unconditional probability of a vulnerable state in our sample.
Other variables that perform relatively well are annual credit growth, the credit-to-
20A preference parameter of µ equal to 0.9 indicates a strong preference for the detection of crises
by the policy maker. In our view this is a reasonable assumption as the current crisis illustrated once
more that financial crises often translate into large costs for the economy. As Sarlin (2013) points
out, using a µ equal to 0.9 and simultaneously taking into account the unconditional probability of
a crisis (which is about 10 % in our sample) is equivalent to using a µ equal to 0.5 without adjusting
for the unconditional probabilities (as in Alessi and Detken 2011 or Lo Duca and Peltonen 2013).
Results for different values of the preference parameter are available upon request.
21The aNtS ratio is the ratio of false signals measured as a proportion of quarters where false
signals could have been issued to good signals as a proportion of quarters where good signals could
have been issued, or (FP/(FP + TN))/(TP/(TP + FN)). A lower aNtS ratio indicates better
predictive abilities of the model.
22This is consistent with findings by Drehmann, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2011) for a different
set of countries and seems to support the approach taken in the CRD IV regulation. However, the
main argument of our paper will be that performance of the individual indicators can be improved
if they are combined in a multivariate approach. Moreover, also global variables are useful for the
identification of vulnerabilities in the banking sector.
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Table 2.3: Evaluation of individual indicators
µ Threshold TP FP TN FN T1 T2 Absolute Relative aNtS Ratio % Predicted Cond Prob Diff Prob
Usefulness Usefulness
Panel A: Domestic Variables
Dom. Credit to GDP Gap 0.9 40 100 497 404 23 0.187 0.552 0.023 0.256 0.678 0.813 0.168 0.047
Dom. Credit Growth (yoy) 0.9 58 85 399 502 38 0.309 0.443 0.022 0.240 0.641 0.691 0.176 0.056
Dom. Credit to GDP Ratio 0.9 69 51 169 732 72 0.585 0.188 0.019 0.211 0.452 0.415 0.232 0.112
Dom. Credit Gap 0.9 37 104 577 324 19 0.154 0.640 0.018 0.201 0.757 0.846 0.153 0.033
Dom. Credit Growth (4q MA) 0.9 48 93 500 401 30 0.244 0.555 0.017 0.194 0.734 0.756 0.157 0.037
Dom. Credit Growth (6q MA) 0.9 61 72 364 537 51 0.415 0.404 0.015 0.170 0.690 0.585 0.165 0.045
Dom. Credit Growth (qoq) 0.9 46 92 530 371 31 0.252 0.588 0.014 0.153 0.786 0.748 0.148 0.028
Dom. Credit Growth - GDP Growth 0.9 54 70 409 492 53 0.431 0.454 0.009 0.103 0.798 0.569 0.146 0.026
Dom. Credit Growth (8q MA) 0.9 66 57 314 587 66 0.537 0.349 0.009 0.100 0.752 0.463 0.154 0.034
Panel B: Global Variables
Glo. Credit Gap 0.9 45 113 427 474 10 0.081 0.474 0.040 0.443 0.516 0.919 0.209 0.089
Glo. Credit Growth (qoq) 0.9 60 100 357 544 23 0.187 0.396 0.037 0.412 0.487 0.813 0.219 0.099
Glo. Credit Growth (yoy) 0.9 57 101 365 536 22 0.179 0.405 0.037 0.411 0.493 0.821 0.217 0.097
Glo. Credit Growth (4q MA) 0.9 49 109 448 453 14 0.114 0.497 0.035 0.386 0.561 0.886 0.196 0.076
Glo. Credit Growth (6q MA) 0.9 46 110 467 434 13 0.106 0.518 0.033 0.373 0.580 0.894 0.191 0.071
Glo. Credit Growth (8q MA) 0.9 41 109 509 392 14 0.114 0.565 0.029 0.318 0.637 0.886 0.176 0.056
Glo. Credit to GDP Ratio 0.9 75 44 100 801 79 0.642 0.111 0.021 0.229 0.310 0.358 0.306 0.185
Glo. Credit to GDP Gap 0.9 37 105 571 330 18 0.146 0.634 0.019 0.216 0.742 0.854 0.155 0.035
Glo. Credit Growth - Glo. GDP Growth 0.9 83 46 161 740 77 0.626 0.179 0.016 0.178 0.478 0.374 0.222 0.102
The table shows results for the evaluation of individual indicator variables using the signaling approach (see Section 2.3.2 for a detailed description). The
preference parameter of µ = 0.9 indicates that policy makers have a strong preference for the detection of crises (i.e., avoiding type I errors) as compared to the
avoidance of false alarms (i.e., type II errors). The optimal threshold is calculated as the one that maximizes the relative usefulness and gives the percentile
of the country-specific distribution at which the respective indicator issues a warning. The columns of the table report the number of observations: Where
the indicator issues a warning that is indeed followed by a banking crises seven to twelve quarters ahead (TP); where the indicator issues a warning that is
not followed by a crisis (FP); where the indicator issues no warning and there is no crises seven to twelve quarters ahead (TN); and where the indicator issues
no warning although there is a crisis coming (FN). Furthermore, the table reports the fraction of type I errors T1 = FN/(TP + FN), the fraction of type II
errors T2 = FP/(FP + TN), the absolute and the relative usefulness (see Section 2.3.2 for details), the adjusted noise-to-signal ratio (i.e., the ratio of false
signals measured as a proportion of months where false signals could have been issued to good signals as a proportion of months where good signals could have
been issued, or (FP/(FP + TN))/(TP/(TP + FN))), the probability of a crisis conditional on a signal being issued (Cond Prob) and the difference between
the conditional and the unconditional probability of a crisis (Diff Prob). The domestic and the global variables are ranked in terms of relative usefulness,
respectively.
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GDP ratio and the credit gap (defined as the deviation of the stock of credit from
its long term trend, see Section 2.2.2).
Interestingly, global variables seem to outperform domestic variables in terms
of usefulness. Panel B of Table 2.3 shows that these indicators usually exert a
higher relative usefulness, a lower adjusted noise-to-signal ratio, and are able to
predict a larger share of the vulnerable states in our sample. This suggests that
focusing on the development of domestic credit variables might not be sufficient.
In an increasingly integrated economy, vulnerabilities that develop at a global level
potentially transmit to countries around the world. Therefore, policy makers should
also take these developments into account when deciding on countercyclical capital
buffer rates.23
The evaluation of the predictive abilities of global variables is subject to a caveat:
As these variables do not vary across countries, and as most countries had a crisis
starting in 2008, the good performance of these variables can in part be explained
by a clustering of crisis episodes within the same year, i.e., indicators based on
global credit variables correctly predicted the current crisis in several of our sample
countries. To a certain extent this puts the higher usefulness of global as compared
to domestic variables in a perspective. However, the current crisis is certainly one of
the best examples for a non-domestic vulnerability that spread to banking systems
around the world. Thus, if the aim of the CCB is to increase the resilience of the
banking system, it appears to be beneficial to take into account both domestic and
global developments.
Multivariate models
While the signaling approach is a simple and useful way to assess the predictive
abilities of individual indicators, a multivariate framework has the advantage of being
able to assess the joint performance of several indicators. We therefore estimate
simple logit models including several of the individual credit variables and assess
their performance and usefulness. In order to account for unobserved heterogeneity
across countries that might otherwise bias our results, we include a set of country
23According to the CRD IV, the CCB rate for a specific bank should be calculated as a weighted
average of the bank’s country exposures.
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dummies.
Results for these models are presented in Table 2.4. Again, we start by considering
only the domestic variables and focus on credit growth and the credit-to-GDP gap, as
these variables performed well in the signaling approach and play a prominent role
in the CRD IV regulations. Credit growth seems to dominate the credit-to-GDP
gap, which is statistically not significant, in this simple model. Next, we gradually
include the global credit variables, interactions between growth and leverage on the
domestic and the global level as well as interactions between the domestic and the
global variables.24 The predictive power of the model improves with each step.25
In order to compare the models’ predictive abilities with those of the individual
indicators we once more apply the signaling approach by translating the predicted
probabilities into country specific percentiles and determining the optimal threshold
for the issuance of warnings as the one that maximizes the relative usefulness of
the model (see Section 2.3.2). Table 2.5 shows that the relative usefulness of the
domestic model is 0.236, which is lower than the one of the best individual indicators.
However, the stepwise inclusion of the remaining variables improves the usefulness,
so that Model 3 surpasses the best domestic as well as the best global indicators in
terms of relative usefulness. This indicates the benefits of a multivariate framework
as compared to single indicators. We will elaborate more on these benefits by taking
into account not only credit variables, but also other variables that might affect the
stability of the banking sector.
Models 4-7 provide the estimation results for the extended models. The sample
size is somewhat smaller than in the Models 1-3, as the data is not available for
24We orthogonalize interaction terms with first-order predictors in order to avoid problems of
multicollinearity (see e.g. Little, Bovaird, and Widaman 2006). In particular, when interacting two
variables X and Y , we first form the simple product X × Y and then regress it on the original
variables: X × Y = α + β1 ×X + β2 × Y + . We then take the residual from this regression—,
which is orthogonal to X and Y—to represent the interaction between the two original variables.
Variance inflation factors (VIF) smaller than ten for all variables indicate that we are able to get
rid of multicollinearity problems in this way.
25Note that the interpretation of interaction effects in logit models is cumbersome. As pointed
out by Ai and Norton (2003), the interaction effect is conditional on the independent variables
(unlike interaction effects in linear models) and may have different signs for different values of the
covariates. Moreover, the statistical significance of these effects cannot be evaluated with a simple
t-test, but should be evaluated for each observation separately. Doing so allows us to conclude
that for most observations only the Interaction(GC1×GC2) is significantly positive, while the other
interactions are insignificant (although e.g. the Interaction(DC2×GC2) has a significantly negative
sign in the regression itself).
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Table 2.4: Multivariate models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Dom. Credit Growth (DC1) 6.38** 2.66 1.61 3.93 1.54 -0.16 0.70
(2.59) (2.95) (2.75) (3.27) (3.73) (4.78) (3.60)
Dom. Credit to GDP Gap (DC2) 3.01 2.71 3.70 8.55*** 12.98*** 13.24*** 20.04***
(1.93) (2.80) (2.66) (2.27) (2.27) (3.19) (2.68)
Interaction(DC1 × DC2) 26.42 55.68** 55.12** 83.05** 53.94
(21.83) (22.77) (22.35) (38.97) (35.03)
Glo. Credit Growth (GC1) 16.71*** 16.07*** 29.01*** 25.99*** 19.72* 6.72
(4.26) (4.80) (5.61) (8.88) (11.12) (12.82)
Glo. Credit to GDP Gap (GC2) 1.96 -2.74 6.74 12.19 26.84** 41.15***
(7.67) (6.57) (6.67) (8.89) (11.72) (15.31)
Interaction(GC1 × GC2) 391.54** -486.53* -324.72 -472.64 -973.05***
(188.05) (258.07) (305.59) (312.51) (317.56)
Interaction(DC1 × GC1) 45.98 -56.67 -28.48 -129.64 34.59
(75.98) (56.65) (68.99) (124.41) (128.36)
Interaction(DC2 × GC2) -239.65*** -417.35*** -472.20*** -410.73*** -582.20***
(49.73) (67.99) (91.07) (100.92) (109.21)
GDP Growth 19.64 41.84 30.80
(18.97) (26.08) (27.05)
Inflation -29.04** -10.04 14.19
(11.73) (12.23) (12.18)
Equity Price Growth -1.01 -0.38 -0.15
(1.10) (1.14) (1.35)
House Price Growth 16.73*** 19.80*** 18.05***
(5.40) (5.56) (5.35)
Global GDP Growth -10.24 -10.58 -9.88
(12.62) (13.68) (13.79)
Global Equity Price Growth 7.39 7.61 7.78
(4.80) (5.42) (6.12)
Global House Price Growth 16.29 14.97 30.09
(18.34) (20.67) (22.55)
Banking Sector Capitalization -136.85***
(39.63)
Banking Sector Profitability 324.89***
(76.45)
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,220 1,220 1,220 919 919 756 756
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0894 0.108 0.133 0.210 0.278 0.272 0.336
AUROC 0.710 0.733 0.780 0.824 0.865 0.846 0.892
Standard error 0.0266 0.0232 0.0185 0.0195 0.0160 0.0165 0.0157
The table shows estimation results for multivariate logit models, where the dependent variable is
set to 1 twelve to seven quarters preceding a banking crisis in a respective country. Observations for
banking crises and six quarters following banking crises are omitted, while other dependent variable
observations are set to 0. All regressions include country-specific dummy variables to account for
unobserved heterogeneity across countries. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the
quarterly level are reported in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10 %-level, **
at the 5 %-level, and *** at the 1 %-level.
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Table 2.5: Model evaluation
µ Threshold TP FP TN FN T1 T2 Absolute Relative aNtS Ratio % Predicted Cond Prob Diff Prob
Usefulness Usefulness
Model 1 0.9 48 97 489 427 28 0.224 0.534 0.021 0.236 0.688 0.776 0.166 0.045
Model 2 0.9 43 114 525 391 11 0.088 0.573 0.030 0.336 0.628 0.912 0.178 0.058
Model 3 0.9 56 108 333 583 17 0.136 0.364 0.045 0.497 0.421 0.864 0.245 0.125
Model 4 0.9 67 71 174 501 26 0.268 0.258 0.041 0.456 0.352 0.732 0.290 0.164
Model 5 0.9 63 92 231 444 5 0.052 0.342 0.054 0.603 0.361 0.948 0.285 0.159
Model 6 0.9 63 66 179 408 6 0.083 0.305 0.051 0.595 0.333 0.917 0.269 0.160
Model 7 0.9 67 64 163 424 8 0.111 0.278 0.051 0.596 0.312 0.889 0.282 0.173
Model R1 0.9 42 91 417 366 6 0.062 0.533 0.036 0.401 0.568 0.938 0.179 0.069
Model R2 0.9 65 81 251 532 16 0.165 0.321 0.045 0.503 0.384 0.835 0.244 0.134
Model R3 0.9 69 34 224 451 14 0.292 0.332 0.032 0.357 0.468 0.708 0.132 0.065
The table shows results for the evaluation of the multivariate models presented in Tables 2.4 and 2.7. As for the individual indicators, we apply the signaling
approach by transforming predicted probabilities into country-specific percentiles. The preference parameter of µ = 0.9 indicates that a policy maker has a
strong preference for the detection of crises (i.e., avoiding type I errors) as compared to the avoidance of false alarms (i.e., type II errors). The optimal threshold
is calculated as the one that maximizes the relative usefulness and gives the percentile of the country-specific distribution at which the respective indicator
issues a warning. The columns of the table report the number of observations: Where the indicator issues a warning that is indeed followed by a banking crises
seven to twelve quarters ahead (TP); where the indicator issues a warning that is not followed by a crisis (FP); where the indicator issues no warning and there
is no crises seven to twelve quarters ahead (TN); and where the indicator issues no warning although there is a crisis coming (FN). Furthermore, the table
reports the fraction of type I errors T1 = FN/(TP + FN), the fraction of type II errors T2 = FP/(FP + TN), the absolute and the relative usefulness (see
Section 2.3.2 for details), the adjusted noise-to-signal ratio (i.e., the ratio of false signals measured as a proportion of months where false signals could have
been issued to good signals as a proportion of months where good signals could have been issued, or (FP/(FP + TN))/(TP/(TP + FN))), the probability of
a crisis conditional on a signal being issued (Cond Prob) and the difference between the conditional and the unconditional probability of a crisis (Diff Prob).
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all variables across the whole period (see Table 2.1). In order to make results com-
parable, Model 4 re-estimates Model 3 on the reduced sample. The most striking
difference between the two regressions is the coefficient for the domestic credit-to-
GDP gap, which turns significant in the reduced sample. This indicates that any
evaluation depends on the respective sample and should make policy makers cautious
when generalizing findings from a particular sample of countries. However, the pre-
dictive abilities of the models are quite impressive. For example, Model 5, to which
we refer as our benchmark model, achieves 60.3 % of the usefulness of a perfectly
performing model and thus outperforms any individual indicator. The model issues
a warning whenever the predicted probability is above its 63rd percentile within the
respective country. In this way, a warning is issued in 94.8 % of the quarters in our
sample where a banking crisis occurs seven to twelve quarters ahead. The probability
of a crisis conditional on a signal being issued is 28.5 %, which is 15.9 % higher than
the unconditional probability of a crisis. Finally, the area under the ROC curve for
this model is equal to 0.865, indicating a good predictive ability of the model for a
wide range of policy makers’ preference parameters (see Figure 2.2 for an illustration
of the ROC curve for our benchmark model).26
We find that the credit variables are indeed among the most important predictors
of vulnerable states of the economy. However, both model fit and model performance
increase significantly when we include the other variables. For example, the consis-
tently positive coefficient for house price growth indicates that asset price booms
promote the build-up of vulnerabilities in the financial sector. This suggests that
regulators should keep an eye on these developments instead of focusing exclusively
on the development of credit variables. Moreover, Model 7 shows that banking sector
variables exert a significant influence on the build-up of financial vulnerabilities.27
We make the following observations: First, a country is more likely to be in a vul-
nerable state, when aggregate bank capitalization within the country is relatively
low. This is a particularly important finding in the context of countercyclical capi-
26In contrast to the individual indicators and most of the credit models, the extended models
perform well also for lower values of the preference parameter µ, which we see as another advantage
of these models. These results are available upon request.
27Again, the sample for Models 6 and 7 is reduced as banking sector variables are not available
for all our sample countries. As before, we first re-estimate Model 5 on the reduced sample (see
Model 6) in order to make results comparable.
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Figure 2.2: ROC curve for benchmark model (Model 5)
The figure shows the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve for our benchmark model.
The area under the ROC curve (AUROC) is equal to 0.8645.
tal buffers as it indicates that indeed regulators could improve the resilience of the
banking system by requiring banks to hold more capital when vulnerabilities build
up. Second, we find that future banking crises are more likely when profits in the
banking sector are relatively high. As Borio et al. (2010) point out, periods of high
bank profitability are typically associated with rapid credit growth, increased risk-
taking and building up of vulnerabilities, which could explain the positive coefficient
for the profitability variable preceding banking crises.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the relationship between predicted crisis probabilities from
our benchmark model (Model 5) and actual banking sector capitalization in the
countries that had a banking crisis in 2007/2008. Most countries exerted declining
or constantly low levels of bank capitalization prior to the crisis, which is consistent
with the evidence from Model 7.28 At the same time, the benchmark model issues
a warning already in late-2004/early-2005 in most cases.29 Hence, if they had relied
on this signal, regulators would have had enough time for the activation of the CCB
prior to the crisis—even if we account for an announcement period of twelve months
28A notable exception is Austria (and to some extent Denmark), where aggregate banking sector
capitalization actually increased prior to the crisis.
29Again, the model issues a warning whenever the predicted probability is higher than the
optimal threshold within the country (indicated by the dashed horizontal line in the figure).
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for the CCB.
a) b)
c) d)
e) f)
Figure 2.3: Predicted crisis probabilities and banking sector capitalization
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a) b)
c) d)
e) f)
Figure 2.3 continued...
The figure plots the predicted probabilities (blue bars) from our benchmark model (Model 5 in
Table 2.4) around the crises of 2008 in our sample countries (depicted by the dashed vertical lines).
The optimal threshold for each country is depicted by the dashed horizontal line. The model
issues a warning whenever the predicted probability is above this threshold. The red line shows
the development of aggregate capitalization in the banking sector defined as total banking sector
equity over total banking sector assets.
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2.4.2 Out-of-sample performance of the models
Given the objective of the early warning systems, any assessment should focus on
the out-of-sample performance. Moreover, as shown by e.g. Berg, Borensztein,
and Patillo (2005), successful in-sample predictions are much easier to achieve than
successful out-of-sample predictions. In order to assess the out-of-sample usefulness
of the models we proceed as follows: First, we consecutively exclude countries that
had a banking crisis prior to 2007 from the estimation of the benchmark model.
Then, we test whether the model based on the remaining countries is able to predict
the crises in the excluded ones.30
The results of this exercise are presented in Figure 2.4. The benchmark model
signals the banking crises in the Nordic countries well before their onset in the early
1990s.31 In both Finland and Sweden, the indicator is consistently above the thresh-
old from 1988Q2 onwards, which is 11 quarters ahead of the crisis for Finland and
9 quarters ahead for Sweden. In both cases, banks would have had enough time to
build up capital before the crisis if the countercyclical capital buffer had been acti-
vated. Similarly, the model issues a warning signal for Italy from 1991Q2 onwards,
11 quarters ahead of the crisis in 1994. In the United Kingdom, the crisis is relatively
close to the beginning of the sample period. Yet, in those quarters preceding the
crisis of 1991, the benchmark model consistently issues a warning signal. Overall,
the benchmark model exhibits strong out-of-sample properties. Information from
the current crisis seems to be useful for the prediction of other systemic banking
crises in the European Union.
2.4.3 Robustness checks
In this section we modify the benchmark model (Model 5 of Table 2.4) in several
ways in order to further assess the robustness of our results. The results from the
robustness analysis are presented in Tables 2.6 and 2.7.
30In principle we could have tried to fit a model to the observations prior to 2007 in order to
see whether this model would be able to predict the current crisis. However, as most of the crisis
episodes in our sample occur after 2007, and as we particularly want to learn something from these
episodes, we prefer the approach described above, i.e., we use the information from the current
crisis and check whether it would have been useful for the prediction of past crises.
31The model issues a warning whenever the predicted probability is higher than the optimal
threshold within the country (indicated by the dashed horizontal line in the figure).
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a) b)
c) d)
Figure 2.4: Out-of-sample performance of the model
The figure shows results for an out-of-sample evaluation of our benchmark model (Model 5 in Table
2.4). We exclude the respective country from the estimation and depict the predicted probabilities
from a model based on the remaining countries around the crisis in the excluded country (dashed
vertical line). The blue bars denote the predicted probabilities, while the horizontal dashed line
presents the threshold.
First, we check whether our results depend on the definition of the dependent
variable. Apart from the ESCB Heads of Research database used in our analysis, the
most common definitions of systemic banking crises are provided by Reinhart and
Rogoff (2011) and Laeven and Valencia (2012). Although the various databases are
broadly consistent with each other, there are some deviations in the timing of crises
as the definition of a systemic event in the banking sector requires a considerable
amount of judgment. Columns 2 and 3 show that overall results are relatively similar
for all three crisis definitions. Moreover, the area under the ROC curve is also greater
than 0.8 for the other two models with the alternative crisis definitions, indicating
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good predictive abilities of the models.
Second, we include a dummy variable that is equal to one for each quarter in
which the respective country is a member of the European Monetary Union (EMU).
As expected, the coefficient for this dummy variable is positive and significant as
most crises in our sample occur after the establishment of the EMU in 1999 (see
column 4). However, the coefficients of the other variables remain largely unaffected
by the inclusion of this dummy variable. Furthermore, the results are robust if we
restrict the sample to include only countries from the EU-15 (column 5) or only
countries that are part of the EMU (column 6).
Third, we augment the model with a money market rate (column 7). The esti-
mated negative coefficient is potentially related to the ’great moderation’, i.e., the
general decline of inflation and money market rates over the sample period. The
high R-squared and AUROC indicate that the fit of the model is superior compared
to the other models. Despite this, we do not select this model as our benchmark
model as its out-of-sample forecast abilities are inferior to the benchmark model,
potentially due to an overfitting problem.
Fourth, following Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013), we transform all variables into
country-specific percentiles before using them in the regression. This method can
be seen as an alternative way to account for heterogeneity across countries as differ-
ences in levels of indicators between countries vanish for the transformed variables.
Columns 8 and 9 show that most of the estimated coefficients have the same sign as
in the benchmark model if we use this alternative method.
Finally, we analyze model performance across different forecast horizons (see also
Schudel 2013). Specifically, we check how the performance of the benchmark model
and the indicator properties of variables change if the time window of the vulnerable
state preceding a systemic banking crisis is altered from the twelve to seven quarters
used in the standard specifications. Results in Table 2.7 show that although the
benchmark model is broadly robust to an alteration of the forecast horizon, the
relative importance and the estimated signs of the coefficients tend to vary a bit.
Particularly important are the reversed signs for domestic and global credit growth
in the model with the twenty to thirteen quarters ahead definition of a vulnerable
state and the strong influence of global asset prices in this model (Model R3). As
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Table 2.6: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Benchmark RR LV EMU EU-15 Euro Interest Rates Percentiles Percentiles
Dom. Credit Growth (DC1) 1.54 -10.01** -0.58 -1.08 1.01 -4.23 2.83 -0.009 -0.000
(3.73) (4.71) (3.28) (4.29) (4.57) (6.77) (5.86) (0.008) (0.010)
Dom. Credit to GDP Gap (DC2) 12.98*** 23.91*** 4.09 15.68*** 12.46*** 14.70*** 37.86*** 0.039*** 0.050***
(2.27) (4.32) (2.60) (2.51) (2.64) (4.73) (4.67) (0.007) (0.009)
Interaction(DC1 × DC2) 55.12** 35.24 26.75 57.40** 55.10* 138.12* 83.42* 0.018*** 0.026***
(22.35) (36.30) (26.96) (26.67) (31.69) (71.79) (46.34) (0.005) (0.005)
Glo. Credit Growth (GC1) 25.99*** 32.12*** 39.40*** 49.67*** 18.57** 13.00 108.66*** 0.024** 0.018
(8.88) (10.77) (15.26) (10.14) (9.42) (10.23) (16.80) (0.010) (0.011)
Glo. Credit to GDP Gap (GC2) 12.19 -8.68 42.49*** -4.67 20.22* 18.52* -37.62** -0.033*** 0.004
(8.89) (10.83) (15.62) (12.87) (11.24) (10.52) (17.82) (0.008) (0.013)
Interaction(GC1 × GC2) -324.72 -255.97 1,718.19*** -806.86** -390.66 -121.35 -1,941.20*** 0.011 -0.005
(305.59) (320.49) (587.11) (345.60) (296.43) (301.21) (527.98) (0.009) (0.010)
Interaction(DC1 × GC1) -28.48 77.07 12.25 -17.42 -240.77** -134.60 208.01 -0.001 -0.004
(68.99) (88.37) (104.67) (89.52) (102.03) (101.30) (139.13) (0.005) (0.006)
Interaction(DC2 × GC2) -472.20*** -754.19*** -339.87*** -617.47*** -436.37*** -276.74** -1,466.07*** -0.042*** -0.062***
(91.07) (102.92) (66.07) (133.84) (96.37) (109.19) (182.09) (0.006) (0.010)
GDP Growth 19.64 2.67 11.35 12.95 18.29 14.00 35.04 0.003 0.001
(18.97) (20.61) (25.41) (20.57) (20.65) (21.40) (24.89) (0.006) (0.006)
Inflation -29.04** -3.98 -25.31* -29.70** -3.65 15.29 68.72*** -0.001 -0.004
(11.73) (11.60) (15.21) (12.35) (10.79) (10.41) (20.10) (0.005) (0.006)
Equity Price Growth -1.01 -0.20 -1.46 -1.57 -0.43 -0.14 -1.77 -0.008 -0.009
(1.10) (1.49) (2.11) (1.16) (1.26) (1.51) (1.91) (0.006) (0.006)
House Price Growth 16.73*** 14.03*** 6.73 21.02*** 23.45*** 20.71*** 20.73** 0.019*** 0.015**
(5.40) (4.81) (8.52) (6.20) (5.33) (5.50) (9.37) (0.005) (0.006)
Gov. Bond Yield -28.69
(45.08)
Money Market Rate -125.08***
(38.55)
Global GDP Growth -10.24 -4.87 -40.28* -8.78 -7.63 -10.67 0.08 -0.004 -0.004
(12.62) (12.25) (20.80) (12.60) (12.95) (15.21) (11.66) (0.009) (0.009)
Global Equity Price Growth 7.39 7.11 21.31*** 6.86 8.58* 10.72* 6.47 0.016 0.018*
(4.80) (4.56) (7.62) (4.99) (5.07) (6.14) (4.61) (0.010) (0.010)
Global House Price Growth 16.29 8.29 51.73** 11.56 20.92 27.87 27.49 0.046*** 0.054***
(18.34) (17.54) (23.01) (20.00) (18.53) (21.34) (19.84) (0.014) (0.013)
D(EMU) 2.83***
(0.62)
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES
Observations 919 835 893 919 869 664 862 919 919
Pseudo R-Squared 0.278 0.286 0.442 0.314 0.269 0.270 0.477 0.324 0.372
AUROC 0.865 0.827 0.807 0.887 0.847 0.836 0.942 0.892 0.909
Standard error 0.0160 0.0207 0.0223 0.0136 0.0172 0.0184 0.0091 0.0126 0.0117
The table shows several robustness checks for our benchmark model (Model 5 in Table 2.4). All specifications (except column 8) include country-specific
dummy variables to account for unobserved heterogeneity across countries. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the quarterly level are reported
in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10 %-level, ** at the 5 %-level, and *** at the 1 %-level.
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Table 2.7: Robustness—forecast horizon
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Benchmark Model R1 Model R2 Model R3
7-12 quarters 1-6 quarters 1-12 quarters 13-20 quarters
Dom. Credit Growth (DC1) 1.54 -11.63 -3.06 -11.77***
(3.73) (8.06) (4.28) (4.07)
Dom. Credit to GDP Gap (DC2) 12.98*** 61.69*** 33.92*** 16.03***
(2.27) (20.72) (3.91) (4.08)
Interaction(DC1 × DC2) 55.12** -18.61 139.78*** -1.36
(22.35) (82.99) (36.95) (32.76)
Glo. Credit Growth (GC1) 25.99*** 113.85*** 93.09*** -50.73***
(8.88) (18.75) (12.10) (14.10)
Glo. Credit to GDP Gap (GC2) 12.19 17.90 2.08 28.57**
(8.89) (21.61) (10.95) (13.06)
Interaction(GC1 × GC2) -324.72 6,895.95*** 2,763.43*** -52.28
(305.59) (1,067.10) (502.18) (449.06)
Interaction(DC1 × GC1) -28.48 453.38 223.97** -606.47***
(68.99) (322.98) (99.32) (111.78)
Interaction(DC2 × GC2) -472.20*** -1,947.93*** -1,193.54*** -458.57***
(91.07) (565.00) (151.01) (79.88)
GDP Growth 19.64 -28.92 -14.58 35.03
(18.97) (48.51) (20.64) (40.03)
Inflation -29.04** 77.15*** 22.54* 24.42**
(11.73) (24.02) (13.25) (10.59)
Equity Price Growth -1.01 2.14 -0.45 -1.14
(1.10) (2.34) (1.40) (1.98)
House Price Growth 16.73*** -22.60** 7.29 8.62
(5.40) (9.98) (6.19) (5.91)
Global GDP Growth -10.24 -0.39 -2.07 12.86
(12.62) (12.63) (13.10) (9.72)
Global Equity Price Growth 7.39 14.15*** 15.06*** 12.53***
(4.80) (5.08) (4.91) (4.76)
Global House Price Growth 16.29 -60.67** -32.74 116.13***
(18.34) (30.62) (23.07) (21.94)
Observations 919 919 919 919
Pseudo R-Squared 0.278 0.781 0.617 0.340
AUROC 0.865 0.726 0.960 0.895
Standard error 0.0160 0.0179 0.0063 0.0134
The table shows the results of robustness analysis with respect to the forecast horizon. Column 1
re-estimates Model 5 from Table 2.4, which is referred as the benchmark model. The dependent
variable in this regression is set to one twelve to seven quarters preceding a banking crisis in a
respective country. In column 2, we replace the dependent variable with a dummy that is equal to
one, six to one quarter before a banking crisis. Similarly, the dependent variable in column 3 equals
one twelve to one quarter before a banking crisis in the respective country. Finally, the dependent
variable in column 4 is equal to one twenty to thirteen quarters before the onset of a banking crisis
in a respective country. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the quarterly level are
reported in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10 %-level, ** at the 5 %-level,
and *** at the 1 %-level.
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shown in Table 2.5, the benchmark model with a forecast horizon of twelve to seven
quarters (Model 5) provides the highest absolute and relative usefulness measures,
followed by the model with a forecast horizon of twelve to one quarter (Model R2).
The performances of the models with the early (six to one quarter) and late (twenty to
thirteen quarters) pre-crisis time horizons in terms of absolute and relative usefulness
are broadly similar, but markedly lower than that of the benchmark model.
2.5 Conclusion
As a response to recent financial crises, the Basel III / CRD IV regulatory frame-
work includes a countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) to increase the resilience of the
banking sector and its ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic
stress. In this context, this paper seeks to provide an early warning model, which
can be used to guide the build-up and release of capital in the banking sector. Given
the prominence of private credit variables in the upcoming regulations, the paper
first examines the evolution of credit variables preceding banking crises in the EU
Member States, and assesses their usefulness in guiding the setting of the CCB. Fur-
thermore, the paper examines the potential benefits of complementing private credit
variables with other macro-financial and banking sector indicators in a multivariate
logit framework. The evaluation of the policy usefulness of the credit indicators and
models follows the methodology applied in Alessi and Detken (2011), Lo Duca and
Peltonen (2013) and Sarlin (2013).
The paper finds that, in addition to credit variables, other domestic and global
financial factors such as equity and house prices and banking sector variables help to
predict macro-financial vulnerabilities in EU Member States. We therefore suggest
that policy makers take a broad approach in their analytical models supporting
CCB policy measures. The models demonstrate good out-of-sample predictive power,
signaling the Swedish and Finnish banking crises of the early 1990s at least 6 quarters
in advance.
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Chapter3
Limits of Model-Based Regulation
3.1 Introduction
Following the financial crisis of 2008, policy makers around the world have concen-
trated their efforts on designing a regulatory framework that increases the safety of
individual institutions as well as the stability of the financial system as a whole. Most
prominently, the Basel III framework aims to enhance both the level and the quality
of banks’ regulatory capital (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011). While
there is relatively wide agreement on the necessity of such measures, a deeper de-
bate has evolved on whether capital levels are appropriately measured in the current
framework. Specifically, capital requirements under Basel III are defined in terms
of risk-weighted assets (RWA), a measure that crucially depends on estimates from
banks’ internal risk models.
Proponents of risk-weighted regulation argue that it leads to a better allocation
of resources, as banks are no longer penalized for having low-risk positions on their
balance sheets. As model-based regulation sought to achieve a better alignment
between regulatory capital and actual asset risk, the scope for regulatory arbitrage
was meant to be reduced. However, although well-intended, critics argue that by now
the regulatory system is much too complex, making it difficult for regulators to keep
track of all the bank internal estimations required for the determination of regulatory
capital ratios. Additionally, as it has become evident that RWA tend to vary across
banks, regulators, investors, and even the banks themselves increasingly distrust this
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measure, preferring to rely on un-weighted capital ratios instead.1 Overall, the calls
for simpler capital rules seem to become louder.2
In this paper, we analyze how the introduction of risk-weighted capital charges
affected banks’ lending behavior towards the German corporate sector. The main
thesis of the paper is that regulation based on models tends to reward “hard” infor-
mation at the expense of “soft” information (or other information that is not included
in the risk model). To the extent that the quality of a loan is a function of both soft
and hard variables, this overweighting of hard information alters the relative mix of
soft and hard information, thus changing the very quality of the loan pool.3 Further,
linking capital charges to model-based risk estimates creates a preferential treatment
of loans to firms that score high on the dimensions used as inputs in the risk model.
Consequently, we expect that loans to firms with low model-based risk estimates are
expanded relatively more following the introduction of risk-weighted capital charges.
It is likely that shifts in the loan portfolio have a direct impact on the accuracy
of banks’ risk models. These models have been calibrated under a regime in which
their outputs did not affect capital charges for loans. However, with risk-weighted
regulation, the overreliance on hard information could induce a worsening of the
borrower pool, so that model-based risk estimates would systematically underesti-
mate the true riskiness of the borrowers. Since banks shift their lending towards
borrowers with low model-based risk estimates, we expect average probabilities of
default (PDs) for loan portfolios that apply the new regulatory approach to be lower.
Further, as model-based regulation induces a change in the borrower pool, we expect
risk estimates for these loans to be less accurate than risk estimates for loans under
the old regime. While the first effect is likely to have a positive impact on financial
stability, the second effect is likely to have a negative impact on financial stability.
To test these hypotheses, we exploit the institutional details of the German
Basel II introduction in 2007. Following the reform, banks were allowed to choose
between a new regulatory approach (referred to as the internal ratings-based ap-
1See, e.g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), European Banking Federation
(2012), and the studies by individual banks cited in these publications.
2See, e.g., Acharya, Engle, and Pierret (2013), Admati and Hellwig (2013), Haldane (2013),
Hoenig (2013), Hellwig (2010), or Hoenig (2010).
3This resonates with the theory of multitasking proposed by Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991).
In the context of securitization, this argument has been used in Rajan, Seru, and Vig (2012).
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proach, short IRB) and a more traditional approach that did not rely on internal
risk parameters (referred to as the standard approach, short SA). The introduction
of IRB required an extensive risk management system that had to be certified by
the regulator. Consequently, only very large banks introduced the new regulatory
approach, while smaller regional banks opted for the standard approach to deter-
mine capital charges. In the first part of the paper, we analyze how banks that
introduced the new regulatory approach adjusted their lending following the reform,
as compared with banks that did not introduce the new approach. As we are trying
to identify a supply side effect, we focus on firms that borrow from both types of
banks. Identifying our coefficients from variation within the same firm allows us to
control for credit demand (see Khwaja and Mian 2008).
Importantly, the introduction of IRB in German banks was staggered over time.
As risk models need to be certified by the regulator on a portfolio basis, banks did
not shift all their loan portfolios to the new approach at the same time.4 While IRB
banks report model-based risk estimates (i.e., PDs) for most of their loans, some of
these loans are still subject to the standard approach, while others have already been
shifted to IRB. Exploiting this setup, we are able to test for systematic differences
in the prediction error (i.e., the difference between a dummy for actual default and
the PD of the loan) between IRB loans and SA loans. As we have relationship-level
data, we can systematically control for bank as well as firm heterogeneity.
The following findings emerge from our analysis. First, we show that indeed
the reform changed both the quantity and the composition of bank lending. Risk
weights are calibrated in a way that ensures that capital charges under IRB are
on average lower than under SA.5 Consequently, as the reform meant a reduction in
capital charges for banks that introduced IRB, these banks increased their lending by
about 9 percent as compared with banks that remained under the standard approach.
Further, controlling for firm heterogeneity, we find that IRB banks increase lending
to the same firm relatively more if model-based PDs for the firm are relatively low,
but not if they are relatively high. For example, an increase of one standard deviation
4Banks had to shift whole portfolios of loans to the new approach. They were not allowed to
pick individual loans for IRB. Furthermore, they were not allowed to move IRB portfolios back to
SA.
5Regulators wanted banks to introduce the new approach and hence provided incentives for the
costly implementation of IRB.
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in firm PD induces a 1.2 percent smaller increase in loans from IRB banks. These
estimation results are robust to the inclusion of bank fixed effects that control for
heterogeneity across banks. Hence, credit supplied by banks that introduced IRB
exhibits a higher sensitivity to model-based PDs than credit supplied by banks that
remained under SA.
Second, we evaluate how these changes in the lending decision process affected
banks’ evaluation of credit risk. In 2008, IRB banks had transferred only a portion
of their loan portfolios to the new approach. Exploiting this within bank variation,
we analyze whether the predictive abilities of banks’ PDs depend on the regulatory
approach used for a specific loan. We observe that the average PD is always lower
in IRB portfolios as compared with SA portfolios. This is consistent with the doc-
umented shift in lending towards firms with low model-based PDs. However, there
seems to be no difference in the average default rate between the two types of loans.
Risk estimates for IRB loans underpredict actual default rates, while there is no such
effect in PDs for SA loans. Again, the result is robust to the inclusion of bank fixed
effects that control for bank heterogeneity. While the effect is particularly strong
directly after the reform, it is also present in later periods and persistent until the
end of the sample period in 2011.
Our results could be biased if the order in which banks transfer their loan port-
folios to IRB is driven by factors that explain differences in the predictive abilities of
PDs for SA loans and IRB loans. Given the institutional details of the Basel II in-
troduction in Germany, such a scenario is very unlikely. Nevertheless, to remove any
remaining doubts, we focus on variation over time within the portfolio of IRB loans.
For loans originated in 2005 or 2006, the average PD is similar to the actual default
rate. In contrast, for loans originated after the Basel II reform, in 2007 or 2008, the
actual default rate is higher than the average PD, indicating an underestimation of
credit risk for this set of loans. The fact that the underestimation effect is much
stronger for IRB loans that were originated after the reform as compared with IRB
loans originated before the reform indicates that our findings are not driven by the
selection of IRB loan portfolios. While these loans differ in the time of origination,
they find themselves within the same portfolios within IRB banks, i.e., within those
portfolios for which the new approach has already been implemented.
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It is important to note that our findings do not imply that banks manipulate PDs
for IRB loans. If this would be the case, we should observe an underprediction of
actual default rates that is independent of the issuance date of IRB loans. Rather,
we believe that the most likely explanation is a change in incentives induced by
an overreliance on information included in banks’ risk models (i.e., a change in the
borrower pool after the reform). While the underestimation effect is particularly
pronounced right after the introduction, it does not seem as if the model validation
process within IRB banks is able to solve the problem. A validated risk model
again provides incentives to bankers to expand lending to those borrowers that score
particularly well in the modified risk model. Since risk models do not include the
entire information set available to the banker (including the soft information that is
costly to collect for the banker), the bias is likely to be persistent.
When assessing the impact of our results on financial stability, one potential
caveat has to be taken into account: Apart from the PD, risk-weights in the model-
based approach also depend on loan-specific factors such as the loss given default
(LGD), exposure at default (EAD), and the maturity (M) of the loan. Risk-weights
in the advanced IRB approach will be lower the better the estimate on any of these
parameters. Hence, the reform provides additional incentives for banks to invest into
the quality of these parameters, for example by increasing the level of collateralization
for IRB loans. Consequently, overall loan quality might have improved, despite the
fact that default rates are higher than PDs for IRB loans. An assessment of the
reform on overall credit risk and bank stability needs to take all loan-specific factors
into account. Nevertheless, we believe that the underestimation of actual default
rates that we document is interesting in itself.
Our paper also has important policy implications regarding the design of the
new regulatory framework, Basel III. Although the framework introduces a leverage
ratio, its currently discussed level is rather low, so that risk-based requirements as
in Basel II would remain the binding ones for most banks. Our findings highlight
important deficiencies of such an approach. To be clear, this paper does not make
the point that a leverage ratio is better able to regulate a bank’s capital. But clearly,
more research is required to evaluate the pros and cons of different approaches to
capital regulation in a systematic manner.
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Our paper connects several strands of the literature. A small but growing number
of papers analyzes how ratings used for regulatory purposes affect financial stability.
Most recently, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013) published an
extensive study that showed a considerable impact of banks’ modeling choices on risk-
weights, documenting that estimated risk parameters vary widely across banks, even
for the same exposures.6 This generates a lot of uncertainty about risk-based capital
ratios, and increasingly market participants seem to lose faith in the meaning of these
measures, as documented by Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Detragiache, and Merrouche (2013).7
Apart from its credibility problem, Hellwig (2010) argues that model-based capital
regulation suffers from the fact that many of the risks involved are not exogenously
given, but endogenously determined. As they depend on the behavior of the parties
involved, they may change over time, and tracking them for regulatory purposes may
be close to impossible.8 An example is given by Acharya (2011), who argues that
low risk weights for residential mortgage-backed securities made investment in this
asset class attractive and endogenously turned it into a systemically important asset
class. Moreover, Acharya, Engle, and Pierret (2013) question the predictive abilities
of risk weights, as they are based on accounting data and can only be updated ex-
post. According to their argumentation, banks game risk-weighted assets by shifting
their portfolios towards assets with lower risk weights, and false and underestimated
risk weights automatically lead to excessive leverage (see also Hoenig 2013). We
document a shift in lending towards firms with low model-based PDs, followed by a
systematic failure of internal risk models, hence providing direct empirical evidence
in support of this view. What is more, our identification strategy in connection
with the richness of our data set allows us to causally identify the effect of the shift
towards model-based regulation on financial stability.
Further, our paper adds to the public choice literature on regulatory capture.
A recent theoretical paper by Hakenes and Schnabel (2013) illustrates how the use
of sophisticated risk models can induce inefficiently low levels of regulation in the
banking sector. Empirical evidence that regulatory reform in the financial sector is
6See also Firestone and Rezende (2013) and Le Lesle´ and Avramova (2012).
7See also Hagendorff and Vallascas (2013), Das and Sy (2012), or Mariathasan and Merrouche
(2012).
8Rajan, Seru, and Vig (2012) apply this reasoning in the context of securitization.
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often driven by industry interests rather than public interest is offered by Becker
and Opp (2013), who examine a change in capital charges on insurance holdings of
mortgage-backed securities. We add to this literature by showing that the introduc-
tion of model-based capital regulation—arguably the most important innovation in
bank regulation in recent decades—mainly served the interests of the industry itself
and compromised financial stability.
3.2 The introduction of model-based regulation in
Germany
One of the main objectives of bank regulation in recent decades has been to estab-
lish a closer link between capital charges and actual asset risk. Regulators around
the world promoted the adoption of stronger risk management practices by the
banking industry in order to achieve the ultimate goal of a sound and stable in-
ternational banking system.9 In 1988, the Basel I agreement introduced risk-based
capital charges by assigning bank assets into different risk groups (or buckets) with
pre-assigned risk-weights (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1988). Risk-
weighted assets were calculated by multiplying these risk-weights (0, 20, 50, or 100
percent) with actual asset values, and capital requirements were defined in terms of
risk-weighted assets.
The next revision of this regulatory framework, referred to as Basel II, tried to
establish a more granular link between capital charges and individual asset risk.
The new framework, introduced in Germany in 2007, allowed banks to use their own
internal risk models to determine capital charges for credit risk (Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision 2006). Under the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach,
each exposure gets assigned an individual risk weight that crucially depends on
the bank’s estimated probability of default (PD) for a specific borrower.10 Risk-
9The introduction of risk-weighted capital charges and potential problems related to them have
been discussed in several papers, e.g. Brun, Fraisse, and Thesmar (2013), Hellwig (2010), Kashyap
and Stein (2004), Dan´ıelsson et al. (2001), Jones (2000), Brinkmann and Horvitz (1995). For an
assessment from the side of the regulator see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999).
10In the foundation IRB approach the bank estimates only the PD, while standard values are
assumed for loss given default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD), and maturity of the loan. In the
advanced IRB approach, the bank has to estimate all four parameters. As risk weights depend on
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weighted assets are calculated by multiplying the—loan-specific—risk-weights with
actual assets values, and capital requirements are defined in terms of risk-weighted
assets as under Basel I.
In Germany, Basel II was implemented by revision of the Solvabilita¨tsverordnung
(2006), which provides the foundation for national bank regulation. This code al-
lows banks to choose between two broad methodologies for calculating their capital
charges: The internal ratings-based approach described above and the so-called stan-
dard approach, that is basically equivalent to the old Basel I framework with fixed
risk weights for corporate loans (100 percent of the loan amount net of collateral).11
The Solvabilita¨tsverordnung (2006) provides a comprehensive set of rules and
guidelines for banks that want to use internal risk models for calculating their capital
charges: PD models used for regulatory purposes should estimate creditors’ one-
year probability of default.12 As the bank could have incentives to report low PDs
in order to economize on regulatory capital, internal risk models are subject to a
strong supervisory review—including on-site audit (see also Bundesbank 2004). In
particular, the regulator requires a precise and consistent estimation of credit risk,
and proof that the model has been used for internal risk management and credit
decisions for at least three years before it may be used for regulatory purposes.
Furthermore, the bank has to constantly validate its models and adjust them if their
estimates are inconsistent with realized default rates. The supervisor certifies rating
systems, continuously monitors compliance with minimum standards, and assesses
banks’ internal validation procedures (see also Bundesbank 2003).
PD models are estimated on a portfolio basis. For corporate loans, their most
important determinant is accounting information from firms’ financial statements
(see, e.g., Initiative fu¨r den Finanzstandort Deutschland 2006; Krahnen and Weber
2001). For loans to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), where there is often a
significant publication lag for accounting information, also target financial ratios or
the PD—our parameter of interest—in both approaches, we do not distinguish between the two in
the empirical analysis.
11Exceptions are cases where borrowers have external credit ratings, as the SA allows banks to
use these ratings to determine capital requirements. However, the German market for corporate
bonds is very small; hence, very few companies have an external rating.
12According to § 125 of the Solvabilita¨tsverordnung (2006), a creditor is in default if (a) the
bank has valid indications that the creditor will not be able to fulfill his obligations, or (b) the
creditor is more than 90 days past due on his obligations.
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industry characteristics may be used. Besides these quantitative factors, also quali-
tative information such as a firm’s management quality or its competitive situation
can be included in the models. However, since such information is by definition hard
to quantify its impact on the rating is rather limited. A prominent PD model used
for the estimation of corporate credit risk is Moody’s RiskCalcTM model (Moody’s
Analytics 2013). To obtain predicted probabilities of default for a given portfolio,
historical information on corporate defaults is regressed on accounting information
such as the equity ratio, capital structure, net debt ratio, sales growth, net profit
ratio, personnel cost ratio, payables payment period, or cash flow per liabilities. In
a second step, estimates from this model are used to attribute predicted PDs to cur-
rent and new borrowers. In cases where loan officers consider model outputs to be
unreasonable they have the option to overwrite the predicted PD. However, if such
overwrites occur to frequently, the regulator may ask the bank to revise its model.
Furthermore, a bank has to revise its model if the annual validation process reveals
a considerable discrepancy between predicted PDs and actual default rates.
Besides loan-specific variables such as the loss given default, the exposure at de-
fault and the maturity of a loan, the firm-specific PD estimate is the key ingredient
for the calculation of risk-weighted assets. Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between
estimated PDs and corresponding risk-weights, assuming standard values for the re-
maining parameters. Risk-weight curves are relatively steep for the lowest PDs and
become flatter for higher PDs. This is in line with the objectives of the new agree-
ment: To provide banks with incentives to introduce IRB, risk-weight curves were
calibrated in a way that ensured that capital requirements would be substantially
lower under IRB than under SA (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006, p.
12).
To be eligible for the model-based approach to capital regulation, banks need to
fulfill certain conditions and minimum disclosure requirements. Since the organiza-
tional efforts as well as the administrative expenses for the introduction of the new
approach are high, only large banks opted for its introduction (of our sample of 1,603
German banks, only 45 banks applied for an IRB license; nevertheless these banks
account for about 50 percent of the loans in our sample). The introduction of new
rating models is a complex process, so that banks did not apply the new approach
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Figure 3.1: PDs and regulatory risk weights
The figure shows how estimated PDs map into regulatory risk-weights for loans in the
corporate sector, assuming standard values for loss given default (45 percent) and loan
maturity (2.5 years). The figure plots risk weights for loans to firms with a turnover larger
than e 50 million. For loans to smaller firms, risk weights are multiplied with a correction
factor depending on the exact amount of the turnover.
to all loans at once; rather, they agreed on a gradual implementation plan with the
regulator.13 The plan specified an order according to which different business units
(loan portfolios) had to be shifted to IRB. As the calibration of a meaningful PD
model requires a sufficient amount of data on past loan performance, banks typically
started with loan portfolios in business units where they were relatively active. The
phased roll-out of IRB means that during the transition, which typically lasts for
several years, banks have both IRB and SA loans in their portfolios. We exploit
this feature of the implementation process in our empirical section, where we com-
pare PD estimations with actual default rates for loans that are subject to different
regulatory approaches.
13See Solvabilita¨tsverordnung (2006), §§ 64-67 for details on the implementation plan.
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3.3 Data
Our principal source of data is the German credit register compiled by Deutsche
Bundesbank. As part of its supervisory role, the central bank collects data each
quarter on all outstanding loans of at least e 1.5 million.14 The data set starts in
1993 and includes information on the lender’s and the borrower’s identity, the amount
of the loan outstanding and several other loan characteristics. As a response to the
Basel II reform, reporting requirements for the credit register have been expanded
considerably from 2008 onwards. In addition to the previous information, banks
now also report exposure-level information on the regulatory approach (SA or IRB)
and the estimated probability of default (PD). For loans under the IRB approach,
the reported PD is the one that is used to determine regulatory capital charges.
For loans under SA, banks also have to report PDs if they are estimated internally.
As IRB banks aim to transfer all eligible loan portfolios to the new approach once
the respective model is certified by the regulator, they report PDs for both IRB
loans and SA loans. We use PDs for SA loans as a benchmark against which we
evaluate the performance of PDs for IRB loans. Further, the database contains
information on risk-weighted assets and loan loss provisions in case a loan defaults.
The provisioning rules for loan losses are specified in the Solvabilita¨tsverordnung
(2006). Banks have to make provisions that correspond to the expected loss as soon
as there is information about repayment problems or default of a specific borrower
(see § 125 of Solvabilita¨tsverordnung (2006)). We combine this exposure-level data
with annual bank balance sheet information from Bundesbank’s BAKIS database
and annual firm balance sheet information from Bundesbank’s USTAN database.
Our sample includes 1,603 German banks, 45 of which opted for IRB following
the introduction of Basel II. Panel A of Table 3.1 shows that the average IRB bank
is larger and less capitalized than the average SA bank, whereas average ROA is
similar in the two groups of banks. Further, there are relatively more cooperative
banks among the group of SA banks, whereas IRB banks are mostly large and in-
ternationally active commercial banks. Our empirical setup allows us to analyze the
14Since we focus on corporate lending, this cut-off does not constitute a big issue for our analysis.
When matching firm balance sheet information from the Bundesbank USTAN database to the credit
register, we find that—in the matched sample—lending recorded in the credit register makes up
about 80-90 percent of firms’ overall bank debt on average.
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predictive abilities of PDs for loans subject to different regulatory approaches within
the group of IRB banks only.
Descriptive statistics on the loan level are presented in Panel B of Table 3.1 and
grouped by the regulatory approach used for the determination of capital charges.
There are about twice as many SA loans (80,961) as compared with IRB loans
(45,246) right after the introduction of the new regulatory approach. The first line
of the table shows the average change in the amount of loans outstanding around
the introduction of Basel II.15 The average IRB loan in our sample was increased
by about 6.5 percent over the Basel II introduction, while the average SA loan was
increased by about 1.4 percent. Information on PDs becomes available in the credit
register from 2008 onwards. The average PD in 2008Q1 is slightly higher for SA loans
(2.6 percent) as compared with IRB loans (1.4 percent). While the PD estimates the
firm-specific probability of default, the risk weight for a specific loan also incorporates
loan specific information (e.g., the collateralization of the loan). For SA loans the
corresponding risk weight does not depend on the PD and is equal to 100 percent of
the unsecured fraction of the loan amount.16 Overall, this translates into an average
risk weight of 68.5 percent for SA loans, which is considerably higher than the average
risk weight for IRB loans (47.8 percent). Furthermore, banks are required to report
loan loss provisions for loans in default. Since certain loans are backed by collateral
or guarantees, the consequences of a borrowers’s default may vary. For both SA
loans and IRB loans, loan loss provisions in case of a default are around 45 percent.
Finally, Panel C of Table 3.1 contains descriptives for several firm-level variables.
First, we calculate a PD variable on the firm level by taking the average of all PDs
assigned to the firm (by different banks) in the first quarter of 2008. The average for
this firm-level variable is 2.2 percent and lies between the average PD for SA loans
and the average PD for IRB loans. Second, several accounting variables are obtained
15The sample includes all loans in the credit register that have an observation both before and
after the reform. We calculate the change in lending around the reform by collapsing all quarterly
data for a given exposure into single pre-event and post-event periods by taking the average of the
two years before and the two years after the Basel II introduction. The change in lending is defined
as the difference in the logarithm of these averages, so that there is one observation per loan.
16The Basel regulations include a discount for loans to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as
the regulator wants to promote lending to these firms. Specifically, under Basel II, loans to firms
with a turnover of e 50 million or less are subject to lower capital charges, as regular risk weights
are multiplied with a correction factor depending on the exact amount of the turnover.
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Table 3.1: Descriptives
Panel A: Bank descriptives
SA banks (1,558 banks) IRB banks (45 banks)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Bank assets (2006, in mn e) 1,330 3,750 133,000 259,000
Log bank assets (2006) 20.158 1.162 24.196 1.937
Bank equity ratio (2006) 6.366 4.202 4.246 2.471
Bank ROA (2006) 0.680 0.464 0.673 0.584
Bank type
... commercial 14.0 – 54.3 –
... state 29.4 – 34.3 –
... cooperative 56.7 – 11.4 –
Panel B: Loan descriptives
SA loans (81,961 loans) IRB loans (45,246 loans)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
∆ log(loans) 0.016 0.358 0.064 0.570
PD 0.026 0.060 0.018 0.061
RWA to loans 0.685 0.375 0.422 0.436
LLP to loans 0.438 0.286 0.478 0.305
Interest rate 0.068 0.040 0.075 0.042
Panel C: Firm descriptives
(5,961 firms)
Mean S.D.
Firm PD 0.022 0.031
Firm assets (2006, in mn e) 154 817
Firm debt / assets (2006) 0.343 0.202
Log firm assets (2006) 10.363 1.428
Firm ROA (2006) 7.909 6.982
Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the groups of SA and IRB banks. An IRB bank is defined
as a bank that uses the internal ratings-based approach for some loans during our sample period,
whereas an SA bank is defined as a bank that uses the Basel II standard approach in all its lending
relationships. Panel B shows summary statistics for loans in the German credit register. Data
are restricted to (a) loans that are larger than e 1.5 million (b) loans from commercial, state,
or cooperative banks that are subject to the Basel II capital regulation (c) loans that have an
observation both before and after the introduction of Basel II in 2007. Besides information on
changes in lending around the reform the panel also includes information on loan interest rates, on
the loan-specific ratio of risk-weighted assets to loans, of loan loss provisions to loans, and on the PD
in 2008Q1, the first quarter for which this information is available. Panel C contains information
on the firm level for a matched sample of 5,961 firms. Firm balance sheet information is obtained
from Bundesbank’s USTAN database.
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by a hand-match of the Bundesbank USTAN database with the credit register.17
The match was conducted based on company name, location, and industry segment
that are available in both data sources. The matched dataset contains detailed
information on lending relationships and balance sheet items for 5,961 distinct firms.
We report summary statistics on total assets, debt to assets and return on assets
(ROA) for this sample. The average size of our sample firms is 154 million euros,
the average debt to asset ratio is 34.3 percent, and the average return on assets is
7.9 percent.
3.4 Banks’ lending reaction to the introduction of
IRB
In this section we document banks’ lending reaction to the introduction of model-
based capital regulation, i.e. the internal ratings-based approach. We expect two
effects: First, as capital requirements are lower under IRB than under SA, we expect
that banks that introduced the new approach expand their lending relative to banks
that did not. Second, as the reduction in capital requirements is greatest for firms
with relatively good hard information (i.e., firms with relatively low PDs), we expect
that IRB banks’ expansion in lending is greatest for these firms.
3.4.1 Bank-level lending
Acknowledging high organizational and administrative efforts for the introduction of
IRB, the regulator provided banks with incentives to introduce the new approach by
calibrating it in a way that ensured that requirements were lower under IRB than
under SA (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006, p. 12). Consequently,
when banks introduced IRB in 2007Q1 they experienced a reduction in capital re-
quirements for loans—both in absolute terms and relative to SA banks that did
not introduce the new approach. Figure 3.2 shows that following this reform IRB
banks expanded their lending to corporate borrowers in Germany. For each group
17Even though the credit register and the accounting information all come from Deutsche Bun-
desbank, the two data sets have no unique identifier. For a detailed description of the USTAN
database see Bachmann and Bayer (2013).
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of banks—SA banks and IRB banks—we sum all loans in a given quarter to obtain
aggregate loans. The figure shows the logarithm of aggregate loans—scaled by its
value in 2007Q1—for SA and IRB banks. Prior to the introduction the development
of aggregate loans was relatively similar for the two groups of banks. Following the
reform, however, we see a sharp increase in aggregate loans for IRB banks, while the
loans of SA banks remain relatively constant or even decline.
Figure 3.2: Aggregate lending around the Basel II introduction
The figure shows the development of aggregate lending in our sample for SA banks and IRB
banks around the Basel II introduction in the first quarter of 2007. Aggregate numbers
are obtained from the German credit register and calculated by summing all loans from
the respective group of banks within a given quarter. Aggregate loans are standardized by
their value in 2007Q1, and the figure shows the logarithm of this ratio (see Khwaja and
Mian 2008 for a similar graphical illustration).
We formally test whether IRB banks expanded lending relative to SA banks fol-
lowing the reform by running simple, cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions. To avoid problems of autocorrelation we collapse quarterly bank-level
loans into single pre-event and post-event time periods by taking the average of the
two years before and the two years after the reform (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mul-
lainathan 2004). The change in the logarithm of these averages serves as dependent
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variable in the following regression:
∆log(bank loans) = D(IRB bank)× β1 +B′β2 + , (3.1)
where D(IRB bank) is a dummy that indicates whether the respective bank intro-
duced the IRB approach during our sample period and B′ is a vector of bank control
variables that includes the pre-event values of the logarithm of assets, the ratio of
equity to assets, the ROA, and a set of dummies that indicate the bank’s type. To
be clear, the regression includes one observation for each bank, measuring the change
in aggregate loans over the Basel II introduction in 2007Q1.
Estimation results are presented in Table 3.2. The first column includes only
the IRB bank dummy as an explanatory variable. Following the reform, IRB banks
increased their lending by about 9 percent as compared with SA banks.18 In col-
umn 2 we add several bank-level control variables, and find that smaller banks, better
capitalized banks, and more profitable banks increased their lending relatively more
following the reform. The coefficient for the IRB bank dummy doubles in magnitude
as compared with column 1, and also becomes more significant. Finally, in column 3,
we add bank type dummies and find that state banks reduced their lending relative to
commercial banks and cooperative banks. The coefficient for the IRB bank dummy
remains significantly positive. Overall, the findings in this section document that—
as expected—those banks that opted for the introduction of the Basel II internal
ratings-based approach, and hence experienced a reduction in capital charges for
the average loan, increased their lending relative to banks that remained under the
standard approach. In the next section, we check whether this increase in lending is
particularly strong for loans to firms with relatively good hard information.
3.4.2 Loan-level lending and hard information
Under IRB, the capital charge for a specific loan depends on the estimated PD for
that loan (see Section 3.2 for details). The PD is determined by the bank’s internal
risk model and depends on several hard information criteria. The better the hard
18According to Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), the effect of dummy variables in semi-
logarithmic equations is equal to exp(β)− 1.
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Table 3.2: Bank-level lending
Dependent variable: ∆ log(bank loans)
(1) (2) (3)
D(IRB bank) 0.0867** 0.1754*** 0.1115**
(0.0346) (0.0465) (0.0505)
Log bank assets (2006) -0.0147* 0.0073
(0.0077) (0.0086)
Bank equity ratio (2006) 0.0067* 0.0067*
(0.0036) (0.0039)
Bank ROA (2006) 0.0448* 0.0498**
(0.0235) (0.0239)
D(state bank) -0.0772**
(0.0355)
D(cooperative bank) 0.0461
(0.0345)
Constant 0.1901*** 0.4076** -0.0411
(0.0096) (0.1673) (0.1856)
Observations 1,603 1,547 1,547
R-squared 0.0015 0.0168 0.0336
The table shows results for simple OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the change in
the logarithm of aggregate bank lending over the Basel II introduction in 2007Q1. For each bank,
we calculate aggregate lending by summing all loans in a respective period. We then collapse all
quarterly data for a given bank into single pre-event and post-event periods by taking the average
of the two years before and the two years after the Basel II introduction. The dependent variable
in the regressions above is the difference in the logarithm of these averages, so that there is one
observation per bank. The dummy variable D(IRB bank) indicates whether the respective bank
adopted the Basel II internal ratings-based approach during our sample period. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10 % level, ** at
the 5 % level and *** at the 1 % level.
information for a specific firm, the lower the PD for that firm, and the lower the
capital charge for loans to that firm. Hence, we expect that IRB banks increase
lending particularly to those firms where hard information is relatively good.
We test this assertion using loan-level data from the German credit register. In
particular, we assess how the change in lending for a particular bank-firm relationship
depends on the regulatory approach adopted by the bank as well as on the goodness
of hard information provided by the firm. As on the bank level, we collapse the
quarterly loan data into single pre-event and post-event time periods by taking the
averages of the two years before and the two years after the reform. The change
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in the logarithm of loans from bank i to firm j serves as dependent variable in the
following regression:
∆log(loans)ij = αi + αj +D(IRB bank)i × Firm PDj × γ + ij, (3.2)
where i denotes the individual bank, and j denotes the individual firm. As a proxy
for the goodness of hard information for a specific firm, we use the average PD
banks report for that firm in 2008Q1, the first quarter in which this information
is available (see Section 3.3). The lower this PD, the better the hard information
the firm is able to provide to its banks. The variable is interacted with the dummy
that indicates whether the bank adopted IRB during our sample period. As we are
trying to identify a supply side effect, it is important to control for a firm’s demand
for credit. We do this by including firm fixed effects, αi, into our regression, hence
ensuring that identification for the coefficient of interest comes only from variation
within the same firm.19 That is, we test whether—following the reform—the same
firm obtains relatively more loans from IRB banks as compared with SA banks, and
whether this effect depends on the hard information the firm is able to provide. In
the most stringent specification we additionally include bank fixed effects, αj, that
allow us to systematically control for heterogeneity across banks. That is, we test
whether the same bank increases its lending relatively more to firms with good hard
information, and whether this effect depends on whether the bank is an IRB bank
or not. Finally, to allow for potential correlation among changes in lending from the
same bank we cluster standard errors at the bank level in all loan-level regressions.
Results for these regressions are presented in Panel A of Table 3.3. We start with
a specification without any fixed effects that includes only the IRB bank dummy.
As on the aggregate level, we find that following the reform loans by IRB banks are
increased significantly more than loans by SA banks. In column 2 we add firm fixed
effects in order to control for credit demand. The coefficient remains remarkably sta-
ble, indicating that changes in credit demand are not a big concern for our analysis.
Economically, the two coefficients indicate that loans from IRB banks are increased
19Consequently, the sample is constrained to firms that have at least one loan from an IRB bank
and at least one loan from an SA bank.
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by about 4.5 percent relative to loans from SA banks.20 We proceed by splitting the
sample based on the goodness of hard information firms are able to provide. Col-
umn 3 includes only firms with a lower-than-median average PD in 2008Q1, while
column 4 includes only firms with a higher than median PD.21 In line with our as-
sertion, we find that IRB banks increase lending to the same firm significantly more
than SA banks when the firm’s PD is relatively low (i.e., when hard information is
relatively good and capital charges are relatively low), but not when the firm’s PD
is relatively high (i.e., when hard information is relatively bad and capital charges
are relatively high). In column 5 we interact the IRB bank dummy with the firm
PD variable and find the same effect: IRB banks increase lending to the same firm
relatively more, but less so when the firm’s PD is higher. This effect is robust to the
inclusion of bank fixed effects in column 6 and the inclusion of firm and bank fixed
effects in column 7. Economically, the coefficient indicates that an increase of one
standard deviation in Firm PD (0.031, see Table3.1, Panel B) induces a 1.2 percent
smaller increase in loans from IRB banks, which corresponds to roughly one quarter
of the overall effect identified in columns 1-2.
Unfortunately the PD data in the credit register becomes available only in 2008Q1,
one year after the Basel II introduction. Ideally, we would like to have a proxy for
the goodness of a firm’s hard information prior to the event. In the previous analysis
we had to rely on the assumption that the PD data is relatively sticky, so that firm
PDs in 2006Q4 are similar to those in 2008Q1. Alternatively, we can use different
proxies for hard information from a matched sample that contains firm balance sheet
information. While this sample is smaller than the original one, it has the advantage
that balance sheet information is also available for 2006, the year before the reform.
We now provide additional tests, using the matched sample, in order to validate the
20The magnitude is somewhat smaller than on the bank level, for which we have the following
most likely explanations: (a) Our test shows the effect on the percentage change for the average
loan. The effect will be relatively larger on the bank level if IRB banks increase larger loans
relatively more compared with smaller loans; (b) our test focuses on changes in lending on the
intensive margin, i.e. for loans that already existed prior to the reform. It could be that IRB banks
also increase lending more on the extensive margin, i.e. they create more new loans following the
reform as compared with SA banks. This would also magnify the effect on the bank level.
21Ideally, we would have used the average PD in 2006Q4 in this test, i.e. a pre-reform value.
Unfortunately, information on PDs becomes available in the credit register only in 2008Q1, which
is why we have to rely on the assumption that these PDs are relatively sticky in most cases.
Additionally, we use alternative criteria for the goodness of hard information in a smaller matched
sample for which we have firm balance sheet information (see Panel B of Table 3.3).
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Table 3.3: Loan-level lending
Panel A: Firm PD
Dependent variable: ∆ log(loans)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All All Low PD High PD All All All
D(IRB bank) 0.0486*** 0.0445** 0.0759*** 0.0150 0.0511***
(0.0173) (0.0180) (0.0245) (0.0142) (0.0193)
D(IRB bank) × Firm PD -0.5519*** -0.4529*** -0.3951**
(0.1580) (0.1434) (0.1573)
Firm PD -0.2990***
(0.0890)
Constant 0.0286***
(0.0068)
Firm FE NO YES YES YES YES NO YES
Bank FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
Observations 44,784 44,784 22,391 22,393 44,784 44,784 44,784
R-squared 0.0024 0.2268 0.1818 0.2890 0.2271 0.0402 0.2626
Panel B: Additional firm variables
Dependent variable: ∆ log(loans)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D(IRB bank) × Firm debt / assets (2006) -0.4276*** -0.3020***
(0.0759) (0.0683)
D(IRB bank) × Log firm assets (2006) 0.0391*** 0.0374***
(0.0101) (0.0117)
D(IRB bank) × Firm ROA (2006) 0.0060*** 0.0034*
(0.0021) (0.0018)
D(IRB bank) 0.1609*** -0.4580*** -0.0239
(0.0299) (0.1132) (0.0304)
FIRM FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
BANK FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 8,411 8,411 8,735 8,735 8,748 8,748
R-squared 0.3015 0.3659 0.3245 0.3880 0.3138 0.3784
The table shows how loan level lending changed over the Basel II introduction. For each bank-firm
relationship, we collapse all quarterly data for into single pre-event and post-event periods by taking
the average of the two years before and the two years after the Basel II introduction. The dependent
variable in the regressions above is the difference in the logarithm of these averages, so that there
is one observation per bank-firm relationship. Data are restricted to (a) loans that are larger than
e 1.5 million (b) loans from commercial, state, or cooperative banks that are subject to the Basel
II capital regulation (c) loans that have an observation in both the pre- and the post-event period
(d) loans to firms that have at least one loan from an SA bank and one loan from an IRB bank.
Panel A uses only data from the credit register, Panel B uses a matched sample that includes firm
balance sheet information from Bundesbank’s USTAN database. Robust standard errors adjusted
for clustering at the bank level are reported in parentheses. Note: * indicates statistical significance
at the 10 % level, ** at the 5 % level and *** at the 1 % level.
results from above.
Results for these tests are presented in Panel B of Table 3.3. As balance sheet
variables that proxy for the goodness of a firm’s hard information we use the firm’s
pre-event leverage, size, and profitability. The PD for a specific loan will typically be
lower the lower the firm’s leverage, the larger its size, and the higher its profitability.
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The matched sample contains up to 8,748 loans to 1,712 distinct firms and hence
corresponds to roughly one fifth of the original sample. In columns 1 and 2 we
assess how a firm’s leverage affects IRB banks’ lending decisions. We find that
an increase of one standard deviation in the firm debt to asset ratio (0.209, see
Table 3.1, Panel B) induces a 6.1 to 8.5 percent smaller increase in lending from
IRB banks. Similarly, an increase of one standard deviation in the logarithm of firm
assets (1.775, see Table 3.1, Panel B) induces an increase in loans from IRB banks
that is about 7 percent larger. Finally, also a firm’s profitability affects IRB banks
lending reaction: An increase in one standard deviation of pre-event ROA (5.876,
see Table 3.1, Panel B) results in an increase in loans from IRB banks that is about
2 to 3.5 percent larger. All these estimation results are robust to the inclusion of
both firm and bank fixed effects. Overall, the results presented in this section provide
strong evidence that—following the reform—IRB banks expanded loans in particular
to those firms that have relatively good hard information, i.e., those firms for which
estimated PDs and hence capital charges are relatively low.
3.5 The impact of changed lending incentives on
the quality of PD estimates in banks’ internal
models
In this section we evaluate how the changes in the lending decision process docu-
mented in the previous section affected banks’ evaluation of credit risk. In particular,
we investigate whether actual defaults deviate from the numbers implied by PD es-
timates, and whether this deviation depends on the regulatory approach used for
a specific loan. Further, we examine whether the deviation depends on the timing
of loan origination, that is, we check whether the pattern is different for loans that
were originated under Basel II as compared with loans that were originated under
Basel I. Finally, we provide several robustness checks.
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3.5.1 Empirical strategy
We now explain the empirical strategy employed in order to validate the main argu-
ment of our paper: That the introduction of model-based capital regulation induced
a change in lending behavior that affected the estimations derived from banks’ in-
ternal risk models. For each quarter, we estimate the following equation in order to
test the relationship between PDs and actual default rates:
yijk = α + δ · 1(k∈T ) + ijk, (3.3)
where j denotes the individual bank, i denotes the individual firm, and k indicates
whether the loan belongs to an SA or to an IRB portfolio within the bank. The
dependent variable yijk is defined as the difference between a dummy that indicates
actual default and the PD that bank j attributes to loans to firm i. As PDs for loans
vary between 0 and 1, yijk is positive for loans that actually default and negative for
loans that do not default. The indicator variable 1(k∈T ) takes a value of 1 if loans to
firm i belong to the IRB portfolio of bank j, and 0 if they belong to the SA portfolio.
Further, the equation includes a constant α and a random error term ijk. In order
to allow for potential correlation among default events for loans to the same firm,
standard errors are clustered at the firm level in all regressions.
If we want to interpret the coefficient of interest, δ, as the causal impact of the
regulatory approach on the prediction error yijk for a specific loan, the covariance
between 1(k∈T ) and ijk should be equal to zero (Cov(ijk, 1(k∈T )) = 0). As banks that
introduced the model-based approach tend to be larger, internationally more active
and more sophisticated than banks that remained under the traditional approach, an
estimation based on loans from both types of banks could have biased our coefficients.
Fortunately, the institutional details of the German Basel II introduction described
in Section 3.2 allow us to circumvent this concern by using within-bank variation
in the regulatory approach. IRB institutions did not shift all their portfolios to the
new approach at the same time, so that we can use variation between loans that
have already been shifted to IRB and loans that are still under SA to identify δ in
Equation (3.3).
Although the approach described above addresses many concerns, coefficients
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could be biased if there are omitted factors that determine whether firms are assigned
to SA or IRB portfolios within IRB banks. To address this issue, we focus on firms
that borrow from at least two banks, one bank where loans to the firm belong to
a portfolio that has already been shifted to IRB and one bank where they are still
under SA. Depending on the quarter, our sample contains up to 19,864 loans to 4,971
distinct firms that fulfill this criterion. For each quarter, we estimate:
yijk = αi + αj + δ · 1(k∈T ) + ijk, (3.4)
where αi and αj denote firm and bank fixed effects, respectively, and the remaining
variables are defined as in Equation (3.3). By adding αi and αj we are able to
systematically control for heterogeneity across banks and across firms. That is, we
can check whether the prediction error for loans to the same firm is greater when IRB
instead of SA is used by the bank, and—similarly—whether the estimation error for
loans from the same bank is greater when IRB instead of SA is used for loans to a
specific firm.
The identification strategy described above provides an unbiased estimate of the
impact of the regulatory approach on the prediction error as long as there is no
systematic relationship between the point in time at which a specific portfolio is
shifted to IRB and the bank’s ability to estimate PDs for loans in that portfolio. As
described in Section 3.2, banks typically shifted those portfolios first for which they
had a sufficient amount of data to calibrate a meaningful PD model that could be
certified by the regulator. Hence, any bias from selection of IRB portfolios should
work against us: If anything, banks should be better able to predict actual default
rates for those loan portfolios that have been certified by the regulator (i.e., those
portfolios for which they have sufficient data and experience). Nevertheless, we
further refine the identification strategy to remove any remaining doubts.
We argue that model-based regulation induced an overreliance on hard informa-
tion, thus giving rise to underestimation of actual default rates. If this argumentation
holds true, the effect should be particularly pronounced for loans that were originated
after the introduction of model-based regulation. For those loans, capital charges de-
pended on PD estimates at the time of loan origination, while they did not for loans
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that were originated before the reform and consequently shifted to IRB. We exploit
this time series variation in the loan issuance date to circumvent the selection con-
cern. Specifically, we restrict ourselves to loans that actually use the IRB approach
and check whether the underestimation of actual default rates is greater for loans
that were originated after the reform as compared with loans that were originated
before the reform. We estimate the following equation:
yij = αj + δ · 1(c∈B) + ij, (3.5)
where 1(c∈B) is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the the IRB loan
was issued after the implementation of Basel II (in the year 2007) and 0 otherwise.
Note that this specification is not prone to selection concerns and therefore allows
for an unbiased estimate of the effect of the regulatory approach on the functioning
of PD models.22
3.5.2 Descriptive analysis
We start the analysis by assessing how PD estimates from banks’ internal risk models
compare with actual default rates for a respective set of loans. The information
on PDs—and with it the information on actual defaults—becomes available in the
credit register in 2008Q1. As described above, the analysis in this section focuses
on IRB and SA loans from IRB banks only. Although the information is available
on a quarterly basis, we evaluate loan portfolios once per year—at the end of each
year—for reasons of presentability.23 As stated in Section 3.2, PDs should estimate
one-year default rates and a loan is considered to be in default if the borrower is 90
days past due on his obligations. Accordingly, the dummy variable Actual Default
captures whether a loan is in default in at least one of the four quarters following the
one in which the PD is evaluated. Importantly, all loans that are already in default
in a respective quarter are excluded from the analysis.
22In contrast to previous estimations it is difficult to include also firm fixed effects in these
regressions, as there are relatively few firms that obtained new loans both before and after the
reform.
23Results for the remaining quarters are similar to the results we report, and available from the
authors upon request. See also Figure 3.6 in the Appendix for an overview of average PDs and
actual default rates for all quarters.
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Table 3.4: Estimation error—descriptives
Panel A: IRB banks, IRB loans
Observations Actual default PD Actual default – PD
2008 50,163 0.0267 0.0151 0.0116
2009 47,167 0.0269 0.0198 0.0071
2010 47,019 0.0212 0.0213 -0.0001
2011 46,357 0.0222 0.0176 0.0046
Panel B: IRB banks, SA loans
Observations Actual default PD Actual default – PD
2008 22,751 0.0275 0.0270 0.0004
2009 23,426 0.0251 0.0284 -0.0033
2010 21,130 0.0192 0.0287 -0.0095
2011 18,894 0.0176 0.0235 -0.0059
Panel C: IRB vs. SA
Difference in Difference Difference
actual default in PD in difference
2008 -0.0008 -0.0120 0.0112
[-0.6170] [-31.7598] [8.5746]
2009 0.0018 -0.0086 0.0103
[1.3766] [-18.2768] [7.9694]
2010 0.0020 -0.0074 0.0094
[1.7269] [-14.2997] [7.8497]
2011 0.0046 -0.0060 0.0106
[3.7342] [-13.7121] [8.5387]
The table compares actual default rates with banks’ estimated PDs in 2008Q4, 2009Q4, 2010Q4,
and 2011Q4, respectively. Panel A includes all loans by IRB banks that were subject to the IRB
approach in 2008Q1, the first period where this information is available. The column Actual default
displays the mean of a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan defaults in the year following
the respective quarter. Loans that are already in default in the respective quarter are excluded.
The column PD displays the average estimated one-year default rate for the same set of loans, and
the column Actual default - PD displays the difference between the two. Panel B repeats the same
analysis for all loans by IRB banks that were subject to the standard approach in 2008Q1. Panel C
compares the two panels with each other by calculating—for each quarter—the difference between
the values for IRB loans and for SA loans. The numbers in brackets are t-statistics.
Panel A of Table 3.4 shows descriptive statistics for lending relationships under
IRB. There are 50,163 lending relationships in our sample that had already been
shifted to IRB in 2008. During the sample period from 2008 to 2011, additional
portfolios are shifted to IRB. Relationships that were under SA in 2008 but are
moved to IRB before 2011 are constantly classified as SA loans, since this was the
regulatory regime under which they were originated. New relationships are classified
107
according to the regulatory approach under which they were issued. When comparing
model based PDs with actual default rates, we observe that PDs for IRB loans
underestimate actual defaults in 2008, 2009, and 2011. Only in 2010, the estimated
PDs and actual defaults of IRB loans match.
In Panel B of Table 3.4 we repeat the analysis presented in Panel A for those
loans that were still subject to the standard approach in 2008. These portfolios will
be transferred to IRB once the respective model is certified by the regulator. While
the underlying PD models should hence be similar for IRB loans and SA loans,
capital charges under IRB depend on the estimated PDs while capital charges under
SA do not. Interestingly, while PDs for IRB loans underestimated actual defaults
on average, we do not find a similar pattern for IRB banks’ SA loans. In 2008, the
actual default rate almost matches the average PD, and in the remaining years it is
even lower than the average PD (especially in 2010, a year with a very low actual
default rate).
Figure 3.3 plots average PDs and actual default rates for IRB loans and SA loans
over time.24 In line with our expectation, average PDs for IRB loans are always lower
than average PDs for SA loans. As shown in Section 3.4, IRB banks have shifted
their lending more towards firms with low model-based PDs as capital charges under
IRB are particularly low for loans to these firms. Kernel density plots for PDs further
illustrate this point (see Figure 3.4). Clearly, the distribution for IRB loans is to the
left of the distribution for SA loans in all years. This is confirmed in a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for equality of distributions: The hypothesis that the distributions for
SA loans and IRB loans are equal can be rejected at the 1 percent level in all cases.
Panel C of Table 3.4 and the lower part of Figure 3.3 further compare correspond-
ing actual default rates for the two sets of loans. In stark contrast to PDs, actual
default rates are similar for both portfolios in 2008 and 2009, and, are somewhat
higher for IRB loans in 2010 and 2011 as compared with SA loans.
Finally, Panel C of Table 3.4 also reports differences in the difference between
actual default rates and average PDs. In all years, this difference is larger for IRB
loans: Compared to PDs for SA loans, PDs for IRB loans underestimate actual
24Again, for reasons of presentability, we evaluate loan portfolios only once a year. Results for
the remaining quarters are very similar (see Figure 3.6 in the Appendix).
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Figure 3.3: Average PDs and actual default rates
The figure shows average PDs and actual default rates for SA loans and IRB loans during
the period from 2008Q1 to 2012Q2. For reasons of presentability we evaluate loan portfolios
only once per year, at the end of each year (see Figure 3.6 in the Appendix for the remaining
quarters). The sample includes all loans that are not in default at the respective point
in time. For the top panel, we calculate the averages of reported PDs for the respective
portfolios of loans. For the bottom panel, we create a dummy that equals 1 for loans
that default in the year following the respective quarter, and calculate the average of this
dummy variable for the respective portfolios of loans.
109
Figure 3.4: PD kernel densities
The figure shows Epanechnikov kernel densities for PDs at 2008Q4, 2009Q4, 2010Q4, and
2011Q4, respectively. PDs are reported in logarithms for reasons of presentability. The
smoothing parameter in the density estimation is set to 0.4. The blue line corresponds
to PDs for SA loans of IRB banks, the red line corresponds to IRB loans of IRB banks.
Dashed vertical lines represent the respective mean of the distribution.
default. Albeit illustrative, the latter findings might be explained by borrower or
bank specific factors. We therefore proceed by testing our assertions more formally
in a regression framework.
3.5.3 Regression framework: IRB versus SA loans
Results for Equation (3.4) are presented in Table 3.5. We start with the specification
without any fixed effects in the first four columns and estimate the equation sepa-
rately for each quarter in order to ensure that each loan turns up only once in each
regression.25 In line with the findings in the previous section, the regressions show
that the estimation error is significantly greater for IRB loans as compared with SA
25Again, we constrain ourselves to 2008Q4, 2009Q4, 2010Q4, and 2011Q4 for reasons of pre-
sentability. Results for the remaining quarters are very similar and available from the authors upon
request.
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Table 3.5: Estimation error—regressions
Dependent variable: Estimation error (actual default – PD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011
D(IRB loan) 0.0112*** 0.0103*** 0.0094*** 0.0106*** 0.0113*** 0.0079*** 0.0073*** 0.0096*** 0.0076*** 0.0074*** 0.0071*** 0.0090***
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Constant 0.0004 -0.0033*** -0.0095*** -0.0059***
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Firm FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Observations 72,914 70,593 68,149 65,251 19,864 19,182 17,650 15,431 19,864 19,182 17,650 15,431
R-squared 0.0010 0.0009 0.0009 0.0011 0.6248 0.5910 0.5973 0.5861 0.6297 0.5989 0.6065 0.5914
The table shows loan-level regression results for 2008Q4, 2009Q4, 2010Q4, and 2011Q4, respectively. The dependent variable in all regressions is the difference
between a dummy that indicates whether the respective loan defaults in the year following the respective period and the estimated PD of the loan. The sample
includes all loans from IRB banks, where columns 5-12 are restricted to firms that have at least one IRB loan and at least one SA loan from an IRB bank.
As we evaluate loans periodwise, there is one observation per bank-firm relationship in each regression. The dummy D(IRB loan) indicates the regulatory
approach under which a specific loan was originated and is equal to 1 if the loan was issued under IRB. Columns 5-8 include firm fixed effects to control for
heterogeneity across borrowers and columns 9-12 additionally includes bank fixed effects that control for heterogeneity across banks. Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10 % level, ** at the 5 % level and *** at
the 1 % level.
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loans, i.e.—compared to PDs for SA loans—PDs for IRB loans significantly under-
predict actual default rates.26 Next, we add firm fixed effects in columns 5 to 8. In
these tests, the sample is constrained to firms that have at least one IRB loan and
at least one SA loan from an IRB bank. The coefficient for the IRB loan dummy
remains significantly positive in all cases. PDs are more likely to underpredict actual
default if IRB instead of SA is used for a specific loan.
As a final test, we complete the specification by adding bank fixed effects in
columns 9 to 12 of Table 3.5. The coefficient for the IRB loan dummy remains
significantly positive, which means that—within the same bank—underprediction
of actual default is more likely if IRB instead of SA is used for a particular loan.
Overall, empirical results provide strong support for our assertion that PDs for loans
under the IRB approach tend to underpredict actual default rates.
3.5.4 Regression framework: IRB loans issued before and
after the event
In this section, we revisit potential selection concerns arising from the order in which
IRB banks shift their loan portfolios from SA to IRB. As discussed in detail in Sec-
tion 3.5.1, the selection of IRB portfolios was based on data quality and experience
of the bank and should therefore result—if at all—in a downward bias of our coef-
ficients. Nevertheless, we exploit time series variation in the date of loan issuance
to remove any remaining doubts. To do so, we restrict ourselves to loans that actu-
ally use the IRB approach, and check whether the underestimation of actual default
rates is greater for loans that were originated after the reform as compared with loans
that were originated before the reform. In other words, we circumvent the selection
concern by focusing on variation over time within the portfolio of IRB loans.
Specifically, we evaluate the performance of a sample of loans that were originated
between 2005 and 2008, within two years before and after the reform. As our data
is on the bank-firm level (and not on the contract level), we define the year of a loan
issuance as follows: First, if a new bank-firm relationship is formed in a given year,
it is clear that a new loan was originated in that year. Second, for existing bank-firm
26The coefficients for the IRB loan dummy in columns 1-4 correspond to the differences in
differences in Panel C of Table 3.4.
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relationships, we assume that a new loan was granted if we see an increase of at least
e 1.5 million (the lower bound for being reported in the credit register) and of at
least 30 percent of the amount already outstanding in a given quarter.27 Panel A
of Figure 3.5 shows actual default rates and PD averages for these loans in 2009Q4.
Loans originated in 2005 or 2006 (pre-reform) exhibit average PDs that are relatively
close to actual default rates. In contrast, the actual default rate is considerably higher
than the average PD for loans originated after the Basel II reform in 2007 or 2008
(post-reform), indicating an underestimation of credit risk for this set of loans.
Panel A of Figure 3.5 evaluates loan performance in 2009, which means that loans
originated in different years differ in the time elapsed since their origination.28 To
rule out that the length of a specific relationship explains part of our findings in
Panel A, we repeat the analysis using a different evaluation horizon. In particular,
we evaluate loan performance four years after origination. That is, loans originated
in 2005 are evaluated in 2009Q4, loans originated in 2006 are evaluated in 2010Q4,
and so on. Hence, Panel B of Figure 3.5 evaluates the performance of all loans that
still exist four years after their origination.29 Average PDs are slightly higher than
actual default rates for loans originated before the reform, and considerably lower
than actual default rates for loans originated after the reform.
Table 3.6 provides regression results for Equation (3.5). As before, we use the
estimation error as a dependent variable and start with a specification without any
fixed effects for the set of loans introduced in Figure 3.5, Panel A. We find a sig-
nificant difference between the two regimes, i.e., PDs for loans originated under
Basel II are significantly more likely to underestimate actual default rates than PDs
for loans originated before the reform. Column 2 shows that this result is robust
to the inclusion of bank fixed effects, which means that the same bank more often
underestimates the actual default rate for loans that were originated under Basel II.
27We focus on large increases in the outstanding loan amount of a given bank-firm relationship
since most firms keep a checking account with their banks whose balances keep varying around a
certain level quarter by quarter. Importantly, our results do not depend on the exact definition of
a new loan issuance, i.e., we have tried different cutoff values and obtained similar results.
28Evaluating loans in 2009 allows us to include loans that were originated within a two-year
window around the reform, with the sample being relatively balanced between loans that were
originated before and after the reform. The same test in 2010 yields similar results, but is less
balanced since the share of loans originated before the reform is considerably lower.
29We also tried alternative evaluation horizons (three years, five years) and obtained similar
results.
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Figure 3.5: Average PDs and actual default rates by loan cohorts
The figure shows average PDs and actual default rates for loans under IRB that were
originated in the years around the Basel II introduction, i.e., for bank-firm-relationships
that did not exist before or that display a large increase (i.e., at least e1.5 million and
at least 30 % of existing loan amount) in 2005 or 2006 (pre-reform), 2007 or 2008 (post-
reform). In Panel A, all loans are evaluated in 2009Q4, whereas Panel B evaluates loans
four years after their origination, i.e., loans originated in 2005 are evaluated in 2009Q4,
loans originated in 2006 are evaluated in 2010Q4, and so on.
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Finally, columns 3 and 4 repeat the estimations from the first two columns, using
the set of loans with a four-year evaluation horizon from Figure 3.5, Panel B. Results
are very similar.
Table 3.6: Estimation error by cohorts
Dependent variable: Estimation error (actual default – PD)
Evaluation in 2009 Evaluation after four years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basel II 0.0043*** 0.0045*** 0.0062*** 0.0067***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Constant 0.0008 -0.0018**
(0.0010) (0.0009)
Bank FE NO YES NO YES
Observations 67,015 67,015 49,382 49,382
R-squared 0.0002 0.0213 0.0005 0.0291
The table evaluates how the estimation error depends on the year of the loan origination. We
include only loans that were originated in the years around the Basel II introduction, i.e., bank-
firm-relationships that did not exist before or that display a large increase (i.e., at least e1.5 million
and at least 30 % of existing loan amount) in the respective year. The dependent variable in all
regressions is the difference between the dummy for actual default and the estimated PD for the
loan. The dummy Basel II is equal to 1 if the loan was originated after the Basel II introduction
(i.e., in 2007 or 2008) and equal to 0 if it was originated before (i.e., in 2005 or 2006). In columns 1
and 2, loans are evaluated in 2009Q4. In columns 3 and 4, loans are evaluated four years after
their origination, i.e., loans originated in 2005 are evaluated in 2009Q4, loans originated in 2006 are
evaluated in 2010Q4, and so on. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level
are reported in parentheses. Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10 % level, ** at the
5 % level and *** at the 1 % level.
Results in this section confirm that our findings in the previous section are not
driven by the selection of IRB loan portfolios. We find a stronger underestimation
effect for IRB loans that were originated after the reform as compared with IRB
loans that were originated before the reform. While these loans differ in the time of
origination, they find themselves within the same loan portfolios within IRB banks,
i.e., those portfolios for which the new approach has already been implemented.
3.5.5 Further results
We further report some robustness tests to our main specification in Equation (3.4).
Previously, we have given equal weight to all observations. However, one might argue
that it is more important that IRB banks get PDs for larger loans right, as these
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loans are more important for the determination of overall required capital. If the
underestimation effect is less severe for larger loans, it could be that on aggregate
banks get required capital right. To test this, we report results for weighted regres-
sions in columns 1 to 4 of Table 3.7, where we weight each observation by its loan
size. Coefficients are somewhat smaller in these regressions as compared with the
coefficients in the unweighted regressions (Table 3.5, columns 5 to 8). Nevertheless,
they are still significant in most cases, indicating that the underestimation effect for
IRB loans is also present if one considers the size of each loan.
Next, we use two alternative definitions for the dependent variable in the remain-
ing columns of Table 3.7. First, in columns 5 to 8, we take the absolute value of the
difference between the actual default dummy and the estimated PD for each loan
as a left-hand-side variable. The coefficient for the IRB loan dummy is positive and
significant in all cases. In previous regressions we investigated whether PDs for IRB
loans are more likely to understate actual credit risk. By focusing on the absolute
value of the estimation error, we treat an overestimation of actual default risk in the
same way as an underestimation. Still, the regressions show that PD estimates for
IRB loans are less precise than PD estimates for SA loans on average. Second, we
focus only on loans that actually defaulted, i.e., on loans for which the difference
between the actual default dummy and the PD is greater than 0, and set the differ-
ence for the remaining loans equal to 0. In this way, we check whether default risk
for loans that actually defaulted was underestimated more by PDs for IRB loans.
The positive and significant coefficients for the IRB loan dummy in columns 9 to
12 show that this is indeed the case. PDs for loans that defaulted were on average
lower if the IRB instead of the standard approach was used for the loan.
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Table 3.7: Estimation error—further results
Value weighted Absolute error Positive error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011
D(IRB loan) 0.0087** 0.0053*** 0.0045*** 0.0068*** 0.0040** 0.0030* 0.0043** 0.0098*** 0.0077*** 0.0054*** 0.0058*** 0.0097***
(0.0036) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0017)
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 19,864 19,182 17,650 15,431 19,864 19,182 17,650 15,431 19,864 19,182 17,650 15,431
R-squared 0.6332 0.6583 0.5594 0.6543 0.6540 0.6463 0.6586 0.6334 0.6598 0.6379 0.6406 0.6142
The table shows further loan-level regression results for 2008Q4, 2009Q4, 2010Q4, and 2011Q4, respectively. Columns 1-4 provide weighted regression results,
where the dependent variable is the same as in Table 3.5 and observations are weighted by the size of the respective loan. In column 5-8 the dependent variable
is equal to the absolute value of the difference between the dummy for actual default and the estimated PD for the loan. In columns 9-12 the dependent
variable is equal to the difference between the dummy for actual default and the estimated PD for the loan for positive values of this difference and set to
0 for negative values. As before, the sample includes all loans from IRB banks to firms that have at least one IRB loan and at least one SA loan from an
IRB bank. Loans are evaluated periodwise, so that there is one observation per bank-firm relationship in each regression. The dummy D(IRB loan) indicates
the regulatory approach under which a specific loan was originated and is equal to 1 if the loan was issued under IRB. All columns include firm fixed effects
to control for heterogeneity across borrowers. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Note: * indicates
statistical significance at the 10 % level, ** at the 5 % level and *** at the 1 % level.
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3.6 Conclusion
The regulation of bank capital requirements is one of the most controversial topics in
today’s world of banking. Most recently, Basel-type model-based regulation has come
under pressure as there seems to be growing distrust among investors on the validity
of regulatory risk weights. In this paper, we use data from the German credit register
to show that the introduction of the Basel II internal ratings-based (IRB) approach
affected both the quantity and the composition of bank lending. Specifically, banks
that introduced the IRB approach increased their lending following the reform, in
particular to firms with relatively low model-based PDs. In the second part of the
paper we examine how this change in the composition of borrowers affected the
validity of internal risk estimates. We find that risk estimates for IRB loans tend to
underestimate actual default rates for IRB loans, while there is no such effect for SA
loans. Moreover, the underestimation effect is worse for those IRB loans that were
originated after the reform.
While we cannot—and also do not want to—rule out additional problems as-
sociated with model-based regulation, our empirical findings strongly suggest that
overreliance on borrowers with favorable value parameters for the PD models plays a
crucial role in explaining the underestimation of actual default rates. An alternative
explanation for problems with model-based regulation would be a pure manipula-
tion story: It could be that banks simply shift existing PDs downwards in order to
economize on regulatory capital. Our time-series tests (i.e., the comparison of esti-
mation errors for loans issued before and after the reform) can be seen as evidence
against such an explanation: If banks simply manipulated PDs of existing borrowers
after the reform, the estimation error should be high for all IRB loans, irrespective
of the date of loan origination. We have shown, however, that the estimation error
is considerably larger for loans that were issued after the reform, where banks had
incentives to lend to firms that score well on the dimensions used in the risk models.
118
A3 Appendix to Chapter 3
Figure 3.6: Average PDs and actual default rates—all quarters
The figure shows average PDs and actual default rates for SA loans and IRB loans during
the period from 2008Q1 to 2012Q2. The sample includes all loans that are not in default
at the respective point in time. For the top panel, we calculate the averages of reported
PDs for the respective portfolios of loans. For the bottom panel, we create a dummy that
equals 1 for loans that default in the year following the respective quarter, and calculate
the average of this dummy variable for the respective portfolios of loans.
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Chapter4
The Political Economy of Bank Bailouts
4.1 Introduction
There is now a growing literature that examines the various economic trade-offs
that accompany bank bailout decisions.1 Proponents of bank bailouts argue that
bank failures generate significant negative externalities that can have debilitating
real effects. Thus, every effort should be made to avoid bank failures. Critics, on
the other hand, voice concerns about the fiscal costs and moral hazard problems
that accompany bank bailouts. Most of these discussions, however, omit an impor-
tant factor that could affect bank bailout decisions, namely the personal interests
of politicians involved in these decisions.2 Politicians may follow their own interests
(i.e., constituents and special interest pressure in order to increase their probability
of re-election) or their own ideological preferences (e.g., the conservative principle
of limited intervention in private markets; see Peltzman 1985, Poole and Rosenthal
1996). Several anecdotes suggest that the electoral cycle and the competitiveness of
the electoral process affect public bailout policies, none clearer than the 10 billion
Euro bailout of the state-owned BayernLB just three months after a state election—
contrary to the pre-election claim that the bank would generate a profit in 2008.3 In
1See Merton (1977), Keeley (1990), Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), Dam and Koetter
(2012), Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel (2011). A detailed discussion of state-supported schemes
for financial institutions is provided by Beck et al. (2010).
2A notable exception is Brown and Dinc¸ (2005), who provide evidence that politicians in emerg-
ing countries delay bank failures until after the election.
3The bailout accounted for 2 % of the state gross domestic product and for approximately 30 %
of annual state expenditures.
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this paper, we examine political considerations that could affect bailout decisions.
We provide empirical evidence about the determinants of public bailout policies.
More precisely, we analyze capital injections into distressed savings banks by German
local politicians to examine their motives and incentives. German savings banks are
owned by their municipalities, and politicians tend to be members of their supervisory
board. They thus have a significant control over the banks they govern and plausi-
bly derive both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits from this control. Individual
savings banks are interconnected by a state-level association that operates a safety
net for these banks.4 In case of distress, these associations decide whether to inject
funds or restructure the respective bank (e.g., by cutting down operations of the dis-
tressed bank or by organizing a distressed merger with another savings bank). Since
the funds available to the association are provided by all individual savings banks in
the respective state, the safety net basically constitutes an insurance scheme. Each
association has a board of experts that employs pre-defined criteria to decide about
the respective interventions and subsequent restructuring activities.5 However, local
politicians can circumvent this process by using taxpayers’ money to support the
bank in distress. In this case, the politician keeps control over the savings bank in
his municipality. This set-up allows us to differentiate between alternative motives
of politicians that could drive bailout decisions.
Given that savings banks have an extensive safety net in place, it is a priori
unclear why politicians frequently engage in bailouts.6 On the one hand, it could
be that politicians—in comparison to the association that has to rely on broader
perspective—have better information about the prospects of ‘their’ savings bank.
Since local politicians are often members of the banks’ supervisory board, they should
have a profound knowledge about the bank’s operations and potential causes for the
distress event. By using taxpayers’ money, politicians can prevent the association
from taking inefficient restructuring measures or merger decisions. On the other
4This safety net does not provide deposit insurance, but a so-called institution guarantee. If the
association believes that a specific bank has severe solvency problems it may organize a distressed
merger (Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe 2004).
5See Section 4.2 for details on the composition of the associations’ boards as well as the consti-
tution of these associations.
6About one third of the distress events in our sample constitute capital injections from the
owner.
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hand, it could be that local politicians base their decisions on personal interests (e.g,
their probability of re-election) or ideology. In addition, politicians may value to have
a savings bank under their control, since they can influence important credit allo-
cation decisions, organizational policies and the distribution of the banks’ earnings
(Sapienza 2004). If the association merges a distressed savings bank with another
savings bank, politicians are likely to loose their influence within the new bank.
While capital injections by the politician can prevent this outcome, voters may per-
ceive the bailout as a waste of taxpayers’ money and may punish the politician in the
subsequent election. In a sense, voters exert discipline on the politician who decides
on the bailout.
Our empirical setup allows us to differentiate between these two alternative ex-
planations. If local politicians are better informed in comparison to associations,
no statistical relationship between political variables such as the electoral cycle or
the competitiveness of the political process and capital injections should exist. The
same is true for ideology: If politicians’ decisions are only driven by local knowledge,
we should not observe differences in bailout probabilities between conservative and
non-conservative politicians.
For a sample of 148 distress events of German savings banks between 1994 and
2010, we find that politicians’ interests and ideology have a major impact on their
bailout decisions. Politicians are about 30 % less likely to inject capital into a
distressed bank in the twelve months before an election as compared with the twelve
months following an election. If there is high competition in the electoral process,
a political bailout is 15 % less likely. Also a politician’s ideology explains bailout
decisions: Capital injections are 18 % less likely if the politician is a member of the
conservative party, reflecting the conservative ideology of limited state interventions.
These findings clearly suggest that local knowledge obtained from close proximity to
the bank is not the main driver of politicians’ bailout decisions. Rather, decisions
seem to be motivated by personal interests. The findings are robust to the inclusion
of a wide set of macroeconomic as well as bank-specific control variables.
We further find that politicians in municipalities with a high fiscal deficit are
less likely to bail out distressed banks. This can be interpreted as an example for
the disciplining effects of fiscal federalism. Moreover, we do not find that personal
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connections between the board of the association and the board of the respective
bank in distress affect the associations’ decision to support the bank. This suggests
that the decision process at the association is rather transparent and follows pre-
determined rules.
In the second part of the paper we evaluate consequences of political bailouts.
In particular, we compare developments at banks that received capital injections
from the owner to developments at banks that were supported by the association.
Such a comparison could be subject to selection bias for two reasons: First, we do
not have accounting information on banks that were involved in a distressed merger
following the event. Since the association may decide to organize distressed merg-
ers for those banks with the worst prospects, comparing the remaining association
bailouts to the average owner bailout could suffer from a bias. Second, there might
be unobserved variables that jointly affect the politician’s bailout decision and the
future performance of the bank.
In order to address the first concern we focus on a sample of banks that do
not have a potential merger partner in their association. Further, we use the fact
that political and ideological variables are important determinants for politicians’
bailout decisions. Apart from their influence on the probability of a bailout by
the politician, the dummies for the electoral cycle, for competitive counties and
for conservative bank chairmen should not have an influence on a bank’s future
performance. Therefore, we can use these variables as instruments. The comparison
of the long-run performance of banks bailed out by the owner and banks bailed out
by the association yields a consistent pattern: Banks that obtained support from the
association perform better and are also better capitalized in the years following the
distress event.
It could be that politicians are not primarily concerned about the health of the
bank itself, but rather care about the general economic development within their
region. As a final piece of evidence, we compare the development of county-level
macroeconomic variables around the distress events. We do not find differential
effects on aggregate lending in counties with different types of events. However,
following the distress event, the share of all loans within a given county that are
extended by state banks increases in counties with owner bailouts and decreases
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in countries with support measures from the association. Both in counties with
bailouts from the owner and in counties with support measures from the association,
the GDP growth rate is relatively stable. Similarly, there are no significant changes
in the share of employees within the population. Overall, we do not observe a better
macroeconomic performance of counties in which the bank distress event was resolved
by the owner as compared with the association.
The German savings bank sector provides an ideal set-up for our analysis for
several reasons. First, savings banks in Germany represent a relatively homogeneous
group. They operate in predefined geographic regions and are small in comparison
to commercial banks. Consequently, bailout decisions concerning these banks are
not distorted by too-big-to-fail arguments. Second, the savings bank organization
has an extensive guarantee system that ensures the solvency and liquidity of its
member institutions. Assuming that the organization’s decisions on capital injections
and distressed mergers are driven by economic considerations, they provide an ideal
benchmark against which the decisions by local politicians can be evaluated. Third,
institutional quality in Germany is rather high (e.g., corruption is extremely low).
Therefore, the impact of political and ideological factors that we examine is not
distorted by other institutional issues. Finally—and perhaps most importantly—
Deutsche Bundesbank provides detailed information about distress events of savings
banks that allows us to identify the capital injections of different parties as well as
other restructuring measures around the event.
Our paper has important policy implications on the optimal proximity between
banks and politicians or regulators that decide on bailouts. Although close proximity
between politicians and banks might result in local knowledge for the decision maker,
we document that outcomes are driven by personal incentives and ideology. A larger
distance between policymakers and banks requires policymakers to rely on broad
perspective. However, a larger distance is also likely to reduce personal stakes of
politicians, and may therefore result in more efficient decisions on financial sector
interventions. Our findings can be considered as relevant for the debate about the
optimal level of banking supervision in the United States (Agarwal et al. 2012b),
or the discussion about a unified banking supervision within the Euro zone. Since
bailout decisions have dramatic consequences on the resulting market structure as
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well as on banks’ risk taking7, an understanding of politicians’ incentives is of major
importance.
This paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first one that explicitly examines
how political incentives affect bank bailout decisions in a developed country. The
most related paper is Brown and Dinc¸ (2005), who find for a sample of 21 emerging
markets that failures of the largest banks in these countries are significantly more
likely directly after an election as compared with the time before an election. While
their paper is about the delay of bad news about bank failures prior to elections,
we provide evidence that local politicians exploit their power to keep control of a
bank if political circumstances allow it. Furthermore, we broaden the analysis by
investigating not only the influence of the electoral cycle, but also the one of political
competition and ideology. Another example of political influence on bank bailout
decisions is provided by Imai (2009). He shows that bank regulators in Japan delay
declarations of bank insolvency in counties that support senior politicians of the
party in power.8 Dinc¸ (2005) and Sapienza (2004) show that government-owned
banks increase their lending in election years relative to private banks.9
Our paper also relates to the current literature on public bailout policies and
moral hazard. Dam and Koetter (2012) show that bailout expectations among Ger-
man banks that are partly explained by political variables influence the risk-taking
behavior of these banks. Banks that are more likely to be bailed out engage in ad-
ditional risk-taking. Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel (2011) argue that an increase of
the bailout probability of a bank increases risk taking incentives of the competing
banks since government guarantees distort competition.
Finally, our paper is related to a broader literature on the political economy of
finance. Especially in the aftermath of the recent crisis, several papers examine how
legislation on the financial industry is affected by lobbying of special interest groups
7See Dam and Koetter (2012), Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel (2011).
8The influence of political incentives on bailout decisions is not constrained to the banking
sector. Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) find that firms in 35 countries are more likely to be
bailed out by the government if one of their top officers or a large shareholder is a member of the
national government or parliament.
9For Germany, Vins (2008) and Englmaier and Stowasser (2012) examine how savings banks
adjust their behavior around elections. They find that layoffs of employees, closures of branches
or merger activities of these banks are significantly less likely prior to an election. At the same
time, savings banks increase their lending around elections in order to induce favorable economic
outcomes for the politicians.
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and voter interests (Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2010, 2012, McCarty et al. 2010). Lob-
bying by financial institutions affects the regulatory environment and might have
negative consequences for financial stability (see Romer and Weingast 1991 for the
U.S. in the 1980s). Kroszner and Strahan (1999) provide evidence that special inter-
ests of the financial industry affected the timing of bank branch deregulation in the
U.S. Similarly, Nunez and Rosenthal (2004) show that both ideology and interest
group interventions are important for U.S. legislation on bankruptcy. In another
recent paper, Agarwal et al. (2012a) examine whether the foreclosure decisions of
banks during the recent crisis reflect these banks’ political concerns and find that
banks delayed foreclosures on mortgages located in districts whose representatives are
members of the Financial Services Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives.
Again, politicians and bankers seem to affect each others actions. Compared to the
papers mentioned above our study takes a somewhat different approach. Rather than
investigating how decisions of politicians are influenced by the financial industry, we
concentrate on politicians’ incentives to keep control of a bank that is currently in
their sphere of influence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next sections provides
an overview of our institutional setup. In Section 4.3 we describe the construction of
our dataset. Results on the influence of political variables on bailout decisions among
German savings banks are presented in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, we examine how
the consequences of bailouts depend on the type of the bailout. Finally, we conclude
in Section 4.6.
4.2 Institutional background: Local politicians and
the German savings bank sector
The German financial sector can be classified as bank-based, with a universal banking
system. One of the particularities of the German banking sector is its so-called three-
pillar structure, referring to the three different legal ownership forms of German
banks. The three forms are savings banks, private banks and credit cooperatives.
The focus in this paper is on savings banks that granted 24.3 % of all corporate loans
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and 25.4 % of all consumer loans in Germany in 2010.10 At this point in time, the
savings bank association consisted of 429 individual banks with a combined balance
sheet total of e 1,084 billion, 15,600 branches and about 250,000 employees.
The structure of the German savings banking sector is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Each savings bank operates in a predefined geographic area. By statutes, the savings
banks do not compete with each other and only operate in the geographic region of
the municipality that formally owns the bank. Since savings banks are owned by
the local municipalities, the head of the municipal government, who is either a city
mayor or a county administrator, is the chairman of each savings bank’s supervisory
board. We exploit this link between politicians and banks in the empirical analysis
of our paper. The position as a chairman gives local politicians a strong influence on
the appointment of the banks’ management, the distribution of its earnings and—as
they have a say on the allocation of large loans—the distribution of credit.11 The
supervisory board has about 15 members and the members besides the chairman
consist of representatives from local authorities as well as savings bank employees.
The representatives from local authorities make up about two thirds of the board
members and are in most cases politicians from the local parliament.
The individual savings banks are connected through twelve savings bank associ-
ations at the state level.12 These associations operate guarantee funds in order to
ensure the liquidity and solvency of their member institutions in case of distress.
The guarantee funds function like an insurance scheme: If one of its members gets
into distress, the other banks in the association have to step in and provide support.
Specifically, the resources for the guarantee funds are provided by the individual
savings banks within the association.13 The main support measures are capital in-
10All numbers are taken from Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe (2010). The German market for cor-
porate loans had a volume of e 1,306 billion and the German market for consumer loans had a
volume of e 229 billion in 2010. The shares given in the text are calculated as percentages of these
volumes.
11Since savings banks are on average small institutions, large loans bear a particular risk for these
banks. Therefore these banks generally have a credit committee in place which has to approve loans
made by the bank that exceed a certain volume. Local politicians are often members of this credit
committee.
12The associations do not exactly match the 16 German states. For example, four of the for-
mer GDR states form a single association. The twelve organizations also form the “Deutscher
Sparkassen- und Giroverband” at the federal level.
13The savings bank sector operates a three-layer liability scheme where the regional funds con-
stitute the first layer. If the funds of an individual association are not sufficient to support one of
its member institutions the other associations have to step in due to a supraregional compensation
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Figure 4.1: Institutional setup
Figure 4.1 illustrates the institutional setup for our analysis. The main institutions are the savings
bank associations that operate the savings bank guarantee funds, the local counties or cities that
own and back the individual banks, and of course the banks themselves. The figure shows that
there are several personal and institutional connections within this system.
jections and debt guarantees. If a savings bank receives support from the association
it has to agree on a restructuring plan that may include an organizational restruc-
turing, a dismissal of the management and—in the worst case—a merger of the bank
with another bank in the association.14 In this case, the chairman of the bank will
lose her/his position. Also a restructuring plan can pose severe restrictions on a
bank’s operations and, hence, constrain the power of the chairman. Alternatively,
politicians can step in and use taxpayers’ money to inject capital into the savings
bank. In this case, the supervisory board can decide about potential restructuring
measures without any intervention from the association. Hence, using taxpayers’
scheme. If these funds are still not sufficient, there is a joint liability scheme with central savings
banks (“Landesbanken”) and central building societies (“Landesbausparkassen”).
14The decision on support measures is made by the board of the association, which is elected
by the assembly of the association. Each member institution sends three people—usually the
chairman of the board, the director of the bank and another member of the board—to the annual
assembly of their association. At these meetings, members of the board of the association are elected
among participants for terms that last for four to five years (see, e.g., Rheinischer Sparkassen- und
Giroverband 2009 for more information).
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money to save the banks allows politicians to prevent restructuring measures by the
association. As we will document in the subsequent section (Section 4.3.3), there
is considerably less restructuring in cases where the local politician instead of the
association organizes the bailout of the savings bank. The main task of our em-
pirical analysis is to understand the motives of politicians who inject money into a
savings bank. In particular, we investigate whether their decision is based on su-
perior information about the economic situation of the savings banks or political
considerations.
Since supervisory boards of our sample banks are chaired by local politicians, we
briefly summarize the German political system. Germany is organized as a parlia-
mentary democracy with three layers of government: The federal republic, 16 states
(“Bundesla¨nder”), and 402 county districts consisting of 295 rural counties that are
headed by local administrators, and 107 urban municipalities that are headed by
city mayors. Separate elections on each layer take place in regular intervals. The
focus of our paper is on the elections in rural countries and urban municipalities
that take place every five years.15 County/city elections take place at the same point
in time within a state, but these points may differ across states. However, several
German states have their county/city elections in the same year, so that we identify
four main electoral cycles that correspond to the relevant elections for most of our
sample banks.16
4.3 Data
Our analysis covers the German savings bank sector over the period from 1994 to
2010. We combine several confidential data sets from the Bundesbank’s supervisory
15Laws on these elections are enacted at the state level. While the electoral cycle for county/city
parliaments is five years in almost all German states(with the exception of Bavaria and Bremen,
that have a six year and a four year cycle, respectively), there are some differences in the elections
of local heads of government. In many German states mayors or district administrators are directly
elected in separate elections that take place on the same day as the election of the local parliament.
However, in some states the terms of mayors or district administrators are longer than the terms
of local parliaments, whereas in other states the local head of government is appointed by the local
parliament (and not directly elected). In order to be consistent across states, we focus on the timing
of parliamentary elections on the county or city level in the empirical analysis. These elections are
important for the bank’s chairman as well as other members of the bank’s supervisory board.
16These cycles are 1994-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2008 and 2009-2010.
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and statistics departments to compile a unique dataset that allows us to cleanly
identify distress events of savings banks. In the first part of this section we explain the
construction of this distress event variable. In the second part we describe bank-level
and macroeconomic variables, while the third part illustrates restructuring activities
around the distress events in our sample. The final part introduces the political
variables and explains the motivation behind them.
4.3.1 Distress events
We define a particular savings bank to be in distress in a given year whenever it ei-
ther receives external support (in form of capital injections and/or guarantees) from
the owner and/or association or when it is taken over by another savings bank in
a distressed merger. Identifying distress events in the savings bank sector is cum-
bersome, since not all kinds of potential support measures can be identified from
banks’ balance sheets (e.g., guarantees provided by third parties do not show up in
the balance sheet). Furthermore, many savings banks have been involved in mergers
without being in distress. We therefore combine four sources from Deutsche Bundes-
bank’s supervisory data to cleanly identify distress events; that is, the Bundesbank’s
prudential data base for banking supervision (BAKIS), the monthly balance sheet
statistics (BISTA), the borrowers’ statistics, and the Bundesbank’s data base on
distress events (see Appendix for a detailed description of the four underlying data
sets). Additionally, we consult local media coverage on distress events obtained from
the GENIOS data base in order to verify our event dates.
First, we identify capital support measures by the owner (i.e., local politicians)
by exploiting a peculiarity in savings banks’ balance sheets. For historical reasons,
the equity of these banks usually consists solely of contingency funds (so called
“Sicherheitsru¨cklage”). These funds were originally provided by the owner of the
bank in the year of foundation and then accumulated over the years out of the
bank’s retained earnings. However, if the savings bank—besides its equity in the
contingency funds—also has subscribed capital unequal to zero, then this usually
indicates an undisclosed participation of the bank owner (so-called “stille Einlage”).
We therefore define an increase in subscribed capital that cannot be explained by
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takeovers or restructuring of equity positions as capital injections from the bank
owner.17 By using historical data of subscribed capital from the monthly balance
sheet data (BISTA) we are able to identify the size of the capital injection as well as
the particular month in which the event occurred.
Second, we code capital support measures by the savings bank association. When-
ever one of the associations provides support to a savings bank—most often in the
form of guarantees—this event is recorded in the so called “Sonderdatenkatalog 1”
of the BAKIS database.18 The data source is, however, only available at annual fre-
quency. To determine the month of these events within a given year, we consult two
further databases: First, we obtain data on capital adequacy ratios from the monthly
balance sheet database BISTA;19 and second, we identify large write-offs from the
borrowers’ loan statistics that is available on a quarterly basis.20 We are therefore
able to verify our identified events from two distinct Bundesbank data sources. In
those cases in which we can only identify the respective quarter, we always assign
the mid month of the respective quarter as the event month. We cross-check our
event dates with media coverage on local distress events obtained from the GENIOS
data base and find that the dates are broadly consistent with the coverage in the
local press. There are some cases where savings banks received support from the
association and the owner within the same year (four cases); we assign these events
to the source that provided the larger amount of funds.21
Third, we obtain information on distressed mergers from the Bundesbank database
on distress events.22 A takeover of a distressed savings bank is organized by the
17In some German states the savings bank law allows undisclosed participation not only from the
owner of the bank, but also from the savings bank association. However, this is the rare exception
and we rule out these cases using the BAKIS database as described in the subsequent paragraph.
18Banks are legally bound to report this information to Bundesbank and BaFin. In contrast to
pure balance sheet information this dataset contains confidential supervisory information.
19Large increases in the capital adequacy ratio in a certain month indicate that the savings bank
received capital support at this time. Capital adequacy ratios in the BISTA are available on a
monthly basis until the end of 2007, and on a quarterly basis from 2008 on.
20Large write-offs on loans in a given month indicate that the savings bank experienced a dis-
tress event at this time. Loan portfolio write-off data is available from 2002 on in the borrowers’
statistics; therefore, it can be used to double-check the information on the timing of bailout events,
in particular by the banking association, for roughly half of the time-period of our dataset. For
the period before 2002 we have to rely on the evolution of the capital adequacy ratio in order to
identify the timing of the distress event within a year.
21All results also hold if we exclude these cases.
22As the distress database is only available until 2006, we define distressed mergers in the years
2007-2010 as passive mergers where the bank that was taken over experienced a severe distress
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savings bank association which identifies another savings bank in close geographic
proximity to acquire the bank in distress. While capital injections as well as provi-
sions of guarantees occur right after the bank falls short of regulatory capital (the
distress event), there is generally a time gap between the actual distress event and
the merger. In order to identify the actual date of the distress event we once more
rely on large write-offs from the borrowers’ loan statistics (as described above). For
the savings bank that had a distressed merger before 2002 (the year when the bor-
rowers’ statistics database was initiated) we consult local media coverage from the
GENIOS data base where it is available. For the remaining cases we have to make an
assumption about the date of the distress event: We assume that the distress event
occurred in December of the year before the actual merger took place.23 As we are
mainly interested in identifying whether a distress event took place before or after
an election, this assumption is critical only for those cases where the distress event
occurred within an election year. These are very few cases and excluding them does
not affect our main findings.24
Overall, we identify 148 distress events of German savings banks during our
sample period from 1994 to 2010. Among these 148 distress event, more than one
third was resolved by capital injections from the owner (55 cases). The remaining 93
events were dealt with by the association. Out of these 93 cases, 44 banks experienced
a distressed merger in the year following the distress event (see Table 4.1, Panel A).
A definition of all variables is provided in Table 4.9 in the Appendix.
4.3.2 Bank and macroeconomic variables
Annual bank balance sheet data for all German savings banks is based on the un-
consolidated balance sheet and income statement reports provided by the BAKIS
event in the three years before the merger (i.e., a moratorium, a capital support measure, or a very
low capital ratio).
23We have also experimented with setting the month at March, June or September of the year
before the distressed merger. Our results are unaffected by this choice.
24Out of the distress events resolved by the saving banks association, we have to make an
assumption for seven events that occur within an election year. Assuming that these events took
place in December actually biases our results against finding a significant effect of the electoral
cycle, as some of them might have happened before the election and our main argument is that
directly before an election support measures by the association are relatively more likely than
support measures by the owner. Hence, assuming that these events took place in December is the
most conservative assumption we can make.
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Table 4.1 continued...
Panel C: Macro & Other variables All banks Support from owner Support from association
Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D.
GDPPC growth (in %) 8,246 1.288 3.816 636 1.040 3.925 706 1.874 4.034
GDPPC (in e) 8,228 23,771 8,528 636 27,280 7,931 706 22,648 6,542
Log(GDPPC) 8,228 10.024 0.313 636 10.173 0.285 706 9.988 0.281
Government debt / GDP (in %) 8,246 4.623 1.983 636 3.931 2.028 706 4.862 2.241
Panel D: Political variables Obs. Support from Support from
owner association
All 148 0.372 0.628
12-24 months before election 31 0.355 0.645
0-12 months before election 26 0.154 0.846
0-12 months after election 30 0.500 0.500
12-24 months after election 34 0.441 0.559
24-36 months after election 27 0.370 0.630
No competitive county 73 0.438 0.562
Competitive county 75 0.307 0.693
No conservative chairman 88 0.455 0.545
Conservative chairman 60 0.250 0.750
The table shows descriptive statistics for the banks in our sample. In Panel A we report the number of distress events, where we distinguish between support
measures from the owner and support measures from the association. Panel B shows descriptive statistics for key bank variables. The unit of observation is
a bank-year. The first three columns show statistics for all banks in our sample, whereas the other columns include only bank-year observation of banks that
experienced support measures from the owner or the association during our sample period. Panel C provides descriptive statistics for macro control variables
and a dummy variable that we use in the empirical analysis. Finally, Panel D shows the distribution of capital injections from the owner and support measures
by the association, and how this distribution depends on political variables. For example, of the 148 distress events in our sample, 37.2 % were capital injections
from the owner, while 62.8 % were support measures from the association. Depending on the values of the political variables this distribution differs.
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database.25 Table 4.1, Panel B, provides sample statistics for balance sheet items
used in the empirical analysis. We compare the values of banks that had a distress
event during our sample period with those of the average savings bank (633 in total).
Banks that received capital injections from the owner are larger than average, both
in terms of total assets as well as in terms of total assets divided by county-level
GDP, while banks that were supported by the association are of similar size as the
average bank.26 Further, the bank’s regional market share (proxied by the share of
branches within the county) is slightly higher than the sample mean for banks that
received support from the owner and significantly lower than average for banks that
received support from the association. Overall, these descriptive statistics suggest
that banks that are relatively important (as measured by size) tend to be bailed out
by the owner.
Not surprisingly, the ratio of total equity to total assets is lower for banks that
experienced either type of support measure. Moreover, these banks also have a lower
ROA and a higher ratio of non-performing loans to customer loans on average. In
contrast, the deposit ratio (savings deposits, term deposits, and time deposits to
total assets) is significantly lower for banks that received support from the owner.
The table further reports statistics on the amount of loans granted by the bank to
its owner divided by county-level GDP, which is slightly higher for banks that obtain
support measures from the owner as compared to those banks that are supported by
the association.
We define an additional variable that we use in the empirical analysis for the 148
distress cases. The dummy variable Bank Chairman in Ass. Board indicates whether
the distressed bank’s chairman is also a member of the board of the association.27
As the board of the association makes the decision on potential support measures
by the association, the bank’s chairman might be able to influence this decision if he
25We apply a very thorough merger treatment to the dataset: After the merger of two banks
we artificially create a third bank (for the time after the merger) in the dataset. Note that the
merger treatment causes the total number of banks in the dataset to exceed the maximum number
of banks in a given time period.
26A definition of all variables is provided in Table 4.9 in the Appendix.
27Information on the composition of the boards of the association at each point in time is hand-
collected from the respective annual reports of the associations. We carefully match association
board members with chairmen of the individual banks by comparing both the name of the chairman
as well as the county/city he is from.
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is a member of this board. Overall, the politician is also member of the association
board in 20% of the savings banks considered.
Our regional variables are gathered from various data sources. We obtain in-
formation on county level GDP per capita, its growth rate as well as the ratio of
government debt to GDP on the county/city level from the 16 German State Sta-
tistical Offices. Descriptive statistics for these variables are provided in Panel C of
Table 4.1. On average, banks experiencing a bailout by the politician are located in
a municipality with lower GDP growth in comparison to the municipalities of banks
that are bailed out by the association. Furthermore, municipalities where politi-
cians conduct bailouts have a higher GDP per capita and are less indebted than the
average municipality.
4.3.3 Restructuring efforts following bailouts
Having introduced bank-level variables, we can illustrate differences in restructuring
between bailouts by politicians and bailouts by the association. Table 4.2 presents
the growth rates in customer loans, employees, personal expenditures and the num-
ber of branches of the bank around the bailout events. As we have no accounting
information on the operations of savings banks that were merged with other banks,
we have to exclude these banks for this table. If politicians try to avoid painful
restructuring measures of savings banks in distress, consequences for stakeholders
should be more severe for banks that receive capital support from the association.
The first line of the table shows the average annual growth rate prior to the
event of those banks that experienced the respective type of distress event during
our sample period. For example, banks that received support from the association
during our sample period had an average customer loan growth rate of 6.3 % in
the years between the beginning of our sample period in 1994 and the year of the
distress event. Similarly, column 2 shows that the average growth rate was 5.8 %
for those banks that received capital injections from the owner and column 3 shows
that the difference between the two groups of banks is not significant. In the bailout
year, the average growth rate is significantly lower than the pre-event average for
both types of events. However, the decline in the average growth rate is more than
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twice as large if the funds are provided by the association, and column 3 shows that
customer loan growth in the bailout year is significantly higher if the bank is saved
by the owner. The effect is similar in the year following the bailout, in the second
and even in the third year after the bailout. This indicates that the restructuring
plan imposed by the association has severe consequences for the bank’s customers.
This effect is dampened if the support measures come from the owner of the bank.
Politicians try to avoid consequences for the customers of the bank, a behavior that
is consistent with the personal interest explanation if one keeps in mind that the
customers of the bank are in many cases identical to the politician’s constituents.
A similar effect can be observed if we look at employee growth rates: Except
for the second year after the bailout, there is no significant decline in the employee
growth rate for banks that receive capital injections from the owner, which is rather
surprising given that distress events usually lead to an organizational restructuring.
In contrast, employee growth rates are significantly lower around capital support
measures from the association. As expected, restructuring a bank in distress involves
layoffs. Unfortunately we have information on the number of branches of the banks
in our sample only until 2004, which reduces the number of observations. However,
evidence points into the same direction as with the employee growth rate: The decline
in the number of branches seems to be more severe for support measures from the
association. The growth rate of personnel expenditures is somewhat lower around
both types of events, and the difference between the two is not significant. To a
certain extent, also employees at banks that are supported by the owner suffer from
the distress event. Overall, however, the evidence suggests that politicians try to
limit these negative consequences for stakeholders in the bank by conducting almost
no restructuring activities.
4.3.4 Political variables
As explained in Section 4.2, local politicians often chair the supervisory board of the
savings bank in their municipality. We hand-collect information on the identity and
the position of distressed savings banks’ chairmen from the banks’ annual reports
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Table 4.2: Change in key variables
Percentage Change in... Customer Loans Employees Personnel Expenditures Number of Branches
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Association Owner Difference Association Owner Difference Association Owner Difference Association Owner Difference
Pre Bailout Mean 0,063 0,058 0,004 -0,007 -0,001 -0,006 0,038 0,033 0,006 -0,013 -0,027 0,014
Median 0,057 0,059 -0,006 -0,003 0,037 0,029 0,000 0,000
S.D. 0,078 0,069 0,055 0,044 0,105 0,071 0,074 0,091
Obs. 169 266 169 266 169 266 151 244
Bailout Year Mean 0,000*** 0,028*** -0,028** -0,009 0,004 -0,013 0,020 0,028 -0,008 -0,081*** -0,102*** 0,021
Median -0,010 0,020 -0,014 -0,005 0,018 0,036 0,000 -0,010
S.D. 0,062 0,057 0,071 0,062 0,084 0,065 0,152 0,187
Obs. 41 54 41 54 39 54 32 32
Bailout Year + 1 Mean -0,016*** 0,016*** -0,032*** -0,028** -0,004 -0,023* 0,004* 0,004** -0,001 -0,087*** -0,039 -0,048
Median -0,030 0,016 -0,017 -0,014 0,010 0,016 0,000 0,000
S.D. 0,066 0,041 0,050 0,063 0,087 0,073 0,188 0,074
Obs. 41 45 40 45 40 45 31 26
Bailout Year + 2 Mean -0,018*** 0,024*** -0,042*** -0,030** -0,014* -0,016* 0,008 0,019 -0,011 -0,141*** -0,128*** -0,013
Median -0,016 0,028 -0,027 -0,011 -0,003 0,019 -0,004 -0,033
S.D. 0,052 0,039 0,033 0,040 0,085 0,066 0,281 0,204
Obs. 33 38 33 38 33 38 24 23
Bailout Year + 3 Mean -0,014*** 0,025*** -0,039*** -0,038*** -0,011 -0,027* 0,013 0,006** 0,007 -0,110*** -0,029 -0,082
Median -0,007 0,022 -0,029 -0,021 0,008 0,015 -0,018 0,000
S.D. 0,044 0,050 0,042 0,064 0,056 0,068 0,228 0,116
Obs. 31 36 30 36 31 36 18 19
The table shows changes in key variables of savings banks around the years of capital injections. The first row shows pre-event statistics of banks that
experienced a distress event during our sample period. All bank-year observations prior to the event denoted on top of the column are included. The other
rows show the statistics for the event year as well as the years following the event. * indicates statistical significance at the 10 %-level, ** at the 5 %-level, and
*** at the 1 %-level, in a two-sided test of the mean of bank-year observations prior to the event and bank-year observations in the respective year around the
event (columns 1-2, 4-5, 7-8, and 10-11). In columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 * indicates statistical significance at the 10 %-level, ** at the 5 %-level, and *** at the
1 %-level, in a two-sided test of the mean of bank-year observations of banks that received capital injections from the association and bank-year observations
of banks that received capital injections from the owner in the respective year around the event.
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as published in the Bundesanzeiger.28 We use various internet sources in order to
determine the party membership of these chairmen. Results and dates of elections
on the county/city level are obtained from the 16 German State Statistical Offices.
We carefully match counties and cities with municipal owners of our sample banks.29
In this way, we are able to obtain information on the elections in all municipalities
that own one of our sample banks.
In the following analysis we test whether there is a statical relationship between
a politician’s decision to provide support to a bank and the electoral cycle. To do so,
we define Electoral Cycle Dummies as follows: The dummy variable D(0-12 months)
takes a value of one during the 12 months after the local election and zero otherwise.
The dummy variables D(12-24 months) takes a value of one for the time from the
12th to the 24th month following the local election and zero otherwise. The dummy
variables D(24-36 months) and D(36-48 months) are defined accordingly. The 12
months preceding an election serve as the benchmark category against which the
other time periods are evaluated.
Additionally, local politicians who care about their probability of being re-elected
may base their bailout decision on the political competitiveness of their city/county.
We thus define the variable Competitive County as follows: We calculate the vote
share margin between the first and the second party within the county/city from the
respective state election.30 We then define a dummy that is equal to one if the vote
share margin is smaller than the median and zero otherwise. We take this as a proxy
for political competition within the county/city: The smaller the vote share margin
between the first and the second party, the more intense the political competition
and the more effective the disciplining role voters can exert on politicians.
As laid out in the introduction, a politician’s bailout decisions might be influ-
enced by his/her ideology. To proxy for a politician’s ideology we define the dummy
28This information is available online from 2006 onwards (www.bundesanzeiger.de). For earlier
observations, we consulted microfiche versions of the Bundesanzeiger provided by the university
and regional library in Bonn.
29In cases where several municipalities jointly own a savings bank there is generally one dominant
county or city that owns the largest share of the bank. We account for this by matching the
respective bank to the county or city in which its headquarters are located.
30 We use county/city level state election results as a proxy for political competitiveness as
these elections are relatively similar across states so that results from different states can easily be
compared to one another.
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variable Cons. Bank Chairman: The variable is equal to one if the chairman of the
bank is a member of the German conservative party (“CDU/CSU”). A fundamental
conservative principle is the one of limited government intervention in markets. If
politicians act according to this principle, we would expect less capital injections
from the owner if the chairman of the bank is a CDU/CSU member.
In Table 4.1, Panel D, we display the relationship between the political/ideological
variables introduced in this section and our identified distress events. The relative
frequencies of capital injections by politicians display a clear pattern over the elec-
toral cycle: In the 12 months before the election, the share of owner-bailouts in all
distress events is considerably lower (15.4 %) than in the 12 months following the
election (50.0 %). Further, the likelihood of a bailout by the politician in a com-
petitive county/city is around 31 % conditional on bank distress, compared with
44 % in non-competitive counties/cities. Finally, out of our 148 distress events, 88
cases occurred at banks where the chairman is not a member of the conservative
party (”CDU/CSU”), while the other 60 cases occurred at banks with a conservative
party chairman. Capital injections from the owner are much less frequent when the
chairman of the bank is a politician from a conservative party. This seems to be in
line with the conservative ideology of limited state intervention.
To sum up, the descriptive analysis suggests a strong relationship between polit-
ical and ideological variables and politicians willingness to use taxpayers’ money to
support banks in distress. This relationship should not be present if politicians base
their intervention decisions on superior information obtained in their roles as bank
chairmen.
4.4 Political determinants of bank bailouts
In this section, we present the results of our empirical analysis. We start by inves-
tigating the timing of distress events by applying a hazard model. We proceed by
modeling the owner’s decision to bail out a bank conditional on distress. Finally, we
end the section by examining the impact of the fiscal situation of the municipality
as well as other political factors on the owner’s bailout decision.
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4.4.1 The timing of distress events
Figure 4.2 displays the distribution of distress events over the electoral cycle. Panel A
focuses on capital injections from the owner and displays a clear pattern over the
electoral cycle: Capital injections from the owner are less likely in the 12 months
before an election, while support measures by the association are relatively evenly
distributed over the cycle (Panel B). Panel C shows the distribution of all 148 distress
events over the electoral cycle. Although the bar for the 12 months before the election
is a bit lower than the other ones, we do not observe a clear relationship between
bank distress events per se and the electoral cycle in Germany. This is in contrast to
findings for emerging economies (Brown and Dinc¸ 2005), which might be explained
by a strong supervision of the banking sector, requiring the disclosure of monthly
capital adequacy ratios. In such a supervisory environment bankers do not have the
opportunity to delay distress events.
We formally test whether the electoral cycle influences the timing of bank distress
events by using a hazard model. Potentially, if banks know about differences in
politicians’ willingness to bail them out, they might have an incentive to delay distress
events. We define the period from the beginning of our sample in 1994 until a distress
event as the time until distress for each bank. Thus, the hazard rate, h(t), is the
probability that a bank distress occurs at time t, given that no distress occurred until
then. Following Brown and Dinc¸ (2005), we test whether distress events depend on
the electoral cycle, using an exponential hazard model:
hi(t) = exp(β
′
0 · xit−1 + β′1 · Electoral Cycleit + β′2 · timet + β3 · associationi) (4.1)
where xit−1 denotes a vector of covariates for bank i at time or duration t − 1; β
is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. The vector Electoral Cycleit
includes our dummies for the electoral cycle. In the case of no failure, the electoral
cycle dummies take a value of one if the bank’s accounting year t falls into the
respective period. The regression also includes time as well as association fixed
effects. Since the cycles of the local elections are to a large extent synchronized (see
Section 4.2), year fixed effects would absorb the Electoral Cycleit. Therefore, we
define time fixed effects which take the value of one during one particular election
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Panel A: Capital injections by owner
Panel B: Support measures by association
Panel C: Total distress events (Panel A + Panel B)
Figure 4.2: Support measures and the electoral cycle
Figure 4.2 illustrates how the number of banks that receive support measures varies over the
electoral cycle, where the vertical black line indicates the election date. The top panel shows
the number of capital injections from the owner, the second panel shows the number of support
measures by the association, i.e. the number of capital injections from the association plus the
number of distressed mergers, and the third panel shows the sum of the first two panels across the
electoral cycle.
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Table 4.3: Hazard model
All
(1) (2) (3)
D(0-12 months after) 0.319 0.445 -0.069
(0.432) (0.478) (0.585)
D(12-24 months after) 0.181 0.183 -0.330
(0.329) (0.387) (0.574)
D(24-36 months after) 0.072 -0.135 -0.311
(0.333) (0.362) (0.442)
D(12-24 months before) 0.484 0.582 0.370
(0.382) (0.462) (0.548)
Total Assets / GDP (t-1) 0.043 0.069
(0.177) (0.178)
Capital Ratio (t-1) -0.107 -0.317*
(0.117) (0.168)
ROA (t-1) -0.416*** -0.470***
(0.125) (0.135)
NPL Ratio (t-1) -0.001 -0.001***
(0.001) (0.000)
Market Share (t-1) -0.013** -0.019**
(0.006) (0.008)
Deposit Ratio (t-1) -0.018** -0.035**
(0.008) (0.015)
GDPPC Growth (t-1) 0.020 -0.002
(0.030) (0.036)
Log(GDPPC) (t-1) -0.416 -0.646***
(0.345) (0.121)
Time Dummies YES YES YES
Association Dummies NO NO YES
Observations 8,232 8,135 8,135
The table shows results for the following exponential hazard model:
hi(t) = exp(β
′
0 · xit−1 + β′1 · Electoral Cycleit + β′2 · timet + β3 · associationi),
where xit−1 denotes the a vector of covariates for bank i at time or duration t− 1; β is a vector of
unknown parameters to be estimated. The vector Election Cycleit indicates our dummies for the
electoral cycle. Regressions include both savings banks that experienced a distress event during
our sample period and savings banks that did not. Time dummies indicate the four election cycles
in our sample (1994-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2008, 2009-end of sample), while association dummies
indicate the regional savings bank association of the bank. Standard errors are clustered by year.
* indicates statistical significance at the 10 %-level, ** at the 5 %-level, and *** at the 1 %-level.
cycle (5 year interval) and zero otherwise (see Section 4.2). Standard errors are
clustered by year.31 We also employed a simple probit model instead of the hazard
model, which yields very similar results.
The regressions include all bank-year observations for savings banks (those that
31Alternatively we cluster standard errors by association. This results in lower standard errors.
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experienced a distress event as well as those that did not), starting in 1994. Table 4.3
presents our findings for the relationship between all distress events and the electoral
cycle. In column 1 we only include time fixed effects as well as the Electoral Cycleit
dummies. None of the dummies are significant. Thus, there is no relationship be-
tween the timing of distress events of state owned banks and the electoral cycle in
Germany. This observation is unchanged if we add control variables in column 2.
The control variables indicate that distress is less likely for large (measured by mar-
ket share), profitable banks and those banks that take a higher fraction of customer
deposits. Association dummies are included in column 3 to control for the fact that
economic conditions differ among states. Results remain unchanged: There is no
statistical relationship between the electoral cycle and distress events.
Having shown that the occurrence of distress events does not depend on the
electoral cycle, we now turn to politicians’ decisions to inject money into a distressed
bank. We therefore focus on the 148 distress cases and examine how political and
ideological variables affect a politician’s decision to bail out one of these banks.
4.4.2 The impact of political factors on the bailout decision
by politicians
It is a priori unclear why politicians should conduct capital injections into savings
banks in distress, as the savings bank organization—as described in Section 4.2—
has an extensive guarantee system. By modeling a politician’s bailout decision we
aim at differentiating between two possible explanations for this decision: Either
the politician has more information about the economic situation of the bank and—
therefore—aims to avoid restructuring measures by the association; or the politician
cares about his/her probability of re-election and/or his/her ideology and therefore
bases his decision on these factors.
Figure 4.3 displays the frequency distribution of owner bailouts over the electoral
cycle on a biannual basis. Only one out of 55 cases of capital support by the owner
occurs in the six months directly preceding an election. This suggests that politicians
are reluctant to use taxpayers’ money in order to support a savings bank in distress
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Figure 4.3: Capital injections from the owner and electoral cycle
Figure 4.3 illustrates how the number of banks that receive capital injections from the owner varies
over the electoral cycle, where the vertical black line indicates the election date.
right before an election.32 The relative percentage of owner’s injections to total
distress events is shown in Figure 4.5. Again, there is a clear indication that the
probability of injecting money into a distressed bank is considerably lower in the
year before the election.
To test these patterns in a formal way, we use a linear probability model in
order to assess the relative likelihood of the two possible outcomes: Bailout by the
politician and support measures by the association. We use the 148 distress cases in
our sample to estimate the following equation:33
Event Typeijkt = associationj + timet + POL
′
ktβ +B
′
it−1γ + C
′
kt−1δ + ijkt, (4.2)
where i denotes the individual bank, j the association to which the bank belongs, k
the county or city of the bank, and t the year in which the distress event occurred.
32Note that Figure 4.3 is identical to Panel A of Figure 4.2, using a 6 months interval instead of
a 12 months interval. We used a 12 months interval in Figure 4.2 as we cannot identify the exact
timing within the year for some distressed merger events. When we add these events to the first
half of the year we create an artificial pattern of more events in the first six months compared to
the second six months (and the opposite if we add these events to the second part of the year).
33Using a nonlinear logit model gives results that are very similar to the results from our linear
specification (see Table 4.10 in the Appendix).
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The dependent variable is a dummy called Event Typeijkt and takes the value of one
if the bank distress is resolved by the politician and the value of zero if the distress
is resolved by the association.34 The political variables include dummy variables
for the electoral cycle, the political competition within the county, and the ideology
of the politician. They are summarized in the vector POLkt. Bank level control
variables are denoted by the vector Bit−1 and include the bank’s relative size to
county/city GDP, the capital ratio, the return on assets, the non-performing loans
ratio, the market share, and the deposit ratio. They are lagged by one year in order
to obtain pre-event values. Regional control variables are also lagged by one year
and include the level and the growth rate of county-level GDP per capita. They are
summarized in the vector Ckt−1. In our most stringent specification, we include two
sets of dummy variables, one of them indicating the association to which the bank
belongs and the other one indicating the time of the event. The specification further
includes a random error term ijkt. The primary variables of interest are the political
variables in the vector POLkt. Coefficients for these variables should be insignificant
if politicians’ decisions are driven by informational advantages, while they should be
significant if decisions are driven by politicians’ personal interests.
Table 4.4 presents estimation results for Equation (4.2). We start with a bench-
mark specification without any political variables in column 1. The regression shows
that larger banks or banks with a higher deposit ratio are less likely to receive cap-
ital injections from the owner. The opposite is true for banks with a higher local
market share. One could argue that these banks are more important for regional
development within the county and therefore the owner has a greater interest in
keeping control of the bank and wants to avoid a painful restructuring plan or even
a distressed merger. Finally, the regression shows that counties or cities with higher
GDP per capita growth are less likely to use taxpayers’ money in order to bail out
a savings bank in distress.
We proceed by stepwise including the political variables into the regression model.
Findings confirm our descriptive analysis presented in Panel D of Table 4.1. Political
variables seem to have a strong influence on the type of the bailout for a savings bank
34Cases in which both the association and the owner inject money into the bank are classified
as the category that contributed the larger amount of capital. See Section 4.3.1 for details.
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Table 4.4: Event type
Dependent Variable: Event Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Assets / GDP (t-1) -0.138** -0.177*** -0.116* -0.160** -0.157**
(0.056) (0.048) (0.060) (0.055) (0.059)
Capital Ratio (t-1) -0.034 -0.042 -0.019 -0.034 -0.065
(0.037) (0.045) (0.037) (0.044) (0.052)
ROA (t-1) 0.067 0.071 0.039 0.046 -0.017
(0.071) (0.058) (0.079) (0.063) (0.055)
NPL Ratio (t-1) -0.022* -0.021 -0.023* -0.022* -0.019*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Market Share (t-1) 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009** 0.009*** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Deposit Ratio (t-1) -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
GDPPC Growth (t-1) -0.020* -0.025** -0.019* -0.023** -0.021**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Log(GDPPC) (t-1) 0.030 0.040 -0.049 -0.051 0.016
(0.095) (0.113) (0.092) (0.114) (0.110)
D(0-12 months after) 0.286*** 0.301*** 0.265**
(0.082) (0.080) (0.102)
D(12-24 months after) 0.390*** 0.384*** 0.413***
(0.092) (0.088) (0.098)
D(24-36 months after) 0.230** 0.222** 0.233**
(0.090) (0.100) (0.088)
D(12-24 months before) 0.296** 0.310** 0.275*
(0.137) (0.129) (0.139)
Competitive County -0.150** -0.118 -0.166**
(0.068) (0.070) (0.077)
Cons. Bank Chairman -0.181** -0.200** -0.141
(0.080) (0.086) (0.081)
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Association Dummies NO NO NO NO YES
Observations 148 148 148 148 148
R-squared 0.240 0.305 0.277 0.341 0.490
The table shows results for an OLS estimation of the following equation:
Event Typeijkt = associationj + timet + POL
′
ktβ +B
′
it−1γ + C
′
kt−1δ + ijkt,
where i denotes the individual bank, j the association, k the county or city where the bank is located,
and t the year of the event. The dummy Event Typeijkt equals one if the bank received capital
injections from the owner and zero if the bank received support measures from the association. The
vector of political variables is denoted by POLkt, Bit−1 includes bank-level control variables, and
Ckt−1 is the vector of regional control variables. All columns include time dummies for the four
election cycles in our sample (1994-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2008, 2009-end of sample), and column 5
additionally includes a set of dummy variables that indicate the association of the bank. * indicates
statistical significance at the 10 %-level, ** at the 5 %-level, and *** at the 1 %-level.
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in distress. In the twelve months before an election, the probability that a politician
resolves a distressed bank is 23 to 36 percent lower as compared to the other years in
the electoral cycle (column 2). Politicians are about 15 percent less likely to support
a distressed bank if political competition within the county or city of the bank is
relatively high (column 3). This is in line with the personal interest explanation:
Voters exert more discipline if the political competition is more intense. Although a
politician might want to prevent restructuring of a distressed bank in order to keep it
under her control, she cannot do so if this will be perceived as a waste of taxpayers’
money and hence be punished in the next election. The more intense the political
competition, the more severe the threat of punishment. Further, column 3 shows
that capital injections from the owner are about 18 percent less likely if the bank
chairman is a member of the conservative party, which is in line with the conservative
ideology of limited state interventions. The results hold when we run a horse-race of
all political variables in column 4. The explanatory power of the model significantly
improves when the political variables are included: The R2 increases from 0.240
in the benchmark case to 0.341. The results are further robust to the inclusion of
association dummies (column 6).
4.4.3 Fiscal and other factors affecting the bailout decision
of politicians
How does the fiscal situation of the local municipality affect the decisions of politi-
cians to resolve bank distress? On the one hand, politicians of municipalities with
a high level of fiscal debt are less capable to further increase spending. On the
other hand, a high level of fiscal debt could indicate a politician’s attitude for fiscal
discipline.
As indicated in the previous section, politicians are less likely to support banks
whose assets are relatively large as a fraction of the municipalities’ GDP (see also
Table 4.5, columns 1 and 2). Since bailouts of large banks tend to be expensive,
this result is likely to reflect fiscal boundaries of local politicians. Once we include
a measure for the fiscal deficit of the community we obtain a significantly negative
relationship: Politicians of highly indebted communities are less likely to resolve
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bank distress (columns 3 and 4). This is an example of the disciplining effect of
fiscal federalism.
We examine further variables that might affect politicians’ willingness to bail out
banks. In columns 5 and 6, we include a proxy for personal connections between the
association board and the board of the respective bank in distress (Bank Chairman
in Ass. Board). This variable is equal to one if the chairman of the bank is also a
member in the board of the association. This board decides on support measures
provided by the association and it is possible that the politician tries to use her/his
influence to obtain support without further restructuring. If this would be the case,
we would expect that politicians are less likely to use taxpayers’ money to resolve
distressed banks. In a way, this variable tests whether the decision process at the
association is rather transparent and follows pre-determined rules, or whether it
is prone to favoritism. The dummy is insignificant, which illustrates once again
the rather transparent decision process of the savings bank associations. If the
association was prone to favoritism we would have expected a significantly negative
coefficient for this dummy.
Next, we test for a link between the bailout decision and funding that the respec-
tive municipality obtains from the distressed bank. Politicians might have incentives
to keep control over a savings bank if this bank provides a large fraction of loans to
the politicians’ municipalities. We include the amount of loans that the municipality
is borrowing from the distressed bank divided by local GDP. We detect no significant
relationship between this measure and the probability of the owner to resolve a bank
in distress (columns 7 and 8).
Finally, the horse race in columns 9 and 10 shows that the political variables
exert a strong and persistent influence on politicians’ decisions to inject money into
distressed banks.
4.5 Consequences of political bailouts
Having established that the decision by politicians to inject funds into distressed
banks depends on political as well as ideological factors, we now examine whether
there are differences in the long-run performance of distressed banks that were ei-
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Table 4.5: Fiscal variables and alternative stories
Dependent Variable: Event Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Capital Ratio (t-1) -0.034 -0.088 -0.048 -0.087 -0.034 -0.088 -0.034 -0.089 -0.045 -0.068
(0.037) (0.056) (0.039) (0.055) (0.036) (0.057) (0.039) (0.058) (0.048) (0.055)
ROA (t-1) 0.067 0.030 0.073 0.036 0.065 0.034 0.069 0.033 0.054 0.002
(0.071) (0.059) (0.075) (0.063) (0.071) (0.058) (0.071) (0.059) (0.068) (0.060)
NPL Ratio (t-1) -0.022* -0.016 -0.018 -0.013 -0.022* -0.016 -0.023* -0.017 -0.019 -0.016*
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
Market Share (t-1) 0.009*** 0.009** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009** 0.009*** 0.009** 0.010*** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Deposit Ratio (t-1) -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
GDPPC Growth (t-1) -0.020* -0.014 -0.019* -0.015 -0.020* -0.015 -0.020* -0.015 -0.022* -0.022**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Log(GDPPC) (t-1) 0.030 -0.052 -0.090 -0.076 0.068 -0.079 0.027 -0.046 -0.110 -0.064
(0.095) (0.119) (0.114) (0.127) (0.119) (0.155) (0.096) (0.128) (0.159) (0.156)
Total Assets / GDP (t-1) -0.138** -0.139*** -0.132** -0.142*** -0.144** -0.132** -0.109 -0.107 -0.164 -0.121
(0.056) (0.042) (0.055) (0.045) (0.057) (0.048) (0.102) (0.093) (0.107) (0.111)
Government Debt / GDP (t-1) -0.044** -0.037** -0.025 -0.023
(0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020)
Bank Chairman in Ass. Board -0.082 0.047 0.012 0.124
(0.120) (0.124) (0.119) (0.108)
Loans to Owner / GDP (t-1) -0.015 -0.018 0.003 -0.011
(0.042) (0.041) (0.037) (0.035)
D(0-12 months after) 0.302*** 0.269**
(0.082) (0.109)
D(12-24 months after) 0.363*** 0.429***
(0.110) (0.103)
D(24-36 months after) 0.224** 0.247**
(0.098) (0.088)
D(12-24 months before) 0.313** 0.298**
(0.124) (0.133)
Competitive County -0.099 -0.157
(0.070) (0.092)
Cons. Bank Chairman -0.172* -0.138
(0.087) (0.090)
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Association Dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
R-squared 0.240 0.407 0.268 0.420 0.244 0.408 0.241 0.408 0.349 0.503
The table shows how fiscal and other variables affect the likelihood of a bailout from the owner. As before the dependent variable is a dummy that equals
one if the bank received capital injections from the owner and zero if the bank received support measures from the association. Bank control variables are
the same as in Table 4.4. Additionally, we include the county-level ratio of government indebtedness to GDP (Government Debt / GDP), a dummy variable
Bank Chairman in Ass. Board that takes the value of one if the chairman of the bank in distress is a member of the board of the local savings bank association,
and the variable Loans to Owner/GDP ) that gives the amount of credit extended by the savings bank to the local government divided by local GDP. As
before, all variables are lagged by one period. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 include time dummies for the four election cycles in our sample (1994-1998, 1999-2003,
2004-2008, 2009-end of sample), and columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 include additional dummies that indicate the association of the bank. * indicates statistical
significance at the 10 %-level, ** at the 5 %-level, and *** at the 1 %-level.
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ther resolved by politicians or by the savings bank association. Furthermore, since
politicians may care about the development of their municipality as a whole rather
than the performance of their savings banks, we also compare the macroeconomic
development of municipalities whose savings banks were bailed out by politicians to
the development of municipalities whose banks were supported by the association.
4.5.1 Bank performance following bailouts
Descriptives
We start with descriptive statistics for changes in key variables for banks that ex-
perienced a distress event.35 As documented in Section 4.3.3, bailouts by politicians
are associated with less restructuring activities, which could affect banks’ long-run
performance. On the one hand, performance could be negatively affected if the politi-
cian tries to prevent necessary restructuring measures that might negatively affect
his probability of re-election. On the other hand, less restructuring might be optimal
if politicians have better information about the situation of their bank. Comparing
the long-run performance of banks that received support from either politicians or
the association helps us to further distinguish between these two explanations.
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4.6. For each bank, we calculate the four-
year change as compared with the bailout year for several key variables, the average
between the four-year change and the five-year change, and so on (up to seven years).
We then average these changes across banks that received support from either the
association or the owner and compare the values for these two groups of banks.
The comparison yields a clear picture: Irrespective of the chosen horizon, banks that
obtained support from the association improved their performance considerably more
in the long run as compared to banks that received support from the owner. For
example, the capital ratio rises significantly more for banks whose distress case was
resolved by the association. Interestingly, only banks that received support from
the association are able to considerably reduce their non-performing loans ratio.
Similarly, there is a higher reduction in the ratio of loan loss provisions to customer
loans for banks that obtained support from the association. Finally, the return on
35As in Section 4.3.3, we cannot include banks that were merged by the association since we do
not have data on their future performance.
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assets for this group of banks increased by about 0.2 percent more on average as
compared to banks that obtained support from the owner.
Table 4.6: Long-run performance—descriptives
Association Owner Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (2)-(5)
Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D.
Capital Ratio
t=4 35 0.590 0.615 39 0.254 0.413 0.336***
t=5 29 0.578 0.647 34 0.229 0.452 0.349**
t=6 24 0.499 0.647 27 0.277 0.500 0.222
t=7 22 0.618 0.563 22 0.303 0.478 0.315*
NPL Ratio
t=4 34 -3.238 4.209 38 0.106 3.077 -3.344***
t=5 29 -4.011 4.136 34 -0.001 3.569 -4.010***
t=6 24 -4.907 4.285 27 -0.795 3.826 -4.111***
t=7 22 -5.118 4.515 22 -1.140 3.577 -3.977***
LLP to CL
t=4 34 -0.698 0.759 39 -0.287 0.837 -0.411**
t=5 29 -0.759 0.767 34 -0.343 0.824 -0.415**
t=6 24 -0.750 0.793 27 -0.384 0.908 -0.365
t=7 22 -0.813 0.823 22 -0.493 0.860 -0.320
ROA
t=4 34 0.271 0.649 39 0.050 0.508 0.221
t=5 29 0.290 0.594 34 0.062 0.464 0.228*
t=6 24 0.213 0.537 27 0.015 0.566 0.198
t=7 22 0.309 0.526 22 0.069 0.482 0.240
The table shows changes in key variables for banks that experienced a distress event. With t
denoting the number of years since the bailout event, we calculate for each bank and for t ∈
{4, 5, 6, 7}
1
t+ 1− 4
t∑
i=4
vari − var0,
where vari denotes the value of the variable in the ith year after the bailout and var0 denotes
the value in the bailout year. We then average these changes across banks. Column 7 shows the
difference in the mean between the two groups of banks, where *, **, and *** indicate statistical
differences in the mean at the 10 %-level, 5 %-level, and 1 %-level, respectively.
Addressing selection
There are two potential sources of selection bias that might explain why banks that
receive support from the association perform better in the long run as compared to
banks that receive support from the owner. First, following the distress event, we
do not have accounting information for banks that experienced a distressed merger.
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The association is likely to organize distressed mergers for the ‘worst’ distress cases.
Hence, comparing the remaining association bailouts to the average owner bailout
might suffer from a bias. Second, there might be unobserved variables that jointly
affect the politician’s bailout decision and the future performance of the bank.
To circumvent the first issue, we restrict the sample to those savings banks that
do not have a potential merger partner. In particular, we require that the bank in
distress does not have another savings bank in close geographic proximity that has at
least 1.5 times its size (in terms of total assets) as well as a capital ratio and an ROA
higher than the median in our sample.36. In this way, we obtain a subsample of 56
distress cases for which we are able to obtain five-year changes in the key variables
from the previous section.37 By only focusing on this subsample, we ensure that the
comparison between association and owner bailouts is a fair comparison.
To address the second issue, we use the fact that political and ideological variables
are important determinants for politicians’ bailout decisions. Apart from their influ-
ence on the probability of a bailout by the politician, the dummies for the electoral
cycle, for competitive counties and for conservative bank chairmen should not have
an influence on a bank’s future performance. Therefore, we can use these variables
as instruments.
We start by illustrating our identification strategy graphically in Figure 4.4. In
Panel A and B we display the absolute and the relative frequency distribution of
capital injections from the owner across the electoral cycle within the subsample of
banks that do not have a potential merger partner. The pattern in the subsample is
similar to the one in the full sample (see Figures 4.3 and 4.5): The probability for a
capital injection from the owner is considerably higher after the election as compared
to the period before the election. More specifically, there are only 6 cases of capital
injections from the owner in the two years before the election, while there are 19
cases in the two years after the election.
36We define a savings bank to be in ‘close geographic proximity’ of a bank in distress if it is
located in a county neighboring the one of the distressed bank. Further, we altered the criteria for
a potential merger partner and found that our results do not depend on the exact definition (in
particular, we tried different size cutoffs (same size, two times the size) and omitted the capital
ratio and ROA criteria in alternative specifications).
37We cannot include distress cases from 2005 or later years as we need at least five years of
accounting information for the bank following the distress event.
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Panel A: CI Owner Panel B: CI Owner (relative frequency)
Panel C: Capital ratio Panel D: NPL ratio
Panel E: LLP to CL ratio Panel F: ROA
Figure 4.4: Long-run performance and electoral cycle
Figure 4.4 illustrates how the long run performance of banks in distress depends on the timing of
the distress event over the electoral cycle, where the vertical black line indicates the election date.
We restrict the sample to banks without a potential partner for a distressed merger to account for
selection bias. Panel A shows the number of capital injections from the owner across the electoral
cycle in the restricted sample, whereas Panel B shows the relative frequency. Further, we calculate
the five-year change in the capital ratio (Panel C), the non-performing loans ratio (Panel D), the
ratio of loan loss provisions to customer loans (Panel E), and the ROA (Panel F), and then show
the average of this change across banks that experienced a distress event at the same time during
the electoral cycle.
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Table 4.7: Long-run performance—regressions
Capital Ratio NPL Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV IV IV OLS IV IV IV
Owner -0.389** -0.833** -1.122*** -1.145*** 5.002*** 3.425* 8.942*** 8.540***
(0.151) (0.335) (0.383) (0.377) (0.927) (1.960) (2.279) (2.161)
Constant 0.578*** 0.792*** -4.011*** -3.250***
(0.105) (0.180) (0.644) (1.054)
Association Dummies NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Time Dummies NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Observations 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
R-squared 0.110 0.114 0.132 0.144 0.350 0.316 0.406 0.455
LLP to CL ROA
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
OLS IV IV IV OLS IV IV IV
Owner 0.629*** 0.910** 0.485 0.459 -0.289* -0.522* -0.292 -0.283
(0.184) (0.388) (0.424) (0.401) (0.145) (0.306) (0.352) (0.343)
Constant -0.759*** -0.894*** 0.290*** 0.402**
(0.128) (0.208) (0.101) (0.164)
Association Dummies NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Time Dummies NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Observations 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
R-squared 0.178 0.142 0.341 0.399 0.069 0.024 0.168 0.194
The table examines how banks’ long-run performance following a distress event depends on the type of the distress event. We restrict the sample to banks
without a potential partner for a distressed merger to account for selection bias. The dependent variable is the the five-year change in the capital ratio as
compared to the bailout year in columns 1-4, the five-year change in the non-performing loans ratio in column 5-8, the five-year change in the ratio of loan
loss provisions to customer loans in columns 9-12, and the five-year change in ROA in columns 13-16. Columns 1, 5, 9, and 13 report results for simple OLS
regressions, where Owner is a dummy equal to one if the bank received capital injections from the owner and equal to zero if it received support from the
association. The remaining columns show results for two-stage least squares regressions. In the first stage, we regress the dummy variable Owner on the
political variables from above (dummies for the electoral cycle, competitive counties, and conservative bank chairmen), and the additional dummy variables
specified at the bottom of the table. In the second change, predicted probabilities from the first stage are used to predict the five-year change in the respective
variable. Again, we include the additional dummy variables denoted at the bottom of the table. * indicates statistical significance at the 10 %-level, ** at the
5 %-level, and *** at the 1 %-level.
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In Panels C to F, we display average values for five-year changes in the bank
performance measures from above (i.e., capital ratio, non-performing loans ratio,
ratio of loan loss provisions to customer loans, and ROA), grouped by the electoral
cycle.38 In general there should be no relationship between banks’ future performance
and the timing of the distress event within the electoral cycle. We know, however,
that the probability for capital injections from the owner is considerably higher after
the election as compared to the time before the election. Therefore, differences in
future bank performance across the electoral cycle can be attributed to the actions
of politicians. Performance measures in Panels C to F display a clear pattern across
the electoral cycle. In particular, improvements in the capital ratio and reductions
in the non-performing loans ratio as well as the ratio of loan loss provisions to
customer loans are considerably smaller for distress events that occurred in the 12
months following an election, when bailouts from the owner are relatively more likely.
Similarly, improvements in profitability are smaller for banks that were bailed out in
the 12 months following an election. It is important to note that these documented
differences in future performance do not depend on the time horizon. We have tried
alternative horizons (i.e., four-year changes and six-year changes) and find similar
patterns.
Finally, we investigate how future bank performance depends on the type of the
bailout in a regression framework. Again, we start with the five-year change in the
capital ratio as a dependent variable. Column 1 of Table 4.7 shows estimates from
a simple OLS regression, which confirm that banks receiving capital injections from
the owner exhibit lower increases in the capital ratio. As described above, we proceed
by using the dummies for the electoral cycle, for competitive counties and for con-
servative bank chairmen as instruments in a two-stage least squares regression. The
first stage regression is similar to the regressions in Table 4.4, while restricting the
sample to the distress cases without a potential merger partner. Results for the sec-
ond stage regressions are presented in columns 2-4 of Table 4.7. Five years after the
bailout, the capital ratio increased significantly more for banks that were resolved by
the association. Remarkably, the magnitude of the coefficient is considerably larger
38Specifically, we average the five-year change in the respective variable across banks in the
restricted sample for which the distress event occurred at the same time in the electoral cycle.
156
in the IV regression as compared to the OLS regression: Capital ratios increase by
about 1 percent more if the distress case is resolved by the association as compared
to the owner. The results are robust to the inclusion of association and time dum-
mies. Again, we observe similar patterns for the other performance measures: Banks
receiving capital injections from the owner experienced smaller improvements in the
non-performing loans ratio, the ratio of loan loss provisions to customer loans and the
profitability measured by ROA. As the number of observations is very small in these
regressions, the findings are particularly impressive. As before, they do not depend
on the exact definition of the time horizon (e.g., see Table 4.11 in the Appendix,
where we use four-year changes in the variables instead of five-year changes).
4.5.2 Macroeconomic performance following distress events
In the previous section we showed that savings banks that experience a bailout from
the association perform considerably better in the long-run as compared to savings
banks that experience a bailout from the owner. By saving the bank from severe
restructuring measures that would be imposed by the association, politicians seem to
hurt the long run performance of the bank. However, it could be that politicians are
not primarily concerned about the health of the bank itself, but rather care about
the general economic development within their region. In order to assess this concern
we examine the macroeconomic development of the county in which the respective
savings bank is located.
In particular, we replicate the estimations from Section 4.5.1, using six county-
level indicators (i.e., the share of aggregate financing provided by state banks, the
ratio of aggregate loans to GDP, the ratio of aggregate loans to private companies
to GDP, the ratio of capital expenditures by firms in the manufacturing sector to
GDP, real GDP growth, and the share of employees in the population) as depen-
dent variables. Since we can also track the macroeconomic development of counties
whose savings banks got involved in a distressed merger, we only have to worry about
omitted variables that affect the owners’ bailout decision and the macroeconomic de-
velopment at the same time (i.e., the second concern in the previous section). To
address this concern we use—as before—our political variables as instruments. The
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Table 4.8: Macroeconomic developments—regressions
State Bank Loan Share Loans to GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV IV IV OLS IV IV IV
Owner 0.0630*** 0.0902** 0.2436*** 0.2156*** 0.2462** 0.2660 0.6606 0.5703
(0.0208) (0.0456) (0.0754) (0.0753) (0.1224) (0.2845) (0.4262) (0.4388)
Constant -0.0337** -0.0444** -0.0791 -0.0865
(0.0131) (0.0207) (0.0750) (0.1217)
Association Dummies NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Time Dummies NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Observations 104 104 104 104 88 88 88 88
R-squared 0.0824 0.0672 0.2345 0.3734 0.0449 0.0446 0.0362 0.1921
Loans to Private Corporate Sector to GDP Private Capital Expenditures to GDP
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
OLS IV IV IV OLS IV IV IV
Owner 0.0241 0.0310 0.0247 0.0464 0.0003 0.0129 0.0161 0.0150
(0.0165) (0.0404) (0.0376) (0.0466) (0.0054) (0.0129) (0.0180) (0.0200)
Constant -0.0068 -0.0093 0.0009 -0.0039
(0.0101) (0.0170) (0.0033) (0.0055)
Association Dummies NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Time Dummies NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Observations 83 83 83 83 88 88 88 88
R-squared 0.0256 0.0236 0.1975 0.4191 0.0000 0.0112 0.0636 0.0910
Real GDP Growth Share of Employees in Population
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
OLS IV IV IV OLS IV IV IV
Owner 0.0036 -0.0215 -0.0205 -0.0445 0.0041 -0.0037 -0.0173 -0.0360*
(0.0162) (0.0383) (0.0528) (0.0605) (0.0045) (0.0108) (0.0154) (0.0194)
Constant 0.0770*** 0.0864*** 0.0098*** 0.0127***
(0.0100) (0.0164) (0.0028) (0.0046)
Association Dummies NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Time Dummies NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Observations 88 88 88 88 91 91 91 91
R-squared 0.0006 0.0037 0.1692 0.2103 0.0093 0.0013 0.1504 0.2797
The table examines how macroeconomic developments on the county level following a distress event
depend on the type of the distress event. The sample includes all observations for which we are able
to obtain the dependent variable, which is the five-year change in share of loans in the county that
is extended by state banks in columns 1-4, the the five-year change in the ratio of aggregate loans to
GDP as compared to the bailout year in column 5-8, the five-year change in the ratio of aggregate
loans to the private corporate sector to GDP as compared to the bailout year in column 9-12,
the five-year change in the ratio of capital expenditures in the manufacturing sector to GDP as
compared to the bailout year in column 13-16, the five-year real GDP growth rate in columns 17-20,
and the five-year change in the share of employees in the population in columns 21-24. Columns 1,
5, 9, 13, 17, and 21 report results for simple OLS regressions, where Owner is a dummy equal to one
if the bank received capital injections from the owner and equal to zero if it received support from
the association. The remaining columns show results for two-stage least squares regressions. In the
first stage, we regress the dummy variable Owner on the political variables from above (dummies
for the electoral cycle, competitive counties, and conservative bank chairmen), and the additional
dummy variables specified at the bottom of the table. In the second change, predicted probabilities
from the first stage are used to predict the five-year change in the respective variable. Again, we
include the additional dummy variables denoted at the bottom of the table. * indicates statistical
significance at the 10 %-level, ** at the 5 %-level, and *** at the 1 %-level.
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second stage results for five-year changes in the macroeconomic variables are sum-
marized in Table 4.8. The first four columns indicate that the type of the support
measure affects the county-level structure of financing: The share of loans in the
county extended by state banks relatively increases in counties where the savings
bank was bailed out by the owner. Moreover, the OLS regression in column 5 indi-
cates that counties with bailouts from the owner see a relative increase in financial
depth (column 5). However, the difference between the two types of events vanishes
in the two-stage least squares regressions (columns 6 to 8). Next, we restrict our-
selves to loans to private, non-financial companies and exclude loans to the public
sector from the loans to GDP ratio. Columns 9-12 suggest no difference between
the different types of support measures: All coefficients are close to zero, and also
the OLS coefficient is now insignificant. Overall, it does not seem as if the type of
support measures affects financing conditions for the private sector.
In the remainder of the table, we evaluate the ratio of capital expenditures by
firms in the manufacturing sector to GDP, real GDP growth, and the share of em-
ployees in the population. There are no significant differences between counties
where banks received support from the owner and counties where the distress case
was resolved by the association. These findings suggest that politicians’ decision to
use taxpayers’ money to bail out a savings bank is not driven by concerns about the
general economic development within their region.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper we document that public bailout policies in Germany are driven by
political interests and ideology. The probability of politicians injecting taxpayers’
money into a distressed bank is about 30 % lower in the year before an election. High
competition in the electoral process reduces the probability of a public bailout by
15 %. We also show that ideology matters for bailout decisions. Capital injections are
17 % less likely if the politician is a member of the conservative party. Furthermore,
the long-run performance of banks that were bailed out by politicians is considerably
lower as compared with banks that were supported by the association. To rule out the
possibility that politicians support their savings bank in order to promote the general
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economic development within their municipality, we compare different measures of
macroeconomic performance between banks obtaining support from the association
and politicians. We cannot detect any positive long-run effects in municipalities
whose savings banks obtained support from politicians.
These findings are surprising since politicians tend to be members of the banks’
supervisory boards and—therefore—have local knowledge about the distressed banks.
If politicians would take advantage of their local knowledge, we should observe no
statistical relationship between political/ideological factors and public capital in-
jections. Our paper contributes to the debate about the proximity of banks and
politicians/regulators that decide on recapitalization in case of distress. While local
politicians have the advantage of local knowledge, decision makers with a larger dis-
tance to the bank have to rely on broader perspective. Nevertheless, we show that
local politicians’ decisions are influenced by political factors and ideology. Thus,
our papers illustrates the advantages of larger distance and broader perspective in
designing an effective regulatory banking supervision. This is particularly important
given the current discussion on a unified European banking supervision. Our results
suggest that such a regulatory design could have considerable advantages.
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A4 Appendix to Chapter 4
Description of Bundesbank data sources
The Bundesbank’s prudential data base (BAKIS): This database (for which
the German Banking Act forms the legal basis) contains micro data on German
banks which is available from the 1990s on and used for both supervisory monitoring
of financial institutions and research purposes. These data contain sensitive and con-
fidential supervisory information and, therefore, can only be used at the Bundesbank
premises and the results may be published only after a thorough anonymization of
the data.39 From the BAKIS data base we obtain bank balance sheet data to con-
struct control variables for our regression analysis. More importantly, we also get
access to the “Sonderdatenkatalog 1” which is a special dataset containing confiden-
tial information which banks are legally bound to report to Bundesbank and BaFin
and, amongst others, allow us to identify capital support measures savings banks
received from the association.
The monthly balance sheet statistics (BISTA): This data base gives a com-
prehensive overview on German financial institutions’ business activities. Hereby,
banks are legally bound to report their balance sheet data on a monthly and highly
disaggregated basis. For our project a major challenge was to access historical BISTA
data which allows us to identify the size of the capital injection as well as the par-
ticular month this event occurred. Moreover, the BISTA database also provides us
with information on each bank’s lending to municipalities (which is used to identify
further motives behind bank bailouts).
The quarterly borrowers’ statistics: This database contains domestic loan
portfolio exposures and write-off data on the bank-portfolio level (i.e., lending to
the German real sector can be identified for 24 corporate and 3 retail portfolios
per bank). Loan exposure data is available from the early 1990s on while data on
write-offs can be accessed from 2002-2010. In our empirical study data from the
borrowers’ statistics is used to double-check the information on the timing of bailout
39For a detailed description of the BAKIS data base see, for example, Memmel, C. and I. Stein
(2008), “The Deutsche Bundesbank’s Prudential Database (BAKIS)”, in: Schmollers Jahrbuch 128,
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, pages 321-328.
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events, in particular by the banking association, for roughly half of the time-period
of our dataset. For the period before 2002 we have to rely on the evolution of the
capital adequacy ratio in order to identify the timing of the distress event within a
year.
The Bundesbank’s distress data base: This database contains information
on distress events which occurred at German financial institutions from the early
1990s on. For our analysis we rely on information on so-called “distressed merg-
ers”; that is, we need to distinguish distressed (or restructuring) mergers from pure
“economy of scale mergers”. As the distress database is only available until 2006, we
define a distressed merger in the years 2007-2010 as a passive merger where the bank
that was taken over experienced a severe distress event (i.e., a moratorium, a capital
support measure, or a very low capital ratio) in the three year before the merger.
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Figure 4.5: CI from owner and electoral cycle (in % of all distress events)
Figure 4.5 illustrates how the number of banks that receive capital injections from the owner varies
over the electoral cycle, where the vertical black line indicates the election date.
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Table 4.9: Variable definitions
Panel A: Events
Support from owner Capital injections from the bank owner are identified by an increase in a bank’s subscribed capital that cannot be explained
by takeovers or restructuring of equity positions (so called “stille Einlage”). Note that for historical reasons, the equity
capital of savings banks usually consists solely of contingency funds (so called “Sicherheitsru¨cklage”). These funds were
originally provided by the owner of the bank in the year of foundation and then cumulated over the years out of the bank’s
retained earnings. However, if the savings bank—besides its equity in the contingency funds—also has subscribed capital
unequal to zero, then this usually indicates an undisclosed participation of the bank owner.
Support from association
... capital support Capital injections or guarantees from the association, obtained from “Sonderdatenkatalog 1” of the Bundesbank BAKIS
database
... distressed merger Information on distressed mergers is taken from the Bundesbank distress data base. As this database is only available
until 2006, we define a distressed merger in the years 2007-2010 as a passive merger where the bank that was taken over
experienced a severe distress event in the three years before the merger (i.e., a moratorium, a capital support measure, or
a very low capital ratio).
Panel B: Bank Variables
Control Variables
Total Bank Assets Total assets (in Mio. EUR)
Log Bank Assets Logarithm (ln) of total assets
Total Assets / GDP Total assets to GDP ratio (county level, in %)
Capital Ratio Equity capital to total assets ratio (in %)
ROA Return (operative result) on total assets (in %)
NPL Ratio Non-performing loans to customer loans ratio (in %)
Market Share (in %) Share of bank branches in the respective county where very small branches (e.g., branches from the Deutsche Postbank)
are excluded. Note that until 2004 banks are legally bound to report the exact location of each of their branches to
the Deutsche Bundesbank; from 2005 on the share of branches can be proxied from banks’ voluntary reporting and from
cross-sectional information.
Deposit Ratio Savings deposits, term deposits, and time deposits to total assets ratio (in %)
Loans to Owner / GDP Claims against municipal governments to GDP ratio (county level, in %)
Conditional on Distress
Bank Chairman in Ass. Board Dummy = 1 if the chairman of the bank in distress is also a member of the board of the association.
Restructuring Variables
Growth Rate (Employees) Year-on-year change of number of bank employees (growth rate)
Growth Rate (Number of Branches) Year-on-year change of number of bank branches (growth rate, available until 2004)
Growth Rate (Customer Loans) Year-on-year change of customer loans to total assets ratio (growth rate)
Growth Rate (Pers. Expenditures) Year-on-year change of personnel expenditures (growth rate)
Loan Loss Provisions / Customer Loans Loan loss provisions to customer loans (in %)
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Table 4.9 continued...
Panel C: Macro & Other Variables
GDPPC Growth Year-on-year change of real GDP per capita (county level, in %)
Log(GDPPC) Logarithm (ln) of real GDP per capita (county level)
Government Debt / GDP Municipal government debt to GDP (county level, in %)
Restructuring Variables
State Bank Loan Share Share of loans in the German credit register that is granted by state banks in a given year
Loans to GDP Loans in the German credit register aggregated at the county level and divided by county-level GDP
Loans to Private Corporate Sector to GDP Loans in the German credit register to private companies aggregated at the county level and divided by county-
level GDP
Private Capital Expenditures to GDP Capital expenditures by companies in the manufacturing sector aggregated at the county level and divided by
county-level GDP
Real GDP Growth Year-on-year change in real GDP (county level, in %)
Share of Employees in Population Ratio of employees to total inhabitants (county level)
Panel D: Political Variables
D(12-24 months before) Dummy = 1 if the last county/city elections took place 12-24 months before the distress event.
D(0-12 months before) Dummy = 1 if the last county/city elections will take place 0 to 12 months before the distress event.
D(0-12 months after) Dummy = 1 if the last county/city elections took place 0 to 12 months after the distress event.
D(12-24 months after) Dummy = 1 if the last county/city elections took place 12-24 months after the distress event.
D(24-36 months after) Dummy = 1 if the last county/city elections took place 24-36 months after the distress event.
No Competitive County Dummy = 0 for a non-competitive county.
Competitive County Dummy = 1 for competitive counties. Hereby, the vote share margin between the first and the second party
within the county from the respective state election is calculated. Then the dummy is defined as equal to one
if the vote share margin is smaller than the median and zero otherwise. This taken as a proxy for political
competition within the county/city: The smaller the vote share margin between the first and the second party,
the more intense the political competition and the more effective the disciplining role voters can exert on
politicians.
No Conservative Bank Chairman Dummy = 0 for a non-conservative chairman.
Conservative Bank Chairman Dummy = 1 if the chairman of the savings bank’s supervisory board is a member of a conservative party (i.e.,
“CDU” or “CSU”).
The table shows a description of the variables we use in the empirical analysis.
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Table 4.10: Event type—logit models
Dependent Variable: Event Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Assets / GDP (t-1) -0.755** -1.093*** -0.707** -1.058*** -1.243**
(0.299) (0.262) (0.337) (0.309) (0.595)
Capital Ratio (t-1) -0.248 -0.334 -0.190 -0.326 -0.705
(0.182) (0.251) (0.184) (0.278) (0.524)
ROA (t-1) 0.353 0.458 0.237 0.411 -0.215
(0.420) (0.357) (0.458) (0.407) (0.669)
NPL Ratio (t-1) -0.149* -0.154* -0.154* -0.154* -0.237**
(0.078) (0.093) (0.080) (0.089) (0.116)
Market Share (t-1) 0.051*** 0.062*** 0.051*** 0.060*** 0.067*
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.035)
Deposit Ratio (t-1) -0.038* -0.044* -0.028 -0.032 0.001
(0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.038)
GDPPC Growth (t-1) -0.109* -0.130* -0.111* -0.135* -0.139*
(0.060) (0.068) (0.060) (0.069) (0.079)
Log(GDPPC) (t-1) 0.179 0.186 -0.217 -0.290 0.272
(0.552) (0.676) (0.584) (0.749) (0.865)
D(0-12 months after) 2.191*** 2.381*** 2.614*
(0.701) (0.768) (1.381)
D(12-24 months after) 2.753*** 2.818*** 3.571**
(0.696) (0.743) (1.461)
D(24-36 months after) 1.976** 2.015** 2.804*
(0.781) (0.978) (1.526)
D(12-24 months before) 2.361** 2.583** 3.551
(1.105) (1.245) (2.273)
Competitive County -0.846** -0.752* -1.887**
(0.401) (0.430) (0.752)
Cons. Bank Chairman -0.950*** -1.140*** -1.132**
(0.360) (0.440) (0.465)
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Association Dummies NO NO NO NO YES
Observations 148 148 148 148 148
Pseudo R-Squared 0.209 0.283 0.244 0.318 0.492
The table re-estimates the results from Table 4.4, using a nonlinear logit specification instead of
the OLS specification. As before, the dependent variable Event Typeijkt equals one if the bank
received capital injections from the owner and zero if the bank received support measures from
the association. All columns include time dummies for the four election cycles in our sample
(1994-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2008, 2009-end of sample), and column 5 additionally includes a set
of dummy variables that indicate the association of the bank. * indicates statistical significance at
the 10 %-level, ** at the 5 %-level, and *** at the 1 %-level.
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Chapter5
Does Financial Structure Shape Industry
Structure? Evidence from Timing of Bank
Liberalization
5.1 Introduction
It has been well accepted that financial systems can influence the allocation of credit
and shape an economy’s growth path.1 What is not as well understood is how
the nature of credit provision affects this allocation process.2 One reason for our
lack of understanding is the inherent difficulty in identifying significant changes in
the nature of credit provision within an economy. This paper exploits variation in
the efficiency of the domestic banking sector at the time of liberalization to identify
large changes in the nature of credit provision, which have a significant impact on the
allocation of credit in the liberalizing countries. These changes in credit allocation
shape countries’ industry structure by influencing the financial structure of firms—
ultimately affecting growth paths of industries in the economy.
1One potential channel is that lenders and intermediaries screen out bad projects (Bagehot
1873, Schumpeter 1912, Diamond 1984, Boyd and Prescott 1986). Another theory argues that pres-
sures from external financiers encourage managers to pursue value-maximizing investment policies
(Jensen 1986). See also Wurgler (2000).
2This issue is best illustrated by the recent vociferous debate surrounding the bailout of banks.
Proponents argue that the allocation of credit would be hampered if old banks were replaced by new
ones since old banks have relationships with firms—especially smaller entrepreneurial firms—which
could not simply be substituted by new credit providers. Critics argue that new banks would be
able to allocate credit as well as their older counterparts.
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We draw insights from the industrial organization and trade literature and argue
that foreign bank entry will interact differentially with the domestic banking sector,
depending on the efficiency of the domestic banking sector at the time of liberal-
ization.3 The rationale is simple: Foreign bank entry induces competitive pressure,
which is likely to be better absorbed by domestic banks that operate close to the
efficiency frontier. These banks are likely to invest and innovate in response to
the competitive threat—for example by improving their technology and processes—
while such a change might be harder for banks further away from the frontier. Conse-
quently, we would expect considerably larger changes in the nature of credit provision
in countries that liberalize when most domestic banks are far away from the efficiency
frontier as compared with countries that liberalize when most domestic banks are
able to compete with foreign entrants. Specifically, the market share of foreign banks
should dramatically increase in countries with a weak domestic banking sector, while
the effect should be more moderate in countries with a better developed domestic
sector.
There are several reasons why one would expect that changes in the nature of
credit provision have an impact on the allocation of credit within the economy. First,
if foreign banks are more efficient in providing capital, they would intermediate capi-
tal to sectors in the economy that could have been rationed out by inefficient domestic
banks. Moreover, it is also possible that the arm’s length nature of foreign bank fi-
nancing plays a role. In particular, domestic banks might be better at screening soft
information borrowers (e.g., local entrepreneurial firms; see Berger, Klapper, and
Udell 2001 and Mian 2006), while foreign banks may have comparative advantages
3A recent and growing trade literature documents effects of a reduction in trade barriers on
product and labor markets. Aghion et al. (2003, 2008) document a heterogeneous response of firms’
efficiency and productivity following the elimination of entrance barriers to foreign firms. They
argue that technologically advanced firms often gain in efficiency following foreign entrance since
they are more likely to respond to the threat of entry by investing in new technologies. However,
firms that are far from the frontier are adversely affected by the entrance threat. Consequently,
opening of product markets amplifies initial differences in productivity. This theoretical argument
is supported by empirical findings. Aghion et al. (2003) (for India), Aghion and Bessonova (2006)
(for Russia) and Aghion et al. (2009) (for the UK) find that a removal of restrictions on foreign firm
entry has a more positive effect on the economic performance for domestic firms and industries that
are initially closer to the technology frontier. In a related paper, Sabirianova, Terrell, and Svejnar
(2005) show that the more foreign firms enter a market, the higher the productivity gap between
foreign and domestic firms. In a theoretical paper, Lehner and Schnitzer (2008) study how spillover
effects from foreign bank entry depend on competition in the domestic banking sector. They find
that an increase in the number of banks is more likely to have positive welfare effects the more
competitive the domestic banking sector.
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in screening hard information borrowers (e.g., larger firms). This could potentially
shape the allocation of credit to firms within an industry and across industries.
Using information from Abiad and Mody (2005) and Bekaert and Harvey (2004)
on liberalization events in 26 emerging markets, this paper examines how the removal
of entry barriers for foreign banks affects the nature of credit provision, and how this
effect depends on the efficiency of the domestic banking sector at the time of liber-
alization. We obtain a comprehensive data set from Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope
data base, covering banking sectors for our sample countries for the period from 1995
to 2007. Using bank-level data, we find that, following liberalization, banks oper-
ating close to the efficiency frontier increase their lending relative to banks further
away from the frontier, where bank efficiency is based on the bank’s profitability, the
cost-to-income ratio, or the non-performing loans ratio prior to the event.
We aggregate the bank efficiency variable on the country level to obtain our key
measure, the share of efficient domestic banks at liberalization. We use this measure
to split our sample countries into those with a lower than median and those with a
higher than median share of efficient domestic banks at liberalization. Aggregating
the Bankscope data on the country level, we find an increase in the aggregate supply
of credit and a moderate increase in the market share of foreign banks in countries
with relatively efficient domestic banks. In contrast, in markets with relatively inef-
ficient banks, foreign lending crowds out domestic lending, resulting in an aggregate
loan supply that is lower than before.
We proceed by showing that this differential change in the nature of credit pro-
vision across economies shapes the financial structure of firms and countries’ overall
industry structure. In particular, we find that smaller firms are negatively affected
in countries with less efficient domestic banks at the time of liberalization. This
result can be rationalized easily: Since smaller firms are likely to be the ones where
soft information is relatively important, they are particularly harmed by the decline
in domestic lending in these economies after banking markets are opened up. In
contrast, small firms are better off in economies with an efficient domestic banking
sector at the time of liberalization.4 In addition, at the industry level, we find that
4Beck et al. (2008) argue that small firms are relatively opaque and hence benefit more from the
reduction of informational problems that comes along with more efficient financial intermediation.
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those industries that are more reliant on external finance benefit from liberaliza-
tion, irrespective of domestic banks’ inherent efficient. Thus, changes in the nature
of credit provision shape the structure of financing within an industry and across
industries.
Finally, we also evaluate how changes in the nature of credit provision affect
economic growth. We find that, following liberalization, there is a higher growth
rate and lower growth volatility for industry sectors in markets with relatively more
efficient domestic banks. The growth effect is driven by industries with a large
share of small and medium enterprises. In markets with relatively efficient domestic
banks such industries accelerate in growth following liberalization, while we find the
opposite for markets with relatively inefficient banks.
It is important for our analysis that the events in our sample countries are ex-
ogenous in the sense that they are not systematically related to countries’ future
growth prospects or the occurrence of banking sector crises. We are confident that
endogeneity is not an issue for three reasons: First, we use within-country, cross-
sectional variation at the bank level, at the industry level, and at the firm level, and
document differential effects of liberalization on banks, industries, and firms within
the same country. Hence, our identification strategy mitigates endogeneity concerns.
Second, we study the dynamic effects of liberalization in our sample countries and
find that key variables change after, not before the event. Finally, political processes
and external pressures applied by the IMF or the World Bank in many of our sample
countries also help to mitigate concerns regarding endogeneity.
As mentioned before, we assess the robustness of our results by using various
definitions for initial banking sector efficiency. Further, as the entry mode chosen by
foreign banks could be another important determinant of the outcome of banking sec-
tor liberalization, we show that the efficiency effect is present both in countries where
foreign banks entered mostly via greenfield investments and in countries where they
entered by taking over domestic banks. As we show that the reaction of remaining
domestic banks depends on their initial efficiency, the selection of banks that were
taken over could be an issue. We show that this selection does not depend on banks’
initial efficiency, hence mitigating this concern. Finally, we control for other events
that might affect lending in our sample countries, like changes in creditor rights or
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current account liberalization.
Our results underscore the importance of domestic institutions in fostering growth.
The main message that comes out from our results is that domestic institutions need
to be developed to a reasonable degree for financial liberalization to have a positive
impact. In other words, we highlight the importance of the timing of liberalization
by showing that it has a direct effect on the structure of lending within an economy,
and that this has real effects on growth and industry structure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 5.2 we describe
the bank liberalization reforms in emerging markets that constitute our event as well
as our underlying data sources. Section 5.3 illustrates the consequences of our event
for loan supply and financial structure (foreign vs. domestic banks) in our sample
countries. We investigate how the documented changes in financial structure affect
economic outcomes and industry structure in Section 5.4 and confirm our results on
the firm-level in Section 5.5. In Section 5.6 we provide some additional robustness
checks, before we conclude in Section 5.7.
5.2 Liberalization reforms and data
5.2.1 The event: Bank liberalization reforms across the world
During the last two decades many emerging markets throughout the world have
opened their banking sectors to foreigners as part of a broader process of financial
liberalization.5 The Washington Consensus—actively promoted by the IMF and the
World Bank—pushed for the elimination of all entry barriers and state involvement
(World Bank 2002). This view is based on the classical Shaw (1973) – McKinnon
(1973) framework in which the opening of financial markets increases the efficiency
of financial intermediation. Moreover, foreign banks are expected to import capital,
to stimulate competition, to introduce new technologies, and to import better su-
pervision and regulation from their home countries (Levine 1996). In line with this
view, many countries removed entry barriers and consequently saw a sharp increase
5See, e.g., Williamson and Mahar (1998), Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) or Abiad, Detra-
giache, and Tressel (2010) for a documentation of liberalization reforms across the world in recent
decades.
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in foreign bank ownership.6
Nevertheless, there is disagreement about the appropriate market opening strat-
egy. Some policy makers fear financial fragility following liberalization since several
countries experienced banking sector crises shortly after the financial sector was
deregulated (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache 1999, Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999 or
Weller 2001). The debate about the advantages and risks of liberalization resulted
in different market opening strategies between different emerging markets. Some
countries opted for the removal of all entry barriers for foreign banks as suggested
by, e.g., Sachs and Warner (1996).7 In Hungary, for example, the majority of the
banking sector was basically sold overnight to foreign-owned banks (Kiraly et al.
2000). Other countries were more reluctant to open their markets. In these coun-
tries, foreign entrance and operations remain restricted by government regulations.8
We collect information on banking market opening policies for a large sample of
emerging market economies that had not yet fully liberalized their banking markets
at the onset of our sample period in 1995. Abiad and Mody (2005) provide an in-
dicator described below that codes changes in entry restrictions for foreign banks.
The Abiad and Mody (2005) database provides information on countries from sev-
eral regions, but does not include Eastern European economies. These countries
are, however, of special interest, since they opened their banking markets during
the 1990s in the quest to join the European Union. Therefore, we construct the
Abiad and Mody (2005) indicator on foreign entrance restrictions for these countries
based on data from the Bekaert and Harvey (2004) database on important financial,
economic and political events in emerging markets. Specifically, Abiad and Mody
(2005) construct an index that is concerned with restrictions on foreign bank entry
that,9
6Claessens et al. (2008) document for a sample of 103 developing countries an increase in foreign
ownership from 23% in 1995 to 38% in 2006.
7Sachs and Warner (1996) argue that high product market competition through liberalization
fosters allocative efficiency which in turn promotes economic growth.
8For reviews about experiences with the removal of entry barriers see Barros et al. (2005) and
Coricelli (2001).
9Abiad and Mody (2005) use information on seven different dimensions of financial sector policy
to calculate an index of financial reform. The subindex on entry barriers incorporates information on
four dimensions: Restrictions on foreign bank entry, restrictions on domestic bank entry, restrictions
on branching, and restrictions on banking activities. The first of these dimensions exactly matches
our variable of interest, hence we take over the coding of our event variable from this sub-subindex.
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• is coded as 0 when no entry of foreign banks is allowed or tight restrictions on
the opening of new foreign banks are in place;
• is coded as 1 when foreign bank entry is allowed, but nonresidents must hold
less than 50 percent equity share;
• is coded as 2 when the majority of share of equity ownership of domestic banks
by nonresidents is allowed or equal treatment is ensured for both foreign banks
and domestic banks or an unlimited number of branching is allowed for foreign
banks.
Overall, we obtain information on the market opening strategies of 26 emerging
economies.10 We use central bank sources in order to double check information
on all liberalization reforms.11 Of these 26 countries, 22 reduced restrictions on
foreign bank entry during our sample period. The remaining four countries did not
reduce restrictions and remain only partially liberalized during our whole sample
period. Countries are located in Central and Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America
and Africa.
An overview of our sample countries and their respective reform years can be
found in Panel A of Table 5.1. The table also contains a short description of the
reforms themselves. Many countries eliminated limitations on foreign ownership in
the banking sector, while others like Indonesia or Taiwan also made it easier for
foreign banks to open branches. Some countries like Guatemala or Costa Rica took
a more gradual approach and liberalized only partly. All in all, we have a diverse set
of reforms that captures the different facets of bank liberalization. In Figure 5.1 the
development of the foreign market share aligned around the respective reform year of
our sample countries is plotted.12 Many countries were already partially liberalized
10We include all countries not yet fully liberalized at the onset of our sample period in 1995 for
which we are able to obtain the coding of the event variable. For 17 of our 26 sample countries
liberalization information is taken from the Abiad and Mody (2005) database and for the remaining
9 countries from the Bekaert and Harvey (2004) database.
11Overall, the quality of the two databases is very good. We make only two minor corrections:
In Mexico, restrictions on foreign bank entry were removed in 1997, two years earlier than reported
in the Abiad/Mody database (Herna´ndez-Murillo 2007). For Bulgaria, the event definition is not
unambiguously clear from the two databases. We consult a paper by Miller and Petranov (2001)
to obtain the correct date of liberalization.
12The foreign market share is defined as the share of total bank assets owned by foreign banks
within the respective country.
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Figure 5.1: Impact of liberalization on financial structure
The figure align countries around their respective liberalization event (inidcated by the vertical
line) and shows the development of foreign banks’ market share in the average sample country.
at the onset of our sample period, so that the average market share of foreign banks
five years before liberalization was about 18 %.13 However, foreign bank operations
were still restricted and highly regulated in these countries. The figure shows that
the foreign market share rose to about 50 % five years after liberalization, which
illustrates that liberalization had a significant impact in our sample countries.
5.2.2 Bank data
We obtain bank balance sheet data and time series information on bank ownership
from Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope database. This database contains detailed in-
formation on up to 30,000 banks and goes back until the early 1990’s. A problem
with the database is that each version covers only the most recent years. To gather
data on the earlier years, we merge information from the 2011 internet version of
13Foreign bank presence prior to liberalization can also be explained by historical reasons in
some of our sample countries. For example, in Mexico, foreign banks were allowed to enter before
restrictions were put in place in 1982. These restrictions were removed again in the 1990s (see
Herna´ndez-Murillo 2007).
175
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Sample countries and liberalization events
Event Year Index Value Description Source
Bolivia 1998 1→2 limitation of voting power of majority shareholders of foreign banks eliminated Abiad/Mody
Brazil — 1 — Abiad/Mody
Bulgaria 1998 1→2 privatization process of former state-owned banks with particular focus on foreign investors Miller/Petranov
Costa Rica 1999 0→1 establishment of fully-owned foreign subsidiaries allowed; establishment of branches of foreign
banks still forbidden
Abiad/Mody
Czech Republic 1999 1→2 privatization process of government banks; large stakes sold to foreign banks Bekaert/Harvey
Egypt 1996 1→2 49% limit on foreign investors’ share in joint-venture banks removed Abiad/Mody
Estonia 1999 1→2 consolidation of the banking market, large stakes of former state-owned banks sold to foreign
investors
Bekaert/Harvey
Ghana 1999 1→2 majority foreign ownership of banks allowed Abiad/Mody
Guatemala 2004 0→1 foreign banks allowed to establish local subsidiaries subject to the conditions of the Monetary
Board
Abiad/Mody
Hungary 1996 1→2 foreign investors in the banking sector granted treatment equivalent to that given domestic financial
institutions
Bekaert/Harvey
India — 1 — Abiad/Mody
Indonesia 1998 1→2 controls on foreign bank branching lifted, up to 85% equity participation allowed Abiad/Mody
South Korea 1998 1→2 banks being restructured exempted from foreign ownership restrictions Abiad/Mody
Lithuania 1999 1→2 removal of restrictions on foreign investment Bekaert/Harvey
Malaysia — 1 — Abiad/Mody
Mexico 1997 1→2 removal of all restrictions on foreign bank entry Herna´ndez-Murillo
Nepal 2001 1→2 limit on foreign ownership of banks increased from 49% to 66% Abiad/Mody
Pakistan — 1 — Abiad/Mody
Poland 1999 1→2 national treatment for financial institutions from OECD member countries; removal of restrictions
on purchase of bigger stock blocks by foreign investors
Bekaert/Harvey
Romania 1999 1→2 all credit operations extended by nonresidents to residents with a maturity exceeding one year
were liberalized; privatization of former state-owned banks with focus on foreign investors
Bekaert/Harvey
Singapore 1999 1→2 40% limit on foreign investors total shareholding in local banks lifted Abiad/Mody
Slovakia 2000 1→2 branches of foreign financial institutions allowed to acquire real estate to operate their business Bekaert/Harvey
Slovenia 2000 1→2 relaxation of rules on foreign investment; foreign banks allowed to open branches Bekaert/Harvey
Taiwan 2003 1→2 banking restrictions relaxed to make it easier for foreign banks to set up branches; foreign banks are
accorded national treatment to enable them to compete with domestic banks on an equal footing
Abiad/Mody
Thailand 1997 1→2 limits of 25 % of equity participation of banks by nonresidents raised to 100% based on case-by-case
approach of the MOF’s approval
Abiad/Mody
Zimbabwe 2000,2002 0→1→2 entry criteria objectified by the Banking Act amendment Abiad/Mody
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Table 5.1 continued...
Panel B: Bankscope data
Country Banks Observations Total assets Total loans Market share ROA
Equity
Total assets
Liquid assets
Total assets
Bolivia 10 90 348 221 0.098 0.22 0.11 0.16
Brazil 78 581 4,086 1,381 0.014 2.13 0.34 0.22
Bulgaria 9 76 504 261 0.017 1.86 0.44 0.17
Costa Rica 25 182 311 174 0.054 2.34 0.16 0.21
Czech Republic 15 85 3,755 1,604 0.050 -0.28 0.36 0.10
Egypt 19 201 2,945 1,292 0.053 1.11 0.32 0.09
Estonia 7 27 1,964 1,431 0.072 1.58 0.26 0.13
Ghana 6 56 169 68 0.079 3.36 0.44 0.14
Guatemala 22 251 283 140 0.026 -0.64 0.18 0.10
Hungary 7 53 2,106 1,257 0.080 0.87 0.3 0.13
India 63 740 5,448 2,620 0.017 0.83 0.19 0.07
Indonesia 61 336 1,820 841 0.021 -0.25 0.31 0.11
Korea Rep. of 29 226 30,695 19,260 0.047 0.01 0.11 0.05
Lithuania 6 40 949 621 0.067 -0.30 0.3 0.14
Malaysia 25 200 6,369 3,850 0.050 1.09 0.27 0.10
Mexico 14 87 4,871 2,888 0.027 0.23 0.28 0.22
Nepal 7 78 168 79 0.092 1.39 0.27 0.07
Pakistan 17 192 1,723 848 0.048 0.60 0.26 0.09
Poland 17 124 2,800 1,376 0.024 1.25 0.22 0.14
Romania 8 56 1,227 605 0.063 0.63 0.43 0.17
Singapore 16 119 14,851 7,368 0.103 1.40 0.24 0.20
Slovakia 6 27 1,906 829 0.019 0.37 0.37 0.10
Slovenia 15 148 1,321 738 0.066 1.01 0.25 0.13
Taiwan 44 487 17,080 9,672 0.023 0.38 0.15 0.10
Thailand 9 90 9,763 6,531 0.093 -0.92 0.13 0.11
Zimbabwe 7 52 663 225 0.080 7.12 0.25 0.11
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Table 5.1 continued...
Panel C: Macro data & efficiency estimates
Country Initial d(initial Initial Initial Herfindahl Log(inflation) GDP growth
ROA ROA) cost to NPL index
income ratio ratio
Bolivia 0.00 0 0.66 0.05 0.13 1.75 3.62
Brazil 0.22 1 0.76 0.10 0.08 2.23 2.97
Bulgaria 0.36 1 0.69 0.27 0.14 2.78 3.47
Costa Rica 0.06 1 0.77 0.03 0.17 2.59 5.07
Czech Republic 0.01 0 0.67 0.22 0.16 1.57 3.47
Egypt 0.08 1 0.54 0.14 0.14 1.86 4.79
Estonia 0.95 1 0.81 0.02 0.46 1.97 7.32
Ghana 1.00 1 0.38 0.13 0.20 3.07 4.91
Guatemala 0.04 0 0.73 0.07 0.09 2.13 3.97
Hungary 0.03 0 0.61 0.05 0.14 2.34 3.76
India 0.02 0 0.60 0.14 0.08 1.92 6.99
Indonesia 0.01 0 0.88 0.49 0.10 2.43 3.76
Korea Rep. of 0.00 0 1.13 0.07 0.10 1.48 4.98
Lithuania 0.06 1 0.76 0.13 0.25 0.91 6.34
Malaysia 0.00 0 0.37 0.19 0.10 1.26 5.46
Mexico 0.08 1 0.73 0.11 0.16 2.34 2.97
Nepal 0.50 1 0.37 — 0.17 1.87 3.94
Pakistan 0.02 0 1.40 0.20 0.14 2.01 4.48
Poland 0.07 1 0.66 0.13 0.10 1.90 4.81
Romania 0.51 1 0.46 0.08 0.19 3.25 3.36
Singapore 0.00 0 0.35 0.05 0.24 0.64 6.57
Slovakia 0.00 0 0.70 0.14 0.17 1.99 5.31
Slovenia 0.05 1 0.53 0.07 0.19 1.98 4.35
Taiwan 0.01 0 — — 0.06 0.74 4.79
Thailand 0.02 0 0.49 0.43 0.13 1.39 3.70
Zimbabwe 0.17 1 0.32 — 0.26 4.98 -2.65
178
Table 5.1 continued...
Panel D: List of ISIC Rev. 3 industries and corresponding characteristics
ISIC Sector External SME ISIC Sector External SME
Dependence Share Dependence Share
151 Meat, fish, fruits, vegetables 0.14 0.0382 261 Glass and glass products 0.53 0.0505
152 Dairy products 0.14 0.0382 269 Non-metallic mineral products 0.06 0.1417
153 Grain mill products, starches, animal feeds 0.14 0.0382 271 Basic iron and steel 0.09 0.0162
154 Other food products 0.14 0.0382 272 Basic non-ferrous metals 0.01 0.0476
155 Beverages 0.08 0.0404 281 Structured metal products 0.24 0.0998
160 Tobacco products -0.45 0.0030 289 Other metal products 0.24 0.0998
171 Spinning, weaving, finishing of textiles 0.4 0.0281 291 General purpose machinery 0.45 0.1368
172 Other textiles 0.4 0.0281 292 Special purpose machinery 0.45 0.1368
173 Knitted and crocheted fabrics 0.4 0.0281 300 Office, accounting, computing machinery 1.06 0.0285
181 Wearing apparel except fur 0.03 0.0818 311 Electric motors, generators, transformers 0.77 0.0344
182 Dressing and dyeing of fur 0.03 0.0818 312 Electricity distribution and control apparatus 0.77 0.0344
191 Tanning, dressing and processing of leather -0.14 0.1045 313 Insulated wire and cable 0.77 0.0344
192 Footwear -0.08 0.0161 314 Accumulators, primary cells, batteries 0.77 0.0344
201 Saw milling and planing of wood 0.28 0.2137 315 Lighting equipment, electric lamps 0.77 0.0344
202 Wood products 0.28 0.2137 319 Other electrical equipment 0.77 0.0344
210 Paper and paper products 0.18 0.0303 321 Electronic valves, tubes 1.04 0.0309
221 Publishing 0.2 0.1632 322 TV/radio transmitters 1.04 0.0309
222 Printing 0.2 0.1632 323 TV/radio receivers 1.04 0.0309
231 Coke oven products 0.33 0.0926 341 Motor vehicles 0.39 0.0228
232 Refined petroleum products 0.33 0.0926 351 Shipbuilding 0.46 0.0656
241 Basic chemicals 0.205 0.0121 359 Transport equipment 0.31 0.0121
242 Other chemicals 0.22 0.0580 361 Furniture 0.24 0.0909
251 Rubber products 0.23 0.0315 369 Other manufacturing 0.47 0.1695
252 Plastic products 1.14 0.0609 Average 0.37 0.0707
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Table 5.1 continued...
Panel E: Amadeus data
Country Period Observations Firms Assets Debt DebtAssets Sales Tangibility
Ebit
Assets d(small) d(young) d(exdep)
Bulgaria 1995-2004 2,823 627 11,300 2,546 0.22 11,400 0.53 0.06 0.71 0.24 0.50
Czech Republic 1995-2005 9,788 1,926 20,900 4,042 0.20 24,900 0.47 0.07 0.40 0.72 0.66
Estonia 1995-2006 1,044 175 7,816 2,325 0.28 10,300 0.52 0.09 0.63 0.58 0.58
Hungary 1995-2007 1,516 576 30,800 3,980 0.17 198,000 0.48 0.08 — — 0.51
Lithuania 1995-2008 706 199 7,178 2,089 0.26 8,066 0.51 0.07 0.73 0.91 0.56
Poland 1995-2009 7,554 1,919 15,200 3,788 0.24 22,200 0.50 0.08 0.43 0.25 0.51
Romania 1995-2010 5,402 1,414 9,615 1,883 0.18 8,396 0.47 0.15 0.67 0.31 0.52
Slovakia 1995-2011 1,656 392 27,500 3,994 0.18 32,500 0.49 0.05 0.28 0.57 0.52
Panel A provides information on our sample countries and the coding of our event variable. Our sample period is from 1995 to 2007. Information on liberalization
events is obtained from an extended version of the financial liberalization database used by Abiad and Mody (2005), the Bekaert and Harvey (2004) database
on important financial, economic and political events in emerging markets and papers by Hernandez-Murillo (2007) and Miller and Petranov (2001). The
liberalization variable takes values between 0 and 2, with 0 indicating tight restrictions on foreign entry, 1 indicating partial liberalization and 2 indicating
full liberalization. Four of our sample countries (Brazil, India, Malaysia and Pakistan) were partially liberalized in 1995 and had no reform during our sample
period. Panel B reports mean values of balance sheet and income statement items obtained from the Bankscope database. Values are in millions of U.S. dollars.
Panel C shows efficiency estimates on the country level that are calculated as follows: We first define a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the bank has—in
the year prior to liberalization—an ROA in the top quartile of all banks in our sample (efficient bank). We then calculate the share of efficient domestic banks
at liberalization as the market share (in terms of total assets) of domestic banks that are efficient according to the definition above (column 1). We divide our
sample into countries with lower and countries with a higher than median value of this variable (column 2). Instead of ROA, we alternatively use the initial
cost to income ratio (column 3) or the initial non-performing loans ratio (column 4) as obtained from the World Bank. The panel further provides mean values
for macro control variables by country. Panel D reports two industry characteristics used in the regression analysis. Column 1 reports the aggregated value
of capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations over capital expenditures for U.S. industries in the 1980s as calculated in Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Column 2 shows the share of total employment of companies with less than 20 employees within U.S. industries in the early 1990s as reported by Beck et
al. (2006). Panel E reports mean values for for the firm balance sheet and income statement items as obtained from the Amadeus database. Values are in
thousands of U.S. dollars. We report mean values for total assets, total debt, the ratio between the two, total sales, a measure of tangibility as defined by fixed
assets to total assets, the ratio of EBIT to total assets and three dummy variables: d(small) takes a value of 1 if the average firm size (as measured by total
assets) prior to liberalization is lower than median, d(young) takes a value of 1 if the average firm age prior to liberalization is lower than median, and d(exdep)
takes a value of 1 if the firm is an industry with a higher than median value of external financial dependence according to Rajan and Zingales (1998).
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the database with data from older CD-ROM versions. In this way, we obtain a con-
sistent dataset for the entire sample period from 1995 to 2007. The years 1993 and
1994 are excluded due to very thin data availability. To avoid a possible distortion
of results due to other forces being at work during the global financial crisis, we also
exclude the years 2008 and 2009. Careful revision of the data is necessary to avoid
double counting and the inclusion of irrelevant data. We eliminate unconsolidated
statements whenever both unconsolidated and consolidated statements are available
for a certain bank. Moreover, we eliminate all statements of non-bank financial
institutions, such as clearing institutions, central banks or securities firms.
In large parts of the paper we distinguish between domestic and foreign lending.
Hence, we need to identify ownership of our sample banks. Bankscope includes
detailed information on ownership, giving both name and nationality of a bank’s
shareholders as well as their respective shares in the bank. Banks are coded as
foreign if at least 50 % of their assets are foreign owned. Unfortunately, even with
different versions of the Bankscope database, ownership information is only available
for the years 2000 to 2007. Hence, for the years 1995 to 1999, we consult the banks’
or central banks’ websites in order to check whether there was a takeover.
Our sample provides information on 842 distinct foreign and domestic banks. We
aggregate loans from all banks within a given market in order to calculate country
level loan supply in a given year. In the bank level regressions our focus is on domestic
banks. Among the 842 banks, our sample contains 542 distinct domestic banks with
4,604 bank-year observations.14 Panel B of Table 5.1 contains descriptive statistics
of the domestic bank balance sheet information by country. It reports the number of
banks per country as well as mean values for bank assets, loans, ROA, market share,
a solvency measure (equity by total assets) and a liquidity measure (liquid assets by
total assets). The number of domestic banks per country ranges from six in Ghana,
Lithuania and Slovakia up 78 in Brazil. Importantly, the sample is not dominated by
a single country: India, the country with the most bank-year observations, makes up
approximately 15 % of the overall sample. Within the sample, domestic banks from
Korea, Taiwan or Singapore are the largest on average, while somewhat surprisingly,
14Besides foreign banks, we exclude also banks that were taken over by foreign banks from the
bank level analysis. If foreign entrants selected these banks based on their efficiency this could
create a potential bias to our analysis. However, we show in Section 5.6 that this is not the case.
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African banks are the most profitable ones.
5.2.3 Efficiency classification of banking markets and macroe-
conomic data
As outlined in the introduction, we want to analyze how differences in the efficiency
of domestic banking markets affect outcomes of banking sector liberalization. In
order to determine the efficiency of a banking sector we would ideally want to know
how efficiently banks screen and monitor investment projects. Since this information
is empirically not observable, we present several accounting based measures.
As a starting point, we focus on banks’ profitability. We calculate the fraction of
domestic banks (weighted by total assets) in a given market whose ROA is in the top
quartile of all sample banks in the year before the respective market is liberalized.15
For the four countries that did not experience a liberalization event during our sample
period the measure displays the share of efficient domestic banks at the onset of
our sample period in 1995.16 The first column of Table 5.1, Panel C displays for
each sample country the resulting share of efficient banks at liberalization (Initial
ROA). There is considerable variation in this measure across our sample countries.
In Eastern Europe, the Czech Republic opened its banking sector while there were
basically no profitable domestic banks. In Poland a fraction of 7 percent of total
banking assets was managed by relatively efficient banks. Most Asian countries
opened their banking markets while having a rather inefficient domestic banking
sector. Among the countries that did not open their markets, only Brazil has a
considerable fraction of profitable domestic banks. Since we conduct sample splits
based on the Initial ROA measure, we define a dummy that takes the value of one if
Initial ROA is above the median and zero otherwise. The respective classification is
displayed in column 2.
Alternatively, we use the cost to income ratio (Initial cost to income ratio) and
the non-performing loans ratio (Initial NPL ratio) to obtain a measure for bank-
ing efficiency. We obtain data for the aggregate banking sectors of every sample
15We have used alternative cut-offs for the definition of the initial efficiency variable. Our results
are robust to these changes.
16Zimbabwe is the only sample country that had two events. We consistently code the first event
as the liberalization event. Results are unaffected by this decision.
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country in the year before liberalization from the World Bank World Development
Indicators.17 The coding of these two indicators is displayed in columns 3 and 4.
Throughout the main part of the paper we consistently apply the measure Initial
ROA. In Section 5.6, we verify that our most important findings are robust to the
two alternative definitions of banking sector efficiency (Initial cost to income ratio
and Initial NPL ratio).
The last three columns of Table 5.1, Panel C, report macro controls obtained
from the World Bank World Development Indicators. We control for banking mar-
ket concentration by including the Herfindahl index of each banks’ market share
in a given banking market (Herfindahl index), the logarithm of the inflation rate
(log(inflation)) and the annual GDP growth rate (GDP growth).
5.2.4 Industry data
To investigate whether the effects of bank liberalization are transmitted to the real
economy, data on industry output is collected from UNIDO’s INDSTAT4 (2011)
database. This database contains time series information on 127 countries for the
period 1990-2008. The measure of industry output reported in the UNIDO database
is based on the census concept and covers only activities of an industrial nature.18
The data is originally stored in national currency valued at current prices. In order
to make data from different countries comparable, it is converted into current U.S.
dollars using the average period exchange rates as given in the International Finan-
cial Statistics (IFS). Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), the analysis is confined
to manufacturing sectors (U.S. SIC 2000-3999) in order to reduce the dependence
on country-specific factors like natural resources. The UNIDO dataset is classified
by ISIC Rev. 3 codes. Using three-digit industry codes as the level of analysis,
a panel of up to 47 industries per country-year is obtained. The basic industry
specification includes 10,520 country-industry-year observations for 1,132 distinct
country-industries.
In Section 5.4, we examine whether industries that differ in certain characteris-
17Series GFDD.EI.07, defined as operating expenses as a share of the sum of net interest rev-
enue and other operating income, and series GFDD.SI.02, defined as the ratio of defaulting loans
(payments of interest and principal past due by 90 days or more) to total gross loans.
18For details on the INDSTAT data see UNIDO Statistics Unit (2011).
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tics are heterogeneously affected by liberalization. Industry measures for external
dependence and the share of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are obtained
from papers by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Beck et al. (2008), respectively.19
Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure a firm’s dependence on external finance as
capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations divided by capital expendi-
tures and aggregate data for U.S.-based publicly listed companies of the 1980’s into
an industry index. They argue that industries differ in their use of external finance
for technological reasons that are persistent across countries. The U.S. is taken as
a benchmark economy as its capital markets are among the most advanced in the
world and hence there are relatively few frictions, market imperfections or policy dis-
tortions. Moreover, data for publicly traded companies is used as these are relatively
large companies that are financially not constrained. Therefore the amount of exter-
nal finance they use is a relatively pure measure of the demand for external finance.
As Rajan and Zingales (1998) point out, the identifying assumption that techno-
logical differences persist across countries does not require that industries have the
same value for external financial dependence in every country, but that the ranking
among them remains relatively stable across countries. Panel D of Table 5.1 shows
that there is considerable variation in the amount of external finance that industries
need in order to fund their operations. Sectors with the highest dependence on exter-
nal finance are Plastic Products and Office/Accounting/Computing Machinery. On
the contrary, Tobacco and Leather sectors seem to rely mostly on internal funding.
The share of small and medium enterprises within an industry is obtained from
Beck et al. (2008) and calculated as the industry’s share of total employment by firms
with less than 20 employees. The paper rests on the same identifying assumptions
as Rajan and Zingales (1998) and also uses the U.S. as a benchmark economy to
measure an industry’s technological share of small firms. Beck et al. (2008) emphasize
that even if there are policy distortions and market imperfections in the U.S., the
19For this the three-digit ISIC Rev. 3 codes used in the UNIDO (2011) dataset are matched
to three-digit ISIC Rev. 2 codes used in these earlier papers. ISIC Rev. 3 codes are generally
finer than ISIC Rev. 2 codes so that in some cases several of the sectors in this paper have the
same value for the respective measure. The United Nations Statistics Division provides tables with
correspondences between different sector classifications on its website. As a consistent matching of
ISIC Rev. 3 sectors 331 Medical instruments, 332 Optical instruments and 333 Watches and clocks
is not possible, these sectors are excluded from the analysis.
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approximation remains valid as long as these distortions do not systematically distort
the ranking of industries. Again, Panel D of Table 5.1 shows considerable variation
between industries. While Wood products and Printing and Publishing are industries
with relatively high shares of SMEs, there are few small firms in the Tobacco or the
Basic Chemicals industry.
5.2.5 Firm data
Unfortunately, no database contains detailed information on firms from all our sam-
ple countries for the period from 1995 to 2007. Nevertheless, we would like to use
firm level data in order to support our argumentation and present evidence on the
mechanism behind our industry results. As a compromise, we use Bureau van Dijk’s
Amadeus database to obtain data on a subsample of countries, the Eastern European
countries. The database contains balance sheet and other financial information on
public and private firms from 43 European countries. Similar to the industry level,
we focus on the manufacturing sector and include only firms from U.S. SIC sectors
2000-3999. Our basic firm-level regressions contains 30,489 observations for 7,228
distinct firms from eight Eastern European countries.
Panel E of Table 5.1 provides a description for the Amadeus data. It covers the
period from 1995 to 2004 and is hence well-balanced around the years 1999 and 2000,
in which most Eastern European countries liberalized their banking sectors. Depen-
dent variables in the regressions are a firm’s total debt and the ratio of total debt to
total assets. Firms from all countries are comparable in size (as measured by total
assets or sales), tangibility (defined as fixed assets over total assets) and profitability
(defined as EBIT over total assets). The last three columns show the average values
of three dummy variables: The first one takes a value of one if the average firm size
(as measured by total assets) prior to liberalization is lower than median, the second
one takes a value of one if the average firm age (in years) prior to liberalization is
lower than median, and the third one takes a value of one if the firm operates in an
industry with a higher than median value of external dependence according to Ra-
jan and Zingales (1998). Importantly, each dummy varies significantly within each
country, so that differences between firms of different external dependence, different
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size, or different age cannot be attributed to differences between countries.20
5.3 Loan supply and financial structure
One important motive to open banking sectors is that policy makers expect an inflow
of new capital through foreign banks. Foreign banks that enter emerging markets
are generally multinational institutions that do not rely on domestic deposits to fund
their loans. From this perspective, liberalization should result in an improved access
to international capital markets and, therefore, an increase of aggregate loan supply
(Beim and Calomiris 2001). However, this argument neglects potential reactions
by domestic banks’ to the increase in competition. We argue that only banks that
operate relatively efficient are able to adapt to the new situation, for example by
improving their technology and processes to counter the competitive threat. As
these banks are able to compete with foreign entrants, efficiency gains and improved
access to international capital markets might induce them to increase their loan
supply. Banks that operate relatively inefficient, on the other hand, may fail to
adapt to the new competitive environment, are likely to lose market shares and
could even be driven out of the market. In this case, foreign lending would simply
be a substitute for domestic lending and one would not expect a positive effect on
aggregate lending within the economy. Similarly, one might expect no positive effect
on aggregate lending if foreign banks enter the market by taking over domestic banks.
The effect of opening the banking sector on lending in the economy might even
be negative. For instance, foreign banks may be unable or unwilling to take over
all of the domestic banks’ customers. Literature suggests that foreign banks—who
are mostly large and multinational enterprises—prefer lending to large and trans-
parent companies that are able to provide hard information (see, e.g., Stein 2002,
Berger et al. 2005, or Mian 2006). Financing to smaller companies that rely on soft
information might suffer from liberalization, if domestic banks previously acting as
relationship lenders are replaced by foreign entrants.21
20In Hungary, the liberalization event was relatively early in 1996. Amadeus does not contain
information on Hungarian firms in 1995, so that we are unable to define the dummy variables for
initial size and initial age.
21In a theoretical model, Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta (2008) show that foreign bank entry
may worsen welfare if domestic banks are better at monitoring soft information customers. In the
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Thus, the effect of liberalization on aggregate loan volume is a priori not obvious.
The overall effect should depend on two factors: The efficiency of the domestic
banking sector at the time of liberalization and the relative importance of the SME
sector that depends on external financing.
5.3.1 Bank-level evidence on loan supply
We start by documenting the reaction of individual domestic banks to liberalization.
In particular, we investigate the effect of liberalization on the loan supply of these
banks. We estimate the following equation:
log(loans)ijt = αi + αjt + φ
′Bit + δ · (initial ROAi · eventjt) + ijt (5.1)
where i indexes the individual bank, j country and t time; αi are bank fixed effects
and αjt are year-country interactions that control for year-specific shocks to certain
banking markets; bank control variables are denoted by Bit and include the bank’s
market share, the ratio of equity to assets and the ratio of liquid to total assets; each
bank’s efficiency in the year before liberalization is measured by the bank’s ROA in
that year (initial ROA). Alternatively, we classify banks as efficient if their ROA is
among the top quartile of all our sample banks (foreign and domestic) in the year
before the respective liberalization event and interact the resulting dummy variable
(d(efficient bank)) with the event variable. Finally, ijt is a random error term. To
allow for correlation between observations from the same country, standard errors in
all our regressions are clustered at the country level.
Results are reported in Table 5.2. We start with including only the event variable
in Equation (5.1). The coefficient δ1 is negative, but not significant (column 1). In
column 2 we include the interaction between initial ROA and liberalization, which
enters with a positive sign and is significant at the 10%-level. The more efficiently a
domestic bank operates prior to liberalization, the more it increases its loan supply
following the event. In column 3 we use the dummy d(efficient bank) instead of the
empirical part of the paper they find support for this prediction and show that there is a negative
correlation between foreign bank penetration and the depth of the private credit market in poor
countries. Their findings are consistent with the above argument: Foreign bank entry may increase
total lending and welfare within a country, but this is not guaranteed and crucially depends on the
efficiency of the domestic banking sector at liberalization.
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Table 5.2: Bank-level loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(loans) Log(loans) Log(loans) Log(loans) Log(loans) Log(loans)
Event -0.200 -0.292 -0.350* -0.226
(0.185) (0.177) (0.181) (0.161)
Interaction (Event 0.100*
× initial ROA) (0.053)
Interaction (Event 0.846*** 0.496** 0.470** 0.316*
× d(efficient bank)) (0.199) (0.185) (0.217) (0.182)
Observations 4604 4604 4604 4604 4604 4604
Distinct banks 542 542 542 542 542 524
R-squared 0.245 0.253 0.261 0.340 0.430 0.602
Year effects YES YES YES YES — —
Bank effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country trends NO NO NO YES — —
Year-country interactions NO NO NO NO YES YES
Bank controls NO NO NO NO NO YES
The table reports coefficients for different specifications of the following equation: log(loans)ijt =
αi + αt + φ
′Bit + δ1 · eventjt + δ2 · (initiali · eventjt) + ijt, where i denotes the individual bank,
j country and t time. Dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of the loan supply
of private domestic banks. Variables of interest are the event variable, an interaction between
liberalization and initial ROA (column 2) and and interaction between liberalization and a dummy
variable taking a value of 1 if the bank is among the 25% most efficient banks in the year of
liberalization (columns 3-6). We use bank and year fixed effects, country-specific trends or a full
set of year-country interactions in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Time varying bank
control variables include the bank’s market share within the country, a solvency measure defined as
equity over total assets and a liquidity measure defined as liquid assets over total assets. Standard
errors adjusted for clustering at the country level are reported in parentheses. * indicates statistical
significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-level.
bank’s initial ROA. The negative coefficient for the event variable means that the
average inefficient domestic bank decreased its loan supply following liberalization,
while the positive sign for the larger interaction term indicates that the average
efficient domestic bank increased its loan supply. These statistically significant effects
are also economically meaningful: Inefficient domestic banks decreased their lending
by 29.5 % on average, while efficient banks increased their loan supply by 64.2 %
following the event. The result is robust to the inclusion of country-specific trends
in column 4, year-country interactions in column 5, and time-varying bank control
variables in column 6. Further robustness checks are provided in Section 5.6.
These bank level results suggest that the timing of liberalization has an important
effect on the loan supply of domestic banks. Initially efficient domestic banks increase
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their lending relative to domestic banks that were inefficient at liberalization. This
result is important as it suggests that the initial efficiency of domestic banks is a
crucial determinant of post-liberalization financial structure.22
5.3.2 Country-level evidence on loan supply
We now test how liberalization affects aggregate, domestic and foreign loan supply
and how this outcome depends on the average initial efficiency of domestic banks
prior to the event. To do so, we use the country-level measure of banking sector
efficiency defined in Section 5.2.3 (see also Table 5.1, Panel C). Specifically, we
calculate the fraction of banks (weighted by total assets) in a given market with an
ROA in the top quartile of all sample banks (domestic as well as foreign owned) in the
year before liberalization and divide our sample into countries were this fraction is
lower than the median and countries where it is higher than the median (see variable
d(initial ROA) in Panel C of Table 5.1). For each subsample, we estimate:
log(loansupply)jt = αj + αt + ψ
′
kCjt + δ · eventjt + jt (5.2)
where j indexes country and t time. The dependent variable is the logarithm of
either aggregate, domestic or foreign loan supply; Cjt is a vector of macro controls
and includes GDP growth, the logarithm of inflation, and the Hirschman-Herfindahl
Index to control for competition within the banking sector; eventjt is the liberaliza-
tion variable. Country and time fixed effects account for unobserved heterogeneity
and are denoted by αj and αt, respectively, and jt is a random error term. As in
the bank level regressions, standard errors are clustered at the country level.
The results from the regressions are reported in Table 5.3. We start by inves-
tigating the effect of liberalization on aggregate loan supply and include all our
sample countries in column 1. Panel A shows that on average there was no sig-
nificant increase in aggregate loan supply after the market opening. This finding is
22The focus in this section is on the reaction of domestic banks, i.e., we do not account for the
reaction of foreign banks and banks that were taken over by foreign banks. If banks that were taken
over by foreign entrants were selected based on their efficiency this could create a potential bias to
our analysis. We address this issue in Section 5.6. Furthermore, we look at aggregate outcomes in
the next two sections, hence also incorporating lending by foreign banks and banks that were taken
over by foreign banks.
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Table 5.3: Aggregate, domestic and foreign lending
Panel A: Aggregate loan supply
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All countries Low efficiency High efficiency All countries
Event 0.054 -0.318** 0.419 -0.318**
(0.190) (0.131) (0.286) (0.128)
Interaction (event × 0.738**
d(initial ROA)) (0.306)
Observations 338 169 169 338
Distinct countries 26 13 13 26
R-squared 0.690 0.683 0.721 0.709
Year effects YES YES YES YES
Country effects YES YES YES YES
Macro controls YES YES YES YES
Panel B: Foreign loan supply
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All countries Low efficiency High efficiency All countries
Event 0.654*** 0.600* 0.705* 0.600**
(0.224) (0.289) (0.350) (0.283)
Interaction (event × 0.106
d(initial ROA)) (0.444)
Observations 328 162 166 328
Distinct countries 26 13 13 26
R-squared 0.698 0.684 0.705 0.698
Year effects YES YES YES YES
Country effects YES YES YES YES
Macro controls YES YES YES YES
Panel C: Domestic loan supply
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All countries Low efficiency High efficiency All countries
Event -0.428* -0.978** 0.111 -0.978***
(0.241) (0.331) (0.209) (0.325)
Interaction (event × 1.089***
d(initial ROA)) (0.384)
Observations 337 168 169 337
Distinct countries 26 13 13 26
R-squared 0.425 0.412 0.502 0.471
Year effects YES YES YES YES
Country effects YES YES YES YES
Macro controls YES YES YES YES
The table shows the impact of liberalization on aggregate (Panel A), foreign (Panel B) and domestic
(Panel C) loan supply at the country level. Columns 1 and 4 include the whole sample, column 2
includes only the countries with a lower than median share and column 3 includes only the countries
with a higher than median share of efficient domestic banks at liberalization. In column 4 we include
an interaction between the event and a dummy that is equal to one for countries with a higher than
median share of efficient domestic banks at liberalization. We use country and year fixed effects in
order to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Furthermore, all regressions include GDP growth,
inflation and the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index as time-varying macro control variables. Standard
errors adjusted for clustering at the country level are reported in parentheses. * indicates statistical
significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-level.
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Figure 5.2: Impact of liberalization on foreign loan supply
The figure shows the development of foreign banks’ loan supply within our sample countries around the liberalization events (indicated by the vertical lines).
All values are in billions of U.S. dollars.
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remarkable: Foreign banks are expected to bring fresh capital into emerging markets,
which should translate into an increase in aggregate loan supply. The insignificant
coefficient for liberalization suggests that in many cases foreign lending just sub-
stitutes domestic lending. Interesting heterogeneities emerge when we divide our
sample countries into those with a lower and those with a higher than median share
of efficient domestic banks at liberalization. For countries with relatively inefficient
domestic banks, the coefficient for liberalization is significantly negative (Panel A,
column 2), while countries with relatively efficient domestic banks see the expected
increase in the aggregate supply of credit (Panel A, column 3, the p-value is 0.16).
Panels B and C of Table 5.3 illustrate the underlying cause of this finding. As
expected, all countries experience significant increases in foreign lending following
the event (Table 5.3, Panel B). This is illustrated in Figure 5.2, which shows the
development of foreign banks’ loan supply around liberalization reforms in our sample
countries. However, the increase in foreign lending translates into an even larger
decrease in domestic lending in countries with relatively inefficient domestic banks
at liberalization (Panel C, column 2). Domestic lending in countries with relatively
efficient domestic banks, on the other hand, is not significantly affected by the event
(Panel C, column 3). This heterogeneous reaction to liberalization by domestic banks
in countries with differing levels of financial development is directly reflected in the
development of aggregate loan supply. While foreign banks replace domestic lenders
in countries with relatively inefficient domestic banks, it seems as if they do not take
over all of their customers, so that aggregate lending decreases. In countries with
relatively efficient domestic banks, on the other hand, foreign lending seems to be
more of a complement to domestic lending. The substitution effect, if present at
all, is much weaker in these countries, so that we see a modest increase in aggregate
lending. In column 4 we reproduce the results of columns 2 and 3 in one regression
by including an interaction between the event and a dummy variable that takes the
value of one in markets with a higher than median share of efficient domestic banks.
Our findings are illustrated in Figure 5.3, which shows Epanechnikov kernel den-
sities of residuals from a regression of aggregate loan supply on country and year
dummies as well as the macro control variables from above. Densities are plotted
for countries with an above/below median share of efficient domestic banks at lib-
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eralization before and after the event. There is a clear rightward shift for countries
with relatively efficient domestic banks, while the density for countries with rather
inefficient domestic banks is shifted to the left. Both shifts are statistically signifi-
cant, as the the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of distribution functions
is rejected at the 1 % level.
Figure 5.3: Aggregate loan supply
The figure plots Epanechnikov kernel densities of residuals from an estimation of the following
equation: log(loansupply)jt = αj + αt + ψ
′
kCjt + jt, where log(loansupply)jt is the logarithm
of aggregate lending within a country-year, αj and αt are country and time fixed effects, respec-
tively, and Cjt is a vector of macro control variables that includes GDP growth, inflation and the
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index. The left panel shows countries with a higher than median share of
efficient domestic banks at liberalization, and the right panel shows countries with a lower than
median share.
An interpretation of our findings is that many domestic banks are able to com-
pete with foreign entrants in initially efficient markets. Hence, they remain active in
the market and continue to serve their customers. In inefficient markets foreign lend-
ing simply replaces domestic lending and aggregate lending declines. Two reasons
could explain this finding. On the one hand, it could be that foreign banks make
better lending decisions than inefficient domestic banks and simply refuse to take
over some of their unhealthy customers. In this case, the decline in the total volume
of credit might still be accompanied by an increase in the efficiency of financial inter-
mediation, as more efficient foreign banks are better able to channel capital into its
most productive use. On the other hand, it might be that foreign banks over-engage
in ’cherry-picking’ their customers and also refuse to take over some of the healthy
customers of the domestic banks they replace. For example, it could be that small
firms who rely on relationship lending become credit-constrained after liberalization.
We investigate this issue in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, but first we provide some direct
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evidence for changes in countries’ financial structures (domestic vs. foreign lending).
5.3.3 Financial structure
We documented in Section 5.3.2 that countries with relatively inefficient domestic
banking sectors experience large declines in domestic lending following the event.
Thus, it is likely that the average efficiency of domestic banks at the time of liberal-
ization affects the post-event market structure (i.e., relative market share of domestic
and foreign banks). Changes in financial structure should be more pronounced in
countries with less developed domestic banking sectors. To test this prediction, we
regress the market share of foreign banks—which we measure as the share of foreign
bank assets in all bank assets for each country—on our event variable, including
country and year fixed effects as well as the vector of macro control variables from
above. Additionally, we use the ratio of foreign banks to all banks within the country
as a dependent variable.
Results are reported in Table 5.4. Columns 1 and 4 use the entire sample. As
already noted in Section 5.2.1 and visualized in Figure 5.1, we see a significant in-
crease in the market share of foreign banks following liberalization. Similarly, the
number of foreign banks in all banks goes up when entry barriers are removed (col-
umn 4). In columns 2 and 3 we apply the same sample split as in Section 5.3.2 and
run separate regressions for countries with a lower than median and those with a
higher than median share of efficient domestic banks at liberalization. We see a sig-
nificant increase in the market share of foreign banks in both subsamples. However,
the effect is much stronger in countries with relatively inefficient domestic banks. An
increase of our index by one unit implies a 23.7% increase in the foreign market share
in markets with inefficient domestic banks, compared to a 9.4% increase in markets
where domestic banks are relatively efficient.
These results are expected, given our findings in Section 5.3.2. In particular, the
documented decrease in domestic lending in inefficient markets implies an additional
increase in the market share of foreign banks. The differential effect is even more
pronounced if we look at the ratio of foreign banks to all banks in columns 5 and 6.
The coefficient for the liberalization variable in the less efficient markets has about
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Table 5.4: Financial structure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign
market share market share market share bank share bank share bank share
All countries Low efficiency High efficiency All countries Low efficiency High efficiency
Event 0.164*** 0.237** 0.094* 0.102*** 0.145** 0.060**
(0.057) (0.102) (0.048) (0.034) (0.062) (0.027)
Observations 338 169 169 338 169 169
Distinct countries 26 13 13 26 13 13
R-squared 0.621 0.507 0.698 0.532 0.594 0.502
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Macro Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
The table shows the impact of liberalization on financial structure. The dependent variable is
the market share of foreign banks (measured as the share of bank assets owned by foreign banks
divided by all bank assets in the country) in columns 1-3 and the percentage number of foreign
banks in all banks in columns 4-6. Columns 1 and 4 include the whole sample, columns 2 and 5
only the countries with a lower than median and columns 3 and 6 only the countries with a higher
than median share of efficient domestic banks at the time of liberalization. We use country and
year fixed effects in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Furthermore, all regressions
include GDP growth, inflation and the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index as time-varying macro control
variables. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level are reported in parentheses.
* indicates statistical significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-level.
2.5 times the size of the coefficient for the more efficient markets. Foreign banks
seem to replace domestic banks in these markets. For both the foreign market share
and the foreign bank ratio, the difference between the coefficients for the inefficient
and the efficient markets is significant at the 1%-level.
Taken together, our findings are in line with our previous results. In both ineffi-
cient and efficient markets liberalization increases the market share of foreign banks.
In markets with more efficient banks at the time of liberalization, however, the mar-
ket as a whole also grew (Table 5.3). Many domestic banks are able to compete
with foreign entrants and remain active in the market. Hence, the ratio of foreign
banks to all banks increases only slightly. On the other hand, we observe a large
increase in this ratio in markets with largely inefficient domestic banks at the time
of liberalization. Thus, the timing of liberalization affects financial structure.
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5.4 Industry evidence
Given the vital role banks play in the allocation of capital within the economy, we
expect that the choice of the liberalization policy transmits to the real sector. We
start by examining how liberalization affects industry output and hence economic
growth. There are three reasons why we expect a positive impact in countries with
relatively efficient domestic banks. First, we find a positive effect of liberalization
on aggregate loan supply in these countries. A large literature following King and
Levine (1993a) and King and Levine (1993b) documents that financial deepening
translates into economic growth. Secondly, foreign banks in transition countries
are found to be more cost efficient and provide better services than their domestic
counterparts (Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel 2005a). As foreign banks took over market
shares from domestic banks, this should translate into an increase in the efficiency
of financial intermediation. Thirdly, stimulating competition from foreign entrants
should induce relatively efficient domestic banks to improve their technology and
services. Hence, the efficiency of domestic lending should also improve in financially
developed countries.
In contrast, the impact in countries with relatively inefficient domestic banks is
less clear cut. Although we observe a decrease in aggregate loan supply in these
countries (Section 5.3.2), the market share that is taken over by foreign banks is par-
ticularly large in countries with relatively inefficient domestic banks (Section 5.3.3).
To the extent that these foreign banks indeed improve the allocation of capital, a
positive effect on industry output could be observed also in financially less developed
countries.
5.4.1 Economic growth
To investigate the effect of liberalization on industry output, we use the UNIDO
data described in Section 5.2.4. As in the loan supply regressions in Section 5.3.2
we use the dummy d(initial ROA) to split our sample into countries with a lower
than median and those with a higher than median share of efficient domestic banks
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at liberalization and estimate the following specification for each subsample:23
log(Y )ijt = αij + αt + δ · eventjt + ijt (5.3)
where i indexes industry, j country and t time; the dependent variable is the loga-
rithm of industry output. We include country-industry interactions in all regressions
in order to account for any unobserved time-invariant determinants of industry per-
formance (e.g., natural endowments, location). Time fixed effects αt control for
changes in economic performance over time. As before, standard errors are clustered
at the country level.
Table 5.5: Industry output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(output) Log(output) Log(output) Log(output)
Low efficiency High efficiency
Event 0.096 -0.250* 0.463** -0.250*
(0.164) (0.138) (0.196) (0.136)
Interaction (event × 0.713***
d(initial ROA)) (0.234)
Observations 10,520 5,690 4,830 10,520
Distinct country-industries 1,132 637 495 1,132
R-squared 0.334 0.365 0.336 0.348
Year effects YES YES YES YES
Country-industry-interactions YES YES YES YES
The table shows estimation results for different specifications of the following equation: log(Y )ijt =
αij+αt+δ1·(eventjt)+ijt, where i denotes industry, j country and t time. The dependent variable is
the logarithm of country-industry output. All regressions include country-industry interactions and
time fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity and a random error term ijt. Columns 1
and 4 use the whole sample of countries, column 2 uses only countries with a lower than median
share, and column 3 uses only countries with a higher than median share of efficient domestic banks
at liberalization. In column 4 we include an interaction between the event and d(initial ROA), a
dummy taking the value of 1 in countries with a higher than median share of efficient domestic
banks at liberalization. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level are reported in
parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the
1%-level.
On average, industry output is not affected by the event. The coefficient for
liberalization is positive but insignificant (Table 5.5, column 1). Thus, in line with
our finding that liberalization did not have an effect on aggregate credit supply,
23Alternatively, we use the whole sample and include an interaction between the event and
d(initial ROA).
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we do not observe an effect on growth in the average industry. Next, we apply
the sample split discussed above, as pooling countries with efficient and inefficient
domestic banking sectors at liberalization masks cross-sectional heterogeneity.
Column 2 includes only the less efficient markets. The coefficient for the event
variable is now negative and significant at the 10%-level. The negative impact on
aggregate loan supply in these countries corresponds to a negative impact on output
in the average industry. In column 3, we include only the more efficient countries.
The coefficient for liberalization is positive and significant at the 5%-level, indicat-
ing that liberalization promotes economic growth in these countries. This finding
underlines our conjecture that domestic banks need to be sufficiently developed be-
fore entry barriers are removed in order for liberalization to have a positive impact.24
Column 4 shows that the difference between the two groups of countries is significant
at the 1%-level.
Figure 5.4: Industry output
The figure plots Epanechnikov kernel densities of residuals from an estimation of the following
equation: log(Y )ijt = αij + αt + ijt, where log(Y )ijt is the logarithm of country-industry output
in a certain year, and αij and αt are country-industry and time fixed effects, respectively. The left
panel shows countries with a higher than median share of efficient domestic banks at liberalization,
and the right panel shows countries with a lower than median share.
Again, we illustrate our findings by plotting Epanechnikov kernel densities of
residuals from a regression of industry output on country-industry interactions and
year fixed effects. Figure 5.4 shows a rightward shift in the density following lib-
eralization in countries with relatively efficient domestic banks, while residuals in
24Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) document that equity market liberalization increases
annual real economic growth by about 1 %. In line with our findings they show that the largest
growth responses occur in countries with high quality institutions.
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countries with rather inefficient banks are shifted to the left. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for the equality of distribution functions indicates that both shifts are
significant at the 1 % level.
5.4.2 Differential effects on output
A potential problem with the analysis in the previous section is that countries that
differ in the development of the domestic banking sector differ in several other di-
mensions that might have an influence on industry performance. While the country-
industry interactions absorb any fixed differences between countries, time-varying
omitted variables pose a threat to identification and might bias our results. To
address this problem, we replace the year effects by year-country interactions and
include an interaction between the liberalization variable and industry characteris-
tics (i.e., an industry’s external financial dependence and an industry’s SME share)
into Equation (5.3):
log(Y )ijt = αij + αjt + λ · industry characteristici · eventjt + ijt (5.4)
We start by examining whether there is a differential impact for industries that differ
regarding their external dependence. The idea is that if liberalization is indeed the
driving force behind our results, any effect it might have on industries should be
especially relevant for those industries that are more dependent on external finance.
Accordingly, any increase in the efficiency of the capital allocation process that might
be induced by liberalization should be reflected in a positive sign for the interaction
coefficient.
Column 1 of Table 5.6 shows results for our whole sample of countries. The coef-
ficient for the interaction is positive and significant at the 1%-level. Indeed, foreign
entry seems to induce an improvement in the efficiency of financial intermediation
that is reflected in a more positive development of industries that are more dependent
on external finance. The differential effect is economically large: According to the
model, moving from the 25th percentile (0.14) to the 75th percentile (0.47) of exter-
nal financial dependence corresponds to a 16.1 % larger increase in industry output
following liberalization in our average sample country (see last line of Table 5.6).
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Given our results until now, it is somewhat surprising that the interaction is also
positive for countries with a lower than median share of efficient domestic banks at
liberalization (column 2). Even though output in the average industry is negatively
affected in these countries, those industries that rely on external finance the most
have relatively higher output following the event. Although aggregate lending de-
clines in these economies, foreign banks seem to improve the efficiency of capital
allocation and lend to more productive firms on average. In other words: Not the
quantity, but the average quality of lending increases in these countries.
Table 5.6: Industry output by external dependence and SME share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(output) Log(output) Log(output) Log(output) Log(output) Log(output)
Low efficiency High efficiency Low efficiency High efficiency
Interaction (event 0.454*** 0.473** 0.434**
× external dependence) (0.120) (0.198) (0.145)
Interaction (event -0.014 -1.235*** 1.364**
× SME share) (0.492) (0.301) (0.574)
Observations 8,799 4,742 4,057 8,606 4,634 3,972
Distinct country-industries 942 527 415 921 515 406
R-squared 0.485 0.511 0.464 0.466 0.493 0.449
Year-country interactions YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-industry-interactions YES YES YES YES YES YES
Differential (75th vs. 25th perc.) 16.1% 19.7% 15.4% -0.1% -7.3% 8.8%
This table shows how liberalization affects industries with different levels of external financial
dependence and different shares of small and medium enterprises. Columns 1-3 provide results for
the following equation: log(Y )ijt = αij + αjt + δ · (external dependencei · eventjt) + ijt, whereas
columns 4-6 estimate the following equation: log(Y )ijt = αij +αjt+δ ·(SME sharei ·eventjt)+ijt.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of industry output. Columns 1 and 4 report results for the
whole sample. Columns 2 and 5 include only countries with a lower than median share of efficient
domestic banks at liberalization, and columns 3 and 6 include only the countries with a higher
than median share. All regressions include country-industry interactions to account for unobserved
heterogeneity and year-country interactions that control for country specific developments within
a certain year (and absorb the event coefficient itself). We also include a random error term ijt.
Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level are reported in parentheses. * indicates
statistical significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-level.
As mentioned above, the literature suggests that large and multinational foreign
banks prefer lending to large and transparent companies, while small firms typi-
cally have problems in obtaining loans from them (Stein 2002, Berger et al. 2005,
Mian 2006). Consequently, small firms might become credit constrained if foreign
banks replace domestic banks previously acting as relationship lenders. This effect
should be particularly relevant in markets that are characterized by a low share of
efficient domestic banks. On the other hand, Beck et al. (2008) show that small-firm
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industries grow disproportionately faster in countries with well-developed financial
systems. The basic argument is that more efficient financial intermediation reduces
informational problems and the need for collateral. Consequently, small firms that
are informationally opaque and rely more on intangible assets than large firms dis-
proportionately benefit from financial development. We argue that liberalization
increases the efficiency of financial intermediation, particularly in countries with
sufficiently developed domestic banking sectors. Hence, liberalization could affect
small-firm industries in a positive way. Overall, we expect a negative impact on
small firm industries in countries with less developed domestic banks, while the ef-
fect should be rather positive in countries with more efficient banking sectors.
Columns 4-6 of Table 5.6 show results for the regressions using the SME share
as an industry characteristic. If we include all sample countries in column 4, the
coefficient for the interaction between an industry’s SME share and liberalization
is insignificant and very close to zero. Thus, in the average country, the effect of
liberalization for industries with high shares of SMEs is not different from the effect
for the average industry. However, we uncover interesting heterogeneities as we split
the sample into countries with a lower than median and countries with a higher than
median share of efficient domestic banks at liberalization.
The coefficient for the interaction term is negative and significant at the 1%-level
in countries with rather inefficient domestic banks. This result is consistent with our
previous findings. These markets are characterized by large drops in domestic lending
following the event. Since the foreign banks who replace domestic lenders mostly rely
on hard information, SMEs are unable to obtain the same level of funding in the post
liberalization period. The reduction in funding opportunities translates into lower
output for these firms. Interestingly, one cannot observe a similar effect in countries
with rather efficient domestic banks. On the contrary, small-firm industries seem
to disproportionately benefit from the improvement in financial intermediation that
liberalization fosters in these countries (column 6). Better screening and monitoring
devices on the part of banks help these firms to overcome financial constraints, a
finding that is in line with the results of Beck et al. (2008).
Our results suggest that liberalization indeed increases the efficiency of financial
intermediation and hence has a positive impact on industry growth rates within the
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liberalizing country. This is unambiguously true if domestic banks are sufficiently
developed at the time of liberalization, so that they are able to compete with foreign
entrants. If this is not the case, particularly small and opaque firms might be harmed
by liberalization, as they lose the domestic relationship lenders they need in order
to obtain funding. Section 5.5 provides further evidence on the firm level regarding
this issue.
5.4.3 Differential impact on industry volatility
We conclude the industry section with some evidence on the effect of liberalization on
output volatility. Evidence on whether liberalization increases or decreases volatility
of industrial production is mixed. While Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004) show
that the allowance of interstate banking reduced economic growth volatility within
U.S. states, Morgan and Strahan (2004) cannot confirm their finding in a study
using international data for nearly 100 countries in the 1990s.25 If anything, their
results suggest that a larger foreign bank presence in non-industrial countries is
associated with more, not less, volatility. Regarding equity market liberalization,
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2006) show that liberalization did not—as often
claimed—increase consumption growth volatility. Instead, they find a significant
decrease in volatility for many countries. However, they conclude that volatility may
not decrease or even increase in countries that have a poorly developed financial
sector.
To investigate the impact of bank liberalization on the volatility of industrial
production, we use an econometric framework similar to the one developed by Mor-
gan, Rime, and Strahan (2004). Specifically, we estimate regressions of the following
structure:
Fluctuationijt = αij + αt + δ1 · eventjt + ijt (5.5)
where i indexes industry, j country and t time. Country-industry interactions
and time fixed effects are represented by αij and αt, ijt is a random error term.
Fluctuationijt equals the absolute deviation from conditional mean growth in indus-
25Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004) examine fluctuations in state gross product, employment
or personal income within U.S. states, while Morgan and Strahan (2004) focus on volatility in real
GDP and real investment growth.
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try output. Specifically, it is equal to the absolute values of the residuals from a
regression of country-industry growth rates on a full set of country-industry interac-
tions and year fixed effects:
Growthijt = αij + αt + uijt, (5.6)
and,
Fluctuationijt =
∣∣uijt∣∣ . (5.7)
Hence, the fluctuation in economic growth for a given country-industry-year can be
interpreted as the size of the deviation from average growth for that country-industry
over our sample period and from average growth for all country-industries in that
year.
Table 5.7 provides results for the estimation of Equation (5.5). In column 1 we
include all sample countries. The coefficient for liberalization is positive but in-
significant, indicating that the event did not affect economic volatility in our average
sample country. Again, we uncover interesting heterogeneities if we divide our sam-
ple into countries with a lower than median and countries with a higher than median
share of efficient domestic banks at liberalization. Volatility in economic production
increases in countries that have mostly inefficient domestic banks (column 2). As
foreign banks took over large shares of the market in these countries, this result is
in line with arguments that point at possible withdrawals of funds by foreign banks
at economic downturns.
In contrast, we document significantly lower volatility in countries with rather
efficient domestic banking sectors at liberalization (column 3). Bank liberalization
seems to stabilize the economy if the domestic banking sector is sufficiently devel-
oped. Column 4 shows that the difference between the two groups of countries is
significant at the 1%-level. The more efficient domestic banks are at liberalization,
the more stable the economy after the event. Overall, results in this section com-
plement the equity market liberalization results of Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad
(2006) and confirm our previous finding that only countries that have a well func-
tioning domestic financial sector are able to leverage the maximum benefits from
liberalization.
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Table 5.7: Industry volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Output Output Output Output
fluctuation fluctuation fluctuation fluctuation
Low efficiency High efficiency
Event 0.019 0.094** -0.071* 0.094**
(0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036)
Interaction (event × -0.165***
d(initial ROA)) (0.049)
Observations 8,936 4,784 4,152 8,936
Distinct country-industries 957 520 437 957
R-squared 0.022 0.013 0.034 0.024
Year effects YES YES YES YES
Country-industry-interactions YES YES YES YES
The table provides evidence on how liberalization affects industry volatility by estimating different
specifications of the following equation: Fluctuationijt = αij +αt + δ1 · (eventjt) + ijt. We regress
fluctuations in the growth rates of industry output on a full set of country-industry interactions,
time fixed effects and our liberalization variable. Columns 1 and 4 use the whole sample of countries,
column 2 uses only countries with a lower than median share, and column 3 uses only countries with
a higher than median share of efficient domestic banks at liberalization. In column 4 we include an
interaction between the event and d(initial ROA), a dummy taking the value of 1 in countries with
a higher than median share of efficient domestic banks at liberalization. Standard errors adjusted
for clustering at the country level are reported in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at
the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-level.
5.5 Firm evidence
In this section, we extend our analysis by presenting firm level evidence for a sub-
sample of eight Eastern European countries.
5.5.1 Debt taking
We start by estimating the general effect of liberalization on firm debt taking in the
Eastern European countries. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
log(debt)ijt = αi + αt + θ
′Fit + δ · eventjt + ijt (5.8)
where i denotes the individual firm, j denotes country and t time. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of total debt or, alternatively, the debt to asset ratio. Firm
and time fixed effects (αi and αt) account for unobserved heterogeneity. Additionally
we include the logarithm of total sales, the firm’s ROA (EBIT/Assets) and a measure
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of tangibility (tangible assets over total assets) as time-varying firm control variables.
Finally, the model includes our liberalization variable from above, as well as a random
error term ijt. As before, standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Column 1 of Table 5.8 provides results for this specification. It can be seen that
on average firms had lower debt following liberalization. Similarly, the debt to asset
ratio decreased on average following the reform (column 6). We expect this result
to be driven by markets with rather inefficient domestic banks, hence we include
an interaction between the event variable and the dummy d(initial ROA) defined
in Section 5.2.3. Indeed, the interaction is significantly positive in both cases: The
reduction in average lending and the average debt to asset ratio is much stronger in
markets with relatively inefficient domestic banks, which is the expected result given
our findings in previous sections (columns 2 and 7). As shown in Table 5.9 in the
Appendix these results are robust to the inclusion of industry-year interactions and
the use of the ratio of debt to pre-liberalization assets as a dependent variable.
5.5.2 Differential impact on firms
We proceed by investigating whether liberalization had a differential impact on firms
in our sample countries. Specifically, we extend Equation (5.8) in the following way:
log(debt)ijt = αi + αt + θ
′Fit + δ · eventjt (5.9)
+η · eventjt · d(initial ROA)j
+κ · eventjt · firm characteristici
+ν · eventjt · d(initial ROA)j · firm characteristici + ijt
In addition to the event variable and its interaction with the dummy d(initial ROA),
we include an interaction between liberalization and one of three dummy variables:
The first dummy takes a value of one for firms in industries that have a higher than
median value of external dependence according to Rajan and Zingales (1998); the
second equals one if the average firm size (as measured by total assets) prior to the
event is above median; and the third is equal to one if the firm is younger than
median prior to the liberalization event. To make the equation complete, we also
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Table 5.8: Firm-level evidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log(debt) Log(debt) Log(debt) Log(debt) Log(debt) DebtAssets
Debt
Assets
Debt
Assets
Debt
Assets
Debt
Assets
Event -0.388*** -0.560*** -0.490** -0.534** -0.437* -0.046** -0.056** -0.051** -0.050 -0.041
(0.109) (0.159) (0.157) (0.198) (0.185) (0.018) (0.022) (0.021) (0.031) (0.030)
Interaction (event × d(initial ROA)) 0.313*** 0.225*** 0.151* 0.166* 0.019** 0.010** 0.009 0.007
(0.063) (0.060) (0.071) (0.072) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Interaction (event × d(exdep)) -0.115*** -0.009***
(0.014) (0.001)
Interaction (event × d(exdep) × d(initial ROA)) 0.142** 0.017**
(0.048) (0.006)
Interaction (event × d(small)) 0.031 -0.012*
(0.024) (0.006)
Interaction (event × d(small) × d(initial ROA)) 0.261*** 0.022**
(0.041) (0.007)
Interaction (event × d(young)) -0.123*** -0.021***
(0.009) (0.004)
Interaction (event × d(young) × d(initial ROA)) 0.293** 0.011
(0.110) (0.017)
Log(sales) 0.476*** 0.469*** 0.470*** 0.574*** 0.580*** -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008
(0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.061) (0.058) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Tangibility 0.819*** 0.822*** 0.822*** 0.724** 0.722** 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.014 0.016
(0.213) (0.213) (0.213) (0.237) (0.244) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.036)
EBIT/Assets -1.751*** -1.698*** -1.697*** -1.689*** -1.698*** -0.193*** -0.190*** -0.190*** -0.175*** -0.174***
(0.066) (0.069) (0.069) (0.121) (0.113) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 30,489 30,489 30,489 17,020 17,020 30,489 30,489 30,489 17,020 17,020
Distinct firms 7,228 7,228 7,228 2,755 2,755 7,228 7,228 7,228 2,755 2,755
R-squared 0.088 0.092 0.092 0.108 0.106 0.042 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.042
Firm effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
In this table we examine how firm debt taking and corporate capital structure are affected by liberalization. The dependent variable is the logarithm of a firm’s
total debt in columns 1-5 and the ratio of total debt to total assets in columns 6-10. Regressions include an interaction between liberalization and a dummy
variable taking the value of 1 for countries with a higher than median share of efficient domestic banks at liberalization. We define three dummy variables
that take the value of 1 for firms a) in industries with above median external financial dependence according to the measure defined by Rajan and Zingales
(1998); b) with above median average size (measured by total assets) prior to liberalization; c) with below median age prior to liberalization. These dummies
are interacted with the event and the dummy indicating efficient markets. Furthermore, we include a measure of size (the logarithm of total assets), a measure
of profitability (ROA), and a measure of tangibility (tangible assets over total assets) as time-varying firm controls. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at
the country level are reported in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-level.
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include a triple interaction between the event, the efficiency dummy and the firm
characteristic. It should be noted that the coefficients for efficiency and the firm
characteristics as well as the interaction between the two are absorbed by the firm
fixed effects.
We start with the results for external dependence. The positive coefficient for
the triple interaction in column 3 of Table 5.8 indicates that financially dependent
firms are able to obtain relatively more debt in markets with efficient domestic banks
as compared to markets with inefficient domestic banks. Firms in these countries
benefit from a better capital allocation process and do not suffer from the reduction
in aggregate lending that we observe in inefficient markets.26 This result is robust
to the use of the debt to assets ratio instead of the logarithm of total debt as a
dependent variable (column 8).
Next, we investigate the role of firm size in columns 4 and 9 of Table 5.8.27 The
triple interaction is positive and significant in both cases, indicating that smaller
firms are relatively better off in markets with efficient domestic banks. While both
large and small firms are better off in efficient markets, the effect is particularly
pronounced for the latter, indicating that large firms are able to obtain funding
in both types of markets, while small firms depend on their domestic relationship
lenders and become credit constrained if these lenders are driven out of the market
in countries with initially inefficient domestic banks.
As an alternative to firm size, we use firm age as a measure of opaqueness in
columns 5 and 10 of Table 5.8. Results are qualitatively very similar; the positive
coefficient for the triple interaction shows that younger firms are relatively better off
in countries with relatively efficient domestic banks at liberalization.28 Overall, the
results on the firm level confirm our previous results on the bank and the industry
level. Only countries with a sufficiently developed banking sector are able to leverage
26In the output growth regressions in Section 5.4.2 the interaction between liberalization was
positive also for countries with inefficient domestic banks, which indicates that—in line with an
increase in the efficiency of financial intermediation—those firms that are able to obtain funding
following the event are more productive on average.
27The sample for these regressions is smaller as we can only include firms for which we have
estimates for initial size (or age), i.e., firms for which we have balance sheet information in the year
before liberalization. However, sample selection does not affect our results: Results for the first
three columns are very similar on the restricted sample and are available from the authors upon
request.
28Again, results for the ratio of debt to pre-event assets are provided in Table 5.9 in the Appendix.
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the maximum benefits from liberalization. If domestic banks are unable to compete
with foreign entrants, they might be driven out of the market and especially small
and opaque firms might become credit constrained.
5.6 Robustness checks
5.6.1 Selection concerns
In this section we undertake several checks to assess the robustness of our findings.
First, we consider the issue that is introduced if we exclude banks from the analysis
that were taken over by foreign banks during our sample period. If banks that
were taken over by foreign entrants are selected based on their efficiency this could
create a potential bias to our analysis. On the one hand, foreign banks might ‘cherry
pick’ especially efficient banks for takeovers. On the other hand, mostly state owned
banks were sold by governments to foreign banks. These banks are likely to operate
inefficiently (see e.g. Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel 2005b).
In order to test whether banks that were taken over were selected based on their
efficiency, we estimate a probit model. The dependent variable Takeover is a dummy
that takes the value of one if a bank was taken over by a foreign bank during the
sample period and the value of zero otherwise. Explanatory variables are the ROA,
the cost to income ratio, and the cost to asset ratio together with further bank
characteristics. Table 5.10 in the Appendix shows that banks that were taken over
were not selected based on their efficiency or performance. Columns 1-3 include
all bank-year observations, in columns 4-6 we collapse the data on the bank level.
Neither the bank’s ROA, nor the cost to income or the cost to asset ratio seem to
have an impact on the probability with which a domestic bank is taken over by
foreign entrants. Nevertheless, we find that foreign banks took over larger banks and
more liquid banks on average.
Next, we investigate whether our results are driven by the mode of entry chosen
by foreign banks. We already showed that takeover banks were not selected based
on their efficiency or performance. Nevertheless it could be that domestic banks
in markets where foreign banks entered mostly by taking over domestic banks are
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affected differently than domestic banks in markets where foreign banks entered via
greenfield investments. To test this, we calculate the share of domestic banks that
were taken over by foreign banks in each market and divide our sample into the
countries where this share is lower than median and countries where it is higher than
median. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.11 in the Appendix show that the differential
effect for banks of differing levels of efficiency is present in both subsamples. Hence,
the efficiency of domestic banks at liberalization seems to be more important than
the mode of entry chosen by foreign banks.
5.6.2 Endogeneity concerns regarding the event
Another issue concerns the potential endogeneity of liberalization reforms. It could
be that countries opened their banking sectors when growth prospects were good and
the need for capital was high. Alternatively, it could be that countries were forced to
open their banking sectors when they had crises in their domestic banking markets.
In both cases, liberalization would not actually be causal for the documented effects
on loan supply and industry output. Our identification strategy in all sections took
these issues into account, as we documented differential effects for banks of varying
degrees of initial efficiency or industries and firms with varying degrees of external
financial dependence. Political processes and external pressures applied by the IMF
or the World Bank should also help to mitigate these concerns.
In column 3 of Table 5.11 we re-estimate Equation 5.1 and include the vector of
macro control variables from the country-level regressions. While the sample size is
significantly reduced, the coefficient for the interaction between liberalization and the
initial efficiency remains significantly positive. To further address reverse causality
issues, we study the dynamic effects of liberalization reforms on the loan supply of
domestic banks. In columns 4 and 5 of Table 5.11 we replace the liberalization index
with four variables: Before0 takes the value of the event variable in the reform year
and the pre-reform value of the event variable in all other years. Before1 is equal to
Before0 forwarded by one year, and After1 is equal to Before0 lagged by one year.
Finally, After2 is equal to the event variable lagged by two years. If the liberalization
reforms were endogenous to the development within the domestic banking sector, we
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should see significant changes in the lending behavior of domestic banks prior to the
reform. Table 5.11 shows that this is not the case: The coefficient for Before1 is
insignificant for both inefficient (column 4) and efficient (column 5) domestic banks.29
Hence, the decision to liberalize was not driven by current developments in the
domestic banking sector. This assuages any remaining concerns of biases driven by
endogeneity.
5.6.3 Concerns regarding alternative events
We also control for other reforms that took place in our sample countries that might
have an influence on our results. We include indices for creditor rights and capi-
tal account liberalization that are obtained from papers by Djankov, McLiesh, and
Shleifer (2007) and Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010), respectively. Column 6
of Table 5.11 provides estimation results for the bank-year observations where both
indices are available. As expected, the coefficient for creditor rights is positive and
significant at the 1%-level. Improvements in the protection of creditors induce an
increase in the individual bank’s supply of credit. In contrast, capital account liber-
alization does not have an influence on the loan supply of the average domestic bank,
as indicated by the negative but insignificant coefficient. Importantly, the inclusion
of the two indices does not affect our results on the efficiency of domestic banks; the
interaction remains significant at the 1%-level.
5.6.4 Concerns regarding the efficiency classification of do-
mestic banking markets
A potential concern using ROA as a measure for bank efficiency could be that this
measure is influenced by market competition. I.e., banks operating in markets that
are highly regulated and therefore not competitive earn a higher margin and, there-
fore, a higher ROA. As a final robustness check we use alternative criteria to classify
banks prior to liberalization. As shown in Table 5.1, Panel C, we obtain two variables
from the World Bank’s Global Financial Development Database: The aggregate cost-
29As before we define a bank as initially efficient if it has an ROA in the top quartile of all banks
in our sample in the year prior to liberalization.
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to-income ratio and the non-performing loan (NPL) ratio of each banking sector of
our sample countries. We use the values of these variables in the year before liber-
alization in the respective country and split our sample into countries with a higher
than median cost-to-income ratio or NPL ratio and those with a lower than median
ratio.
Results for the country-level regressions with these alternative classification cri-
teria are presented in Table 5.12. Panel A shows that changes in financial structure
are more pronounced in countries with a relatively high cost-to-income ratio, i.e.,
countries where the banking is rather inefficient at the time of liberalization. While
aggregate lending evolves similarly in both groups of countries (columns 1 and 2),
those with a higher cost-to-income ratio see a greater decline in domestic lending
(columns 3 and 4), and—correspondingly—a greater increase in the foreign market
share (columns 5 and 6). In Panel B we use the aggregate non-performing loans
ratio as a classification criterion. Again, we find that changes in financial structure
are more pronounced in countries with rather inefficient banks at liberalization, i.e.,
countries where the non-performing loans ratio is relatively high. These countries
see a much greater decline in domestic lending following the event, which translates
into a higher increase in the foreign market share.
5.7 Related literature and discussion
5.7.1 Related literature
Our paper connects to a large literature that debates the effect of financial liberal-
ization on economic outcomes and presents a mixed set of results (see for a summary
Beim and Calomiris 2001). Overall, there seems to be a trade-off between positive
economic outcomes and instability associated with financial liberalization. The be-
nign view of bank liberalization is that foreign bank entry improves the functioning of
credit markets and this in turn promotes economic growth (e.g., Levine 1996, Levine
2001). This could be for several reasons. First, if domestic firms are financially
constrained, which is likely to be the case in emerging and transition economies,
entry of foreign banks relaxes financial constraints—a pure supply effect—and this
211
promotes growth. Second, to the extent that foreign banks are more efficient in
disbursing capital—due to superior screening and monitoring technology—their en-
try may lower the cost of providing funds, and improve the allocative efficiency of
capital. This in turn promotes growth. Finally, entry of foreign banks may generate
positive spill-over effects on existing domestic banks and this may again increase the
efficiency of the banking system.30
There is, however, a malign view of financial liberalization as well. Some scholars
(e.g., Vives 2001) have expressed strong concerns that allowing foreign bank entrance
may increase the fragility of the banking sector and this may in turn hurt growth.
Stiglitz (1994) discusses potential costs for domestic banks and local entrepreneurs
as a consequence of foreign bank entrance (see also Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee
2004), whereas Stiglitz (2000) argues that hastily financial liberalization was one
of the major causes of financial and economic instabilities in East Asia and Latin
America at the end of the last century.31 Another channel through which foreign bank
entry may reduce welfare is pointed out by Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta (2008),
who argue that foreign bank entry may hurt certain soft information borrowers and
thus reduce welfare. Essentially, cream skimming of hard information borrowers
leads to credit rationing of soft information borrowers (see also Sengupta 2007).
We rationalize the differences between the two streams by arguing and showing that
liberalization of banking markets has differential effects that depend on the efficiency
of the domestic banks.
30These arguments go back to the original work of McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973). Several
empirical studies have analyzed this bright side view of opening banking markets. On a positive
note, there is evidence that tighter regulations on bank entry increases the cost of financial interme-
diation (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine 2004) and are associated with lower efficiency of the
banks (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2004). Similarly, bank branch deregulation in the U.S. improved
the efficiency of financial intermediation (Jayaratne and Strahan 1998), promoted economic growth
(Jayaratne and Strahan 1996) and had a positive impact on the creation of new incorporations
(Black and Strahan 2002). Further, equity market liberalization seems to foster economic growth
(Bekaert and Harvey 2004) and to reduce consumption growth volatility (Bekaert, Harvey, and
Lundblad 2006).
31Empirically, Morgan and Strahan (2004) use international data from almost 100 countries and
conclude that at least for non-industrial countries greater bank integration is associated with higher
volatility. Moreover, several countries experienced banking sector crises shortly after the financial
sector was deregulated, suggesting that indeed there is some connection between liberalization and
financial fragility (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache 1999, Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999). There is
also a trade liberalization literature that cautions against the benefits of liberalization and stresses
the importance of domestic institutions in fostering growth, e.g. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000)
express reservations against the bright side view of liberalization and assert that contrary to ex-
pectations, liberalization may be detrimental to growth.
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Several papers empirically examine the impact of foreign bank entry on the ef-
ficiency of financial intermediation (Berger et al. 2000, Claessens, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt,
and Huizinga 2001, Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney 2005, Degryse et al. 2012, Gian-
netti and Ongena 2012). Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel (2005a) provide evidence that
banks with a strategic foreign owner in 11 Eastern European transition countries pro-
vide better services and are more cost efficient than private domestic or government
banks. Potential spillover effects on domestic banks are documented by Claessens,
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001), who find that foreign entry improves the effi-
ciency of domestic financial institutions (see also Unite and Sullivan 2003). The effect
of foreign entry on firms’ access to finance is subject to debate. For example, while
Clarke, Cull, and Martinez-Peria (2006) find that all companies—including small
and medium ones—report lower financing constraints with greater foreign bank par-
ticipation in a sample of 35 emerging markets, Gormley (2010) shows for India that
only a small set of very profitable firms benefited from foreign entry while the average
firm is less likely to have a loan.32 Other papers investigate whether increased for-
eign ownership in the banking sector has real effects for the economy. While Bruno
and Hauswald (2009) find that foreign banks seem to relax financial constraints and
hence promote economic growth, evidence from other studies (Berger, Klapper, and
Udell 2001, Mian 2006, Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta 2008, Giannetti and On-
gena 2009) suggests that these benefits materialize only for large and transparent
companies. Our paper adds to this literature as it sheds light on the exact relation-
ship between foreign bank entry, the development of the domestic banking sector,
economic growth and industry structure, thus helping to explain the controversial
findings mentioned above.
Our paper is also related to literature following Lucas (1990) famous article on
why we do not observe capital flows from developed countries to emerging markets,
although emerging markets have lower levels of capital per worker and hence a higher
marginal product of capital. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) document an interesting
feature of this puzzle: They show that foreign capital does not even flow to those
emerging markets that have grown fastest in the past and hence revealed their high
32Several other papers examine the impact of foreign ownership on bank lending and lending
conditions, see e.g. De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2011), Jeon, Luca, and Wu (2011), Claeys and
Hainz (2013).
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marginal productivity. But a poor country’s inability to obtain foreign financing
does not seem to hurt its growth prospects: Bosworth and Collins (1999) find that
nonindustrial countries that relied less on foreign capital grew faster over the period
1970–2004. Similarly, Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007) show that, among
nonindustrial countries with high rates of investment, those that relied less on foreign
capital grew faster than those that relied more on foreign capital. As an explanation
for this finding they suggest that nonindustrial countries do not have corporations or
financial systems to channel the arm’s-length foreign capital into its most productive
uses. We provide evidence from bank liberalization that is supportive of their claim
that countries with underdeveloped financial sectors are unlikely to be able to use
foreign capital to finance growth.
5.7.2 Conclusion
This paper argues that the nature of financial structure (supply of financing) impacts
the industry structure through its influence on the allocation of credit to firms within
industries and across industries. We exploit the variation in the efficiency of the do-
mestic banking sector at the time of liberalization across 26 emerging economies to
identify large changes in the nature of credit provision within an economy. Following
liberalization there is an increase in the aggregate supply of credit in countries with
relatively efficient domestic banks. In markets with relatively inefficient banks, for-
eign lending largely crowds out domestic lending. There is a higher growth rate and
lower growth volatility for industry sectors in markets with relatively more efficient
domestic banks following liberalization. These results are driven by industries that
are more reliant on external financing and by smaller firms in economies with more
efficient domestic banks. To the contrary, in particular smaller firms are negatively
affected in countries with relatively inefficient domestic banks, resulting in a negative
impact on growth and volatility for the average industry in these countries. Thus,
the timing of liberalization of credit markets interacts with the efficiency of the in-
cumbent domestic banking sector which has implications on the allocation of credit
and overall economic growth. Our findings illustrate that domestic institutions need
to be sufficiently developed for liberalization to have a positive impact.
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Table 5.9: Firm-level evidence—robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Debt
Initial Assets
Debt
Initial Assets
Debt
Initial Assets
Debt
Initial Assets
Debt
Initial Assets
Log(debt) DebtAssets
Debt
Initial Assets
Event -0.157** -0.223** -0.221** -0.220** -0.213** -0.557*** -0.057** -0.223**
(0.050) (0.082) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) (0.158) (0.021) (0.083)
Interaction (event × d(initial ROA)) 0.137*** 0.157*** 0.068*** 0.103*** 0.309*** 0.022*** 0.136***
(0.018) (0.027) (0.011) (0.014) (0.071) (0.006) (0.014)
Interaction (event × d(exdep)) -0.003
(0.008)
Interaction (event × d(exdep) × d(initial ROA)) -0.039
(0.025)
Interaction (event × d(small)) -0.012
(0.017)
Interaction (event × d(small) × d(initial ROA)) 0.127**
(0.038)
Interaction (event × d(young)) -0.014*
(0.006)
Interaction (event × d(young) × d(initial ROA)) 0.095**
(0.039)
Log(sales) 0.268*** 0.264*** 0.263*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.467*** -0.007 0.262***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.047) (0.005) (0.056)
Tangibility 0.382** 0.385** 0.382** 0.379** 0.375** 0.821*** 0.032 0.408***
(0.119) (0.117) (0.116) (0.116) (0.118) (0.214) (0.031) (0.113)
EBIT/Assets -0.591*** -0.554*** -0.554*** -0.549*** -0.552*** -1.662*** -0.188*** -0.550***
(0.038) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.102) (0.016) (0.050)
Observations 17,020 17,020 17,020 17,020 17,020 30,489 30,489 17,020
Distinct firms 2,755 2,755 2,755 2,755 2,755 7,228 7,228 2,755
R-squared 0.215 0.224 0.225 0.228 0.226 0.143 0.093 0.283
Firm effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry-year interactions NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES
This table provide robustness checks for the firm level results. Columns 1-5 repeat the the estimations shown in Table 5.8 and use the ratio of
total debt to total pre-event assets as a dependent variable instead. Columns 6-8 include industry-year interactions in addition to firm and year
indicators. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level are reported in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the
10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-level.
215
Table 5.10: Selection of takeover banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Takeover Takeover Takeover Takeover Takeover Takeover
ROA -0.006 -0.000
(0.006) (0.021)
Cost
Income -0.005 -0.031
(0.011) (0.047)
Cost
Assets 0.156 -0.594
(0.206) (0.575)
Log(assets) 0.135** 0.129** 0.133** 0.167** 0.167** 0.156**
(0.062) (0.060) (0.061) (0.069) (0.066) (0.068)
Market share -0.013 0.030 -0.002 0.002 -0.027 0.088
(1.152) (1.139) (1.150) (1.420) (1.417) (1.416)
Solvency 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Liquidity 0.056 0.059 0.059 0.820* 0.828* 0.798*
(0.245) (0.246) (0.245) (0.464) (0.467) (0.464)
Observations 6,452 6,440 6,452 760 760 760
Pseudo R-Squared 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.129 0.129 0.130
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
The table reports estimated coefficients and standard errors from probit models estimated
with maximum likelihood. The dependent variable Takeover is a dummy that takes the
value of one if a bank is taken over by a foreign bank during the sample period and zero
otherwise. Columns 1-3 include all bank-year observation and the value of the explanatory
variables in the respective year. In columns 4-6 we collapse the data on the bank level
and use mean values of the explanatory variables. Standard errors adjusted for clustering
at the bank level are reported in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the
10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-level.
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Table 5.11: Bank-level loans—robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(loans) Log(loans) Log(loans) Log(loans) Log(loans) Log(loans)
Few Many Inefficient Efficient
takeovers takeovers banks banks
Event -0.322 -0.405 0.045 -0.177
(0.255) (0.245) (0.155) (0.157)
Interaction (event 0.988*** 0.654** 0.534** 0.722***
× d(efficient bank)) (0.292) (0.233) (0.221) (0.189)
Before1 -0.104 -0.253
(0.138) (0.221)
Before0 -0.04 -0.28
(0.182) (0.193)
After1 0.181 0.05
(0.179) (0.131)
After2 0.227 0.323*
(0.271) (0.186)
Capital account liberalization -0.015
(0.074)
Creditor rights 0.850***
(0.172)
Observations 2,474 2,130 2,742 2,065 677 3,477
Distinct banks 280 262 409 320 89 497
R-squared 0.257 0.278 0.486 0.528 0.556 0.129
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Macro controls NO NO YES YES YES NO
Bank controls NO NO YES YES YES NO
The table reports additional robustness checks for the bank level results reported in Table 5.2.
Dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of the loan supply of private domestic banks.
Variables of interest are the event variable and an interaction between liberalization and a dummy
variable taking a value of 1 if the bank is among the 25% most efficient banks in the year of
liberalization. In columns 1 and 2 we distinguish between markets were foreign banks entered
mostly via greenfield investments and markets where foreign banks entered mostly via takeover.
The specification in column 3 includes macro and time varying bank control variables, and in
columns 4 and 5 we use lags and leads of the event variable in order to investigate the dynamics
around liberalization, where column 4 includes only inefficient and column 5 includes only efficient
domestic banks. Finally, column 6 controls for capital account liberalization and creditor rights.
Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level are reported in parentheses. * indicates
statistical significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-level.
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Table 5.12: Measures of bank efficiency—robustness
Panel A: Cost-to-Income Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aggregate Aggregate Domestic Domestic Foreign Foreign
loan supply loan supply loan supply loan supply market share market share
High CIR Low CIR High CIR Low CIR High CIR Low CIR
Event 0.226 0.243 -0.673 -0.090 0.289** 0.107**
(0.341) (0.168) (0.409) (0.234) (0.094) (0.044)
Observations 156 169 155 169 156 169
Distinct countries 12 13 12 13 12 13
R-squared 0.654 0.704 0.407 0.487 0.711 0.444
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Macro controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Panel B: NPL Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aggregate Aggregate Domestic Domestic Foreign Foreign
loan supply loan supply loan supply loan supply market share market share
High NPL Low NPL High NPL Low NPL High NPL Low NPL
Event -0.027 0.279 -1.110** -0.150 0.331*** 0.154***
(0.301) (0.301) (0.366) (0.335) (0.096) (0.049)
Observations 156 143 155 143 156 143
Distinct countries 12 11 12 11 12 11
R-squared 0.669 0.656 0.427 0.511 0.669 0.650
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Macro controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
This table provides results for different definitions of the bank efficiency variables. Panel A uses
the aggregate cost-to-income ratio while Panel B uses the non-performing loans ratio, where both
variables are obtained from the World Bank and measured in the year before liberalization in the
respective country. The dependent variable is the logarithm of aggregate loans in columns 1 and
2, the logarithm of total loans from domestic banks in columns 3 and 4, and the foreign market
share in columns 5 and 6. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level are reported
in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at
the 1%-level.
218
Bibliography
Abiad, Abdul, Enrica Detragiache, and Thierry Tressel. 2010. “A new database of
financial reforms.” IMF Staff Papers 57 (2):281–302.
Abiad, Abdul and Ahoka Mody. 2005. “Financial reform: What shakes it? What
shapes it?” American Economic Review 95 (1):66–88.
Acharya, Viral. 2009. “A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank
regulation.” Journal of Financial Stability 5 (3):224–255.
———. 2011. “Ring-fencing is good, but no panacea.” In The Future of Banking
(edited by Thorsten Beck). Vox eBook.
Acharya, Viral, Robert Engle, and Diane Pierret. 2013. “Testing macroprudential
stress tests: The risk of regulatory risk weights.” NBER Working Paper Series.
Acharya, Viral, Hamid Mehran, Til Schuermann, and Anjan Thakor. 2012. “Robust
capital regulation.” Current Issues in Economics and Finance Federal Reserve
Bank of New York.
Admati, Anat, Peter DeMarzo, Martin Hellwig, and Paul Pfleiderer. 2012. “Debt
overhang and capital regulation.” Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Re-
search on Collective Goods Bonn 2012/5.
Admati, Anat and Martin Hellwig. 2013. The bankers’ new clothes: What’s wrong
with banking and what to do about it. Princeton University Press.
Agarwal, Sumit, Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David, and Serdar Dinc¸. 2012a. “The
legislative process and foreclosures.” Working Paper.
219
Agarwal, Sumit, David Lucca, Amit Seru, and Francesco Trebbi. 2012b. “Inconsis-
tent regulators: Evidence from banking.” Working Paper.
Aghion, Philippe, Philippe Bacchetta, and Abhijit Banerjee. 2004. “Financial devel-
opment and the instability of open economies.” Journal of Monetary Economics
51 (6):1077–1106.
Aghion, Philippe and Evguenia Bessonova. 2006. “On entry and growth: Theory
and evidence.” Revue de l’OFCE 97 (5):259–278.
Aghion, Philippe, Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith, Peter Howitt, and Susanne
Prantl. 2009. “The effect of entry on incumbent innovation and productivity.”
Review of Economics and Statistics 91 (1):20–32.
Aghion, Philippe, Robin Burgess, Stephen Redding, and Fabrizio Zilibotti. 2003.
“The unequal effects of liberalization: Theory and evidence from India.” Mimeo.
———. 2008. “The unequal effects of liberalization: Evidence from dismantling the
License Raj in India.” American Economic Review 98 (4):1397–1412.
Ai, Chunrong and Edward Norton. 2003. “Interaction terms in logit and probit
models.” Economics Letters 80 (1):123–129.
Aiyar, Shekhar, Charles Calomiris, and Tomasz Wiedalek. 2012. “Does macro-pru
leak? Evidence from a UK policy experiment.” NBER Working Paper Series.
Alessi, Lucia and Carsten Detken. 2011. “Quasi real time early warning indicators
for costly asset price boom/bust cycles: A role for global liquidity.” European
Journal of Political Economy 27 (3):520–533.
Andersen, Henrik. 2011. “Procyclical implications of Basel II: Can the cyclicality of
capital requirements be contained?” Journal of Financial Stability 7:138–154.
Ayuso, Juan, Daniel Pe´rez, and Jesu´s Saurina. 2004. “Are capital buffers pro-
cyclical? Evidence from Spanish panel data.” Journal of Financial Intermediation
13 (2):249–264.
220
Babecky, Jan, Tomas Havranek, Jakub Mateju, Marek Rusna´k, Katerina Smidkova,
and Borek Vasicek. 2012. “Banking, debt and currency crisis: Early warning
indicators for developed countries.” ECB Working Paper No. 1485 .
Bachmann, Ru¨diger and Christian Bayer. 2013. “Investment dispersion and the
business cycle.” American Economic Review forthcoming.
Bagehot, Walter. 1873. Lombard street: A description of the money market. London:
Murray, 1931 ed.
Barrell, Ray, Philip Davis, Dilruba Karim, and Iana Liadze. 2010. “Bank regulation,
property prices and early warning systems for banking crises in OECD countries.”
Journal of Banking & Finance 34 (9):2255–2264.
Barros, Pedro, Erik Berglo¨f, Paolo Fulghieri, Jordi Gual, Colin Mayer, and Xavier
Vives. 2005. Integration of European banking: The way forward. London: Centre
for Economic Policy Research.
Barth, James, Gerard Caprio, and Ross Levine. 2004. “Bank regulation and super-
vision: What works best?” Journal of Financial Intermediation 13 (2):205–248.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 1988. International convergence of capital
measurement and capital standards. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International
Settlements.
———. 1999. Capital requirements and bank behaviour: The impact of the Basle
Accord. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements.
———. 2006. International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards
– A revised framework. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements.
———. 2010. “Guidance for national authorities operating the countercyclical capital
buffer.” Bank for International Settlements .
———. 2011. Basel III: A global regulatory framework more resilient banks banking
systems. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements.
221
———. 2013. Regulatory consistency assessment programme (RCAP): Analysis of
risk-weighted assets for credit risk in the banking book. Basel, Switzerland: Bank
for International Settlements.
Beck, Thorsten, Diane Coyle, Mathias Dewatripont, Xavier Freixas, and Paul
Seabright. 2010. Bailing out the banks: Reconciling stability and competition.
London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Luc Laeven, and Ross Levine. 2008. “Finance,
firm size, and growth.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 40 (7):1379–1405.
Becker, Bo and Marcus Opp. 2013. “Replacing ratings.” NBER Working Paper
Series.
Beim, David and Charles Calomiris. 2001. Emerging financial markets. New York,
NY: McGraw-Hill.
Bekaert, Geert and Campbell Harvey. 2004. “Country risk analysis - A chronology of
important financial, economic and political events in emerging markets.” Internet
database.
Bekaert, Geert, Campbell Harvey, and Christian Lundblad. 2005. “Does financial
liberalization spur growth?” Journal of Financial Economics 77 (1):3–55.
———. 2006. “Growth volatility and financial liberalization.” Journal of Interna-
tional Money and Finance 25 (3):370–403.
Berg, Andrew, Eduardo Borensztein, and Catherine Patillo. 2005. “Assesing early
warning systems: How have they worked in practice?” IMF Staff Papers
52 (3):462–502.
Berger, Allen, Robert DeYoung, Hesna Genay, and Gregory Udell. 2000. “Globaliza-
tion of financial institutions: Evidence from cross-border banking performance.”
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: Finance and Economics Dis-
cussion Series.
222
Berger, Allen, Leora Klapper, and Gregory Udell. 2001. “The ability of banks to
lend to informationally opaque small businesses.” Journal of Banking and Finance
25 (12):2127–2167.
Berger, Allen, Nathan Miller, Mitchell Petersen, Raghuram Rajan, and Jeremy Stein.
2005. “Does function follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending
practices of large and small banks.” Journal of Financial Economics 76 (2):237–
269.
Berger, Allen and Gregory Udell. 1994. “Did risk-based capital allocate bank credit
and cause a ”credit crunch” in the United States?” Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking 26 (3):585–628.
Bernanke, Ben. 1983. “Nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in the propagation
of the Great Depression.” American Economic Review 73 (3):257–276.
Bernanke, Ben, Cara Lown, and Benjamin Friedman. 1991. “The credit crunch.”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1991 (2):205–247.
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. “How much
should we trust differences-in-differences estimates?” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 119 (1):249–275.
Bhattacharya, Sudipto, Arnoud Boot, and Anjan Thakor. 1998. “The economics of
bank regulation.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 30 (4):745–770.
Black, Sandra and Philip Strahan. 2002. “Entrepreneurship and bank credit avail-
ability.” Journal of Finance 62 (6):2807–2833.
Blum, Ju¨rg and Martin Hellwig. 1995. “The macroeconomic implications of capital
adequacy requirements for banks.” European Economic Review 39 (3–4):739–749.
Bonin, John, Iftekhar Hasan, and Paul Wachtel. 2005a. “Bank performance, effi-
ciency and ownership in transition countries.” Journal of Banking and Finance
29 (1):31–53.
———. 2005b. “Privatization matters: Bank efficiency in transition countries.”
Journal of Banking and Finance 29 (8–9):2155–2178.
223
Borio, Claudio, Mathias Drehmann, Leonardo Gambacorta, Gabriel Jimenez, and
Carlos Trucharte. 2010. “Countercyclical capital buffers: Exploring options.” BIS
Working Paper No. 317 .
Borio, Claudio, Craig Furfine, and Philip Lowe. 2001. “Procyclicality of the financial
system and financial stability: issues and policy options.” BIS Working Paper.
Bosworth, Barry and Susan Collins. 1999. “Capital flows to developing countries.”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity No.1.
Boyd, John. and Edward Prescott. 1986. “Financial intermediary coalitions.” Journal
of Economic Theory 38 (2):211–232.
Brinkmann, Emile and Paul Horvitz. 1995. “Risk-based capital standards and the
credit crunch.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 27 (3):848–863.
Brown, Craig and Serdar Dinc¸. 2005. “The politics of bank failures: Evidence from
emerging markets.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (4):1413–1444.
Brun, Matthieu, Henri Fraisse, and David Thesmar. 2013. “The real effects of bank
capital requirements.” HEC Paris Research Paper .
Brunnermeier, Markus. 2009. “Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007–
2008.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 23 (1):77–100.
Brunnermeier, Markus, Charles Goodhart, Avinash Persaud, Andrew Crockett, and
Hyun Shin. 2009. “The fundamental principles of financial regulation.” Centre for
Economic Policy Research London.
Bruno, Valentina and Robert Hauswald. 2009. “The real effect of foreign banks.”
EFA Bergen Meetings Paper.
Bundesbank. 2003. “Approaches to the validation of internal rating systems.”
Monthly Report September :59–71.
———. 2004. “New capital requirements for credit institutions (Basel II).” Monthly
Report September :73–94.
224
———. 2005. “Approval for banks to use Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approaches
to calculate regulatory capital requirements in Germany.” Monthly Report June
:1–14.
———. 2006. “Die Umsetzung der neuen Eigenkapitalregelungen fu¨r Banken in
deutsches Recht.” Monatsbericht Dezember :69–91.
Bussie`re, Matthieu and Marcel Fratzscher. 2006. “Towards a new early warning sys-
tem of financial crises.” Journal of International Money and Finance 25 (6):953–
973.
Candelon, Bertrand, Jean-Pierre Urbain, and Jeroen Van den Berg. 2008. “A cau-
tious note on the use of panel models to predict financial crises.” Economics Letters
101 (1):80–83.
Caprio, Gerard and Daniela Klingebiel. 2003. “Episodes of systemic and borderline
financial crises.” World Bank Research Dataset .
Carling, Kenneth, Tor Jacobson, Jesper Linde´, and Kasper Roszbach. 2002. “Capital
charges under Basel II: Corporate credit risk modelling and the macro economy.”
Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series.
Claessens, Stijn, Asli Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Harry Huizinga. 2001. “How does for-
eign entry affect domestic banking markets?” Journal of Banking and Finance
25 (5):891–911.
Claessens, Stijn, Neeltje Van Horen, Tugba Gurcanlar, and Joaquin Mercado. 2008.
“Foreign bank presence in developing countries 1995-2006: Data and trends.”
Mimeo.
Claeys, Sophie and Christa Hainz. 2013. “Modes of foreign bank entry and effects on
lending rates: Theory and evidence.” Journal of Comparative Economics forth-
coming.
Clarke, George, Robert Cull, and Maria Martinez-Peria. 2006. “Foreign bank par-
ticipation and access to credit across firms in developing countries.” Journal of
Comparative Economics 34 (4):774–795.
225
Corco´stegui, Carlos, Luis Gonza´lez-Mosquera, Antonio Marcelo, and Carlos
Trucharte. 2002. “Analysis of procyclical effects on capital requirements derived
from a rating system.” Banco de Espan˜a Working Paper Series.
Coricelli, Fabrizio. 2001. “The financial sector in transition.” In Financial Lib-
eralization, edited by Gerard Caprio, Patrick Honohan, and Joseph E. Stiglitz.
Cambridge University Press.
Dages, Gerard, Linda Goldberg, and Daniel Kinney. 2005. “Foreign and domestic
bank participation in emerging markets: lessons from Mexico and Argentina.”
Economic Policy Review (Sep):17–36.
Dam, Lammertjan and Michael Koetter. 2012. “Bank bailouts, interventions, and
moral hazard.” Review of Financial Studies 25 (8):2343–2380.
Dan´ıelsson, Jo´n, Paul Embrechts, Charles Goodhart, Con Keating, Felix Muennich,
Olivier Renault, and Hyung Son Shin. 2001. “An academic response to Basel II.”
LSE Financial Markets Group, Special Paper No. 130.
Das, Sonali and Amadou Sy. 2012. “How risky are banks’ risk weighted assets?
Evidence from the financial crisis.” IMF Working Paper.
Davis, Philip and Dilruba Karim. 2008. “Could early warning systems have helped to
predict the sub-prime crisis?” National Institute Economic Review 206 (1):35–47.
De Haas, Ralph and Iman Van Lelyveld. 2011. Multinational banks and the global
financial crisis: Weathering the perfect storm? European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, London.
Degryse, Hans, Olena Havrylchyk, Emilia Jurzyk, and Sylwester Kozak. 2012. “For-
eign bank entry, credit allocation and lending rates in emerging markets: Empirical
evidence from Poland.” Journal of Banking & Finance 36 (11):2949–2959.
Dembiermont, Christian, Matthias Drehmann, and Siriporn Muksakunratana. 2013.
“How much does the private sector really borrow? A new database for total credit
to the private non-financial sector.” Bank for International Settlements Quarterly
Review, March 2013 .
226
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Asli and Enrica Detragiache. 1998. “The determinants of banking
crises in developing and developed countries.” IMF Staff Papers 45 (1):81–109.
———. 1999. “Finacial liberalization and financial fragility.” International Monetary
Fund.
———. 2000. “Monitoring banking sector fragility. A multivariate logit approach.”
World Bank Economic Review 14 (2):287–307.
———. 2002. “Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An em-
pirical investigation.” Journal of Monetary Economics 49 (7):1373–1406.
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Asli, Enrica Detragiache, and Ouarda Merrouche. 2013. “Bank
capital: Lessons from the financial crisis.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
45 (6):1147–1164.
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Asli, Luc Laeven, and Ross Levine. 2004. “Regulations, market
structure, institutions, and the cost of financial intermediation.” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking 36 (3):593–622.
Detragiache, Enrica and Antonio Spilimbergo. 2001. “Crises and liquidity – Evidence
and interpretation.” IMF Working Paper No. WP/01/2 .
Detragiache, Enrica, Thierry Tressel, and Poonam Gupta. 2008. “Foreign banks in
poor countries: Theory and evidence.” Journal of Finance 63 (5):2123–2160.
Diamond, Douglas. 1984. “Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring.” Re-
view of Economic Studies 51 (3):393–414.
Diamond, Douglas and Raghuram Rajan. 2000. “A theory of bank capital.” Journal
of Finance 55 (6):2431–2465.
———. 2001. “Liquidity risk, liquidity creation, and financial fragility: A theory of
banking.” Journal of Political Economy 109 (2):287–327.
Dickey, David and Wayne Fuller. 1979. “Distribution of the estimators for autoregres-
sive time series with a unit root.” Journal of the American Statistical Association
74:427–431.
227
Dinc¸, Serdar. 2005. “Politicians and banks: Political influences on government-owned
banks in emerging markets.” Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2):453–479.
Djankov, Simeon, Caralee McLiesh, and Andrei Shleifer. 2007. “Private credit in 129
countries.” Journal of Financial Economics 84 (2):299–329.
Drehmann, Mathias, Claudio Borio, and Konstantinos Tsatsaronis. 2011. “Anchor-
ing countercyclical capital buffers: The role of credit aggregates.” International
Journal of Central Banking 7 (4):189–240.
Drehmann, Mathias and Mikael Juselius. 2013. “Evaluating early warning indicators
of banking crises: Satisfying policy requirements.” BIS Working Papers No. 421 .
Edge, Rochelle and Ralf Meisenzahl. 2011. “The unreliability of credit-to-GDP ratio
gaps in real-time: Implications for countercyclical capital buffers.” International
Journal of Central Banking 7 (4):261–298.
Englmaier, Florian and Till Stowasser. 2012. “Electoral cycles in savings bank lend-
ing.” Working Paper, University of Wu¨rzburg.
EU. 2013. “Capital Requirements Directive IV.” Available online: http:// eur-lex.
europa.eu/ LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32013L0036:EN:NOT .
European Banking Federation. 2012. “Study on internal rating based (IRB) models
in Europe.” Brussels.
Faccio, Mara, Ronald Masulis, and John McConnell. 2006. “Political connections
and corporate bailouts.” Journal of Finance 61 (6):2597–2635.
Financial Stability Institute. 2010. Survey on the implementation of the new capital
adequacy framework. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements.
Firestone, Simon and Marcelo Rezende. 2013. “Are banks’ internal risk parameters
consistent? Evidence from syndivated loans.” Working Paper.
Fo¨rstemann, Till. 2011. “Improvements in rating models for the German corporate
sector.” Bundesbank Discussion Paper.
228
Francis, William and Matthew Osborne. 2009. “Bank regulation, capital and credit
supply: Measuring the impact of prudential standards.” FSA Occassional Papers
in Financial Regulation.
Frankel, Jeffrey and Andrew Rose. 1996. “Currency crashes in emerging markets:
An empirical treatment.” Journal of International Economics 41 (3):351–366.
Galati, Gabriele and Richhild Moessner. 2012. “Macroprudential policy – A literature
review.” Journal of Economic Surveys online early view.
Gambacorta, Leonardo and Paolo Mistrulli. 2004. “Does bank capital affect lending
behavior?” Journal of Financial Intermediation 13 (4):436–457.
Giannetti, Mariassunta and Steven Ongena. 2009. “Financial integration and firm
performance: Evidence from foreign bank entry in emerging markets.” Review of
Finance 13 (2):181–223.
———. 2012. ““Lending by example”: Direct and indirect effects of foreign banks
in emerging markets.” Journal of International Economics 86 (1):167–180.
Goodhart, Charles, Boris Hofman, and Miguel Segoviano. 2004. “Bank regulation
and macroeconomic fluctuations.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 20 (4):591–
615.
Gordy, Michael and Bradley Howells. 2006. “Procyclicality in Basel II: Can we treat
the disease without killing the patient?” Journal of Financial Intermediation
15 (3):395–417.
Gormley, Todd. 2010. “The impact of foreign bank entry in emerging markets:
Evidence from India.” Journal of Financial Intermediation 19 (1):26–51.
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier and Olivier Jeanne. 2013. “Capital flows to developing
countries: The allocation puzzle.” Review of Economic Studies forthcoming.
Gropp, Reint, Hendrik Hakenes, and Isabel Schnabel. 2011. “Competition, risk-
shifting, and public bail-out policies.” Review of Financial Studies 24 (6):2084–
2120.
229
Hagendorff, Jens and Francesco Vallascas. 2013. “The risk sensitivity of capital
requirements: Evidence from an international sample of large banks.” Review of
Finance forthcoming.
Hahm, Joon-Ho, Hyun Song Shin, and Kwanho Shin. 2013. “Noncore bank liabilities
and financial vulnerability.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 45 (s1):3–36.
Hakenes, Hendrik and Isabel Schnabel. 2013. “Regulatory capture by sophistication.”
Working Paper.
Haldane, Andrew. 2013. “Constraining discretion in bank regulation.” Available on-
line: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2013/
speech657.pdf. Bank of England, Speech on 9 April.
Halvorsen, Robert and Raymond Palmquist. 1980. “The interpretation of dummy
variables in semilogarithmic equations.” American Economic Review 70 (3):474–
475.
Hanson, Samuel, Anil Kashyap, and Jeremy Stein. 2011. “A macroprudential ap-
proach to financial regulation.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 25 (1):3–28.
Hellwig, Martin. 2009. “Systemic risk in the financial sector: An analysis of the
subprime-mortgage financial crisis.” De Economist 157 (2):129–207.
———. 2010. “Capital regulation after the crisis: Business as usual?” CESifo DICE
Report 8 (2):40–46.
Herna´ndez-Murillo, Rube´n. 2007. “Experiments in financial liberalization: The Mex-
ican Banking Sector.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 89 (5):415–432.
Hoenig, Thomas. 2010. “Banking: From Bagehot to Basel, and back again.”
Available online: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/
speeches/2010/speech455.pdf. Bank of England, Speech on 25 October.
———. 2013. “Basel III capital: A well-intended illusion.” Available online: http:
//www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spapr0913.html. FDIC, Speech on 9 April.
230
Holmstro¨m, Bengt and Paul Milgrom. 1991. “Multitask principal-agent analyses:
Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design.” Journal of Law, Economics,
and Organization 7:24–52.
Im, Kyung So, Hashem Pesaran, and Yongcheol Shin. 2003. “Testing for unit roots
in heterogeneous panels.” Journal of Econometrics 115 (1):53–74.
Imai, Masami. 2009. “Political influence and declarations of bank insolvency in
Japan.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 41 (1):131–158.
Initiative fu¨r den Finanzstandort Deutschland. 2006. “Rating Broschu¨re.”
Ivashina, Victoria and David Scharfstein. 2010. “Bank lending during the financial
crisis of 2008.” Journal of Financial Economics 97 (3):319–338.
Iyer, Rajkamal, Samuel Da-Rocha-Lopes, Jose´-Luis Peydro´, and Antoinette Schoar.
2013. “Interbank liquidity crunch and the firm credit crunch: Evidence from the
2007-2009 crisis.” Review of Financial Studies forthcoming.
Jayaratne, Jith and Philip Strahan. 1996. “The finance-growth nexus: Evidence from
bank branch deregulation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (3):639–670.
———. 1998. “Entry restrictions, industry evolution, and dynamic efficiency: Evi-
dence from commercial banking.” Journal of Law and Economics 41 (1):239–274.
Jensen, Michael. 1986. “Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and
takeovers.” American Economic Review 76 (2):323–329.
Jeon, Bang, Alina Luca, and Ji Wu. 2011. “Foreign bank penetration and the lending
channel in emerging economies: Evidence from bank-level panel data.” Journal of
International Money and Finance 30 (6):1128–1156.
Jime´nez, Gabriel, Steven Ongena, Jose´-Luis Peydro´, and Jesu´s Saurina. 2013a. “Haz-
ardous times for monetary policy: What do twenty-three million bank loans say
about the effects of monetary policy on credit risk-taking?” Econometrica forth-
coming.
231
———. 2013b. “Macroprudential policy, countercyclical bank capital buffers and
credit supply: Evidence from the Spanish dynamic provisioning experiments.”
European Banking Center Discussion Paper.
Jokipii, Terhi and Alistair Milne. 2008. “The cyclical behaviour of European bank
capital buffers.” Journal of Banking and Finance 32 (8):1440–1451.
Jones, David. 2000. “Emerging problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory
capital arbitrage and related issues.” Journal of Banking & Finance 24 (1):35–58.
Kahle, Kathleen and Rene´ M Stulz. 2013. “Access to capital, investment, and the
financial crisis.” Journal of Financial Economics forthcoming.
Kaminsky, Graciela. 2006. “Currency crises: Are they all the same?” Journal of
International Money and Finance 25 (3):503–527.
Kaminsky, Graciela, Saul Lizondo, and Carmen Reinhart. 1998. “Leading indicators
of currency crises.” IMF Staff Papers 45 (1):1–48.
Kaminsky, Graciela and Carmen Reinhart. 1999. “The twin crises: The causes
of banking and balance-of-payments problems.” American Economic Review
89 (3):473–500.
Kaminsky, Graciela and Sergio Schmukler. 2008. “Short-run pain, long-run gain:
Financial liberalization and stock market cycles.” Review of Finance 12 (2):253–
292.
Kashyap, Anil, Raghuram Rajan, and Jeremy Stein. 2008. “Rethinking capital reg-
ulation.” In Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium at Jackson Hole.
431–471.
Kashyap, Anil and Jeremy Stein. 2000. “What do a million observations on banks
say about the transmission of monetary policy?” American Economic Review
90 (3):407–428.
———. 2004. “Cyclical implications of the Basel II capital standards.” Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago: Economic Perspectives (1):18–31.
232
Keeley, Michael. 1990. “Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking.”
American Economic Review 80 (5):1183–1200.
Khwaja, Asim and Atif Mian. 2008. “Tracing the impact of bank liquidity shocks:
Evidence from an emerging market.” American Economic Review 98 (4):1413–
1442.
Kim, Daesik and Anthony Santomero. 1988. “Risk in banking and capital regula-
tion.” Journal of Finance 43 (5):1219–1233.
King, Robert and Ross Levine. 1993a. “Finance and growth: Schumpeter might be
right.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (3):717–37.
———. 1993b. “Finance, entrepreneurship and growth.” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 32 (3):513–542.
Kiraly, J., B. Majer, L. Matyas, B. Ocsi, and A. Sugar. 2000. “Experience with
internationalization of financial services provision. Case-study: Hungary.” In In-
ternationalization of Financial Services, edited by Stijn Claessens and Marion
Jansen. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press.
Koehn, Michael and Anthony Santomero. 1980. “Regulation of bank capital and
portfolio risk.” Journal of Finance 35 (5):1235–1244.
Krahnen, Jan and Martin Weber. 2001. “Generally accepted rating principles: A
primer.” Journal of Banking and Finance 25 (1):3–23.
Kroszner, Randall and Philip Strahan. 1999. “What drives deregulation? Economics
and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions.” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 114 (4):1437–1467.
Laeven, Luc and Fabian Valencia. 2008. “Systemic banking crises: A new database.”
IMF Working Papers No. WP/08/224 .
———. 2010. “Resolution of banking crises: The good, the bad, and the ugly.” IMF
Working Papers No. 10/146 .
233
———. 2012. “Systemic banking crises database: An update.” IMF Working Papers
No. 12/163 .
Le Lesle´, Vanessa and Sofiya Avramova. 2012. “Revisiting risk-weighted assets.”
IMF Working Paper.
Lehner, Maria and Monika Schnitzer. 2008. “Entry of foreign banks and their impact
on host countries.” Journal of Comparative Economics 36 (3):430–452.
Levine, Ross. 1996. “Foreign banks, financial development, and economic growth.”
In International Financial Markets, edited by Claude E. Barfield. Washington,
D.C.: AEI Press.
———. 2001. “International financial liberalization and economic growth.” Review
of International Economic 9 (4):688–702.
Lindquist, Kjersti-Gro. 2004. “Banks’ buffer capital: How important is risk?” Jour-
nal of International Money and Finance 23 (3):493–513.
Little, Todd, James Bovaird, and Keith Widaman. 2006. “On the merits of or-
thogonalizing powered and product terms: Implications for modeling interactions
among latent variables.” Structural Equation Modeling 13 (4):497–519.
Lo Duca, Marco and Tuomas Peltonen. 2013. “Assessing systemic risks and predict-
ing systemic events.” Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (7):2183–2195.
Lowe, Philip. 2002. “Credit risk measurement and procyclicality.” BIS Working
Paper.
Lowe, Philip and Miguel Segoviano. 2002. “Internal ratings, the business cycle and
capital requirements: Some evidence from an emerging market economy.” BIS
Working Paper.
Lucas, Robert. 1990. “Why doesn’t capital flow from rich to poor countries?” Amer-
ican Economic Review 80 (2):92–96.
Mariathasan, Mike and Ouarda Merrouche. 2012. “The manipulation of Basel risk
weights. Evidence from 2007-10.” University of Oxford Working Paper.
234
McCarty, Nolan, Keith Poole, Thomas Romer, and Howard Rosenthal. 2010. “Polit-
ical fortunes: On finance & its regulation.” Daedalus – Journal of the American
Academy of Arts & Sciences Fall 2010:61–73.
McKinnon, Ronald. 1973. Money and capital in economic development. Washington
D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Merton, Robert. 1977. “An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance
and loan guarantees An application of modern option pricing theory.” Journal of
Banking and Finance 1 (1):3–11.
Mian, Atif. 2006. “Distance constraints: The limits of foreign lending in poor
economies.” Journal of Finance 61 (3):1465–1505.
Mian, Atif, Amir Sufi, and Francesco Trebbi. 2010. “The political economy of the
US mortgage default crisis.” American Economic Review 100 (5):1967–1998.
———. 2012. “The political economy of the subprime mortgage credit expansion.”
Working Paper.
Miller, Jeffrey and Stefan Petranov. 2001. “The financial system in the Bulgarian
economy.” Bulgarian National Bank Discussion Papers.
Moody’s Analytics. 2013. “RiskCalcTM Plus.”
Morgan, Donald, Bertrand Rime, and Philip Strahan. 2004. “Bank integration and
state business cycles.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (4):1555–1584.
Morgan, Donald and Philip Strahan. 2004. “Foreign bank entry and business volatil-
ity: Evidence from U.S. states and other countries.” Working Papers Central Bank
of Chile.
Morrison, Alan and Lucy White. 2005. “Crises and capital requirements in banking.”
American Economic Review 95 (5):1548–1572.
Nunez, Stephen and Howard Rosenthal. 2004. “Bankruptcy reform in congress: Cred-
itors, committees, ideology, and floor voting in the legislative process.” Journal of
Law, Economics, and Organization 20 (2):527–557.
235
P
arav
isin
i,
D
an
iel,
V
eron
ica
R
ap
p
op
ort,
P
h
ilip
p
S
ch
n
ab
l,
an
d
D
an
iel
W
olfen
zon
.
2013.
“D
issectin
g
th
e
eff
ect
of
cred
it
su
p
p
ly
on
trad
e:
E
v
id
en
ce
from
m
atch
ed
cred
it-ex
p
ort
d
ata.”
W
ork
in
g
P
ap
er.
P
ark
,
J
o
on
an
d
P
eter
P
h
illip
s.
2000.
“N
on
station
ary
b
in
ary
ch
oice.”
E
con
om
etrica
68
(5):1249–1280.
P
eek
,
J
o
e
an
d
E
ric
R
osen
gren
.
1995a.
“B
an
k
regu
lation
an
d
th
e
cred
it
cru
n
ch
.”
J
ou
rn
al
of
M
on
ey,
C
redit
an
d
B
an
kin
g
27
(3):625–638.
—
—
—
.
1995b
.
“T
h
e
cap
ital
cru
n
ch
:
N
eith
er
a
b
orrow
er
n
or
a
len
d
er
b
e.”
J
ou
rn
al
of
B
an
kin
g
an
d
F
in
an
ce
1
(1):3–11.
—
—
—
.
1997.
“T
h
e
in
tern
ation
al
tran
sm
ission
of
fi
n
an
cial
sh
o
ck
s:
T
h
e
case
of
J
ap
an
.”
A
m
erican
E
con
om
ic
R
eview
87
(4):495–505.
—
—
—
.
2000.
“C
ollateral
d
am
age:
E
ff
ects
of
th
e
J
ap
an
ese
b
an
k
crisis
on
real
activ
ity
in
th
e
U
n
ited
S
tates.”
A
m
erican
E
con
om
ic
R
eview
90
(1):30–45.
P
eltzm
an
,
S
am
.
1970.
“C
ap
ital
in
vestm
en
t
in
com
m
ercial
b
an
k
in
g
an
d
its
relation
-
sh
ip
to
p
ortfolio
regu
lation
.”
J
ou
rn
al
of
P
olitical
E
con
om
y
78
(1):1–26.
—
—
—
.
1985.
“A
n
econ
om
ic
in
terp
retation
of
th
e
h
istory
of
con
gression
al
votin
g
in
th
e
tw
en
tieth
cen
tu
ry.”
A
m
erican
E
con
om
ic
R
eview
75
(4):656–675.
P
o
ole,
K
eith
an
d
H
ow
ard
R
osen
th
al.
1996.
“A
re
legislators
id
eologu
es
or
th
e
agen
ts
of
con
stitu
en
ts?”
E
u
ropean
E
con
om
ic
R
eview
40
(3-5):707–717.
P
rasad
,
E
sw
ar,
R
agh
u
ram
R
a
jan
,
an
d
A
rv
in
d
S
u
b
ram
an
ian
.
2007.
“F
oreign
cap
ital
an
d
econ
om
ic
grow
th
.”
B
ro
ok
in
gs
P
ap
ers
on
E
con
om
ic
A
ctiv
ity
N
o.
1.
P
u
ri,
M
an
ju
,
J
o¨rg
R
o
ch
oll,
an
d
S
asch
a
S
teff
en
.
2011.
“G
lob
al
retail
len
d
in
g
in
th
e
afterm
ath
of
th
e
U
.S
.
fi
n
an
cial
crisis:
D
istin
gu
ish
in
g
b
etw
een
su
p
p
ly
an
d
d
em
an
d
eff
ects.”
J
ou
rn
al
of
F
in
an
cial
E
con
om
ics
100
(3):556–578.
R
a
jan
,
R
agh
u
ram
an
d
L
u
igi
Z
in
gales.
1998.
“F
in
an
cial
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
an
d
grow
th
.”
A
m
erican
E
con
om
ic
R
eview
88
(3):559–586.
236
Rajan, Uday, Amit Seru, and Vikrant Vig. 2012. “The failure of models that pre-
dict failure: Distance, incentives and defaults.” Journal of Financial Economics
forthcoming.
Ravn, Morten and Harald Uhlig. 2002. “On adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott filter for
the frequency of observations.” Review of Economics and Statistics 84 (2):371–376.
Reinhart, Carmen and Kenneth Rogoff. 2008. “Banking crises: An equal opportunity
menace.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 14587 .
———. 2011. “From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis.” American Economic Review
101 (5):1676–1706.
Repullo, Rafael and Jesu´s Saurina. 2011. “The countercyclical capital buffer of Basel
III: A critical assessment.” CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8304 .
Repullo, Rafael, Jesu´s Saurina, and Carlos Trucharte. 2010. “Mitigating the pro-
cyclicality of Basel II.” Economic Policy 25 (64):659–702.
Repullo, Rafael and Javier Suarez. 2012. “The procyclical effects of bank capital
regulation.” Review of Financial Studies 26 (2):452–490.
Rheinischer Sparkassen- und Giroverband. 2009. Satzung des Rheinischen
Sparkassen- und Giroverbandes. Du¨sseldorf. Online: http://www.rsgv.de
[02.01.2013].
Rochet, Jean-Charles. 2008. “Procyclicality of financial systems: Is there a need to
modify current accounting and regulatory rules?” Banque de France Financial
Stability Review (12):95–99.
Rodriguez, Francisco and Dani Rodrik. 2000. “Trade policy and economic growth:
A skeptic’s guide to the cross-national evidence.” NBER Macroeconomics Annual
15:261–338.
Romer, Thomas and Barry Weingast. 1991. “Political foundations of the thrift de-
bacle.” In Politics and Economics in the Eighties, edited by Alberto Alesina and
Geoffrey Carliner. University of Chicago Press.
237
Sabirianova, Klara, Katherine Terrell, and Jan Svejnar. 2005. “Distance to the effi-
ciency frontier and foreign direct investment spillovers.” Journal of the European
Economic Association 3 (2–3):576–586.
Sachs, Jeffrey and Andrew Warner. 1996. “How to catch up with the industrial world
– Achieving rapid growth in Europe’s transition economies.” Transition Newsletter
7 (9–10):1–4.
Sapienza, Paola. 2004. “The effects of government ownership on bank lending.”
Journal of Financial Economics 72 (2):357–384.
Sarlin, Peter. 2013. “On policymakers’ loss functions and the evaluation of early
warning systems.” Economics Letters 119 (1):1–7.
Saurina, Jesu´s and Carlos Trucharte. 2007. “An assessment of Basel II procyclicality
in mortgage portfolios.” Banco De Espan˜a Working Paper.
Schudel, Willem. 2013. “Shifting horizons: Assessing macro trends before, during,
and following systemic banking crises.” Mimeo .
Schularick, Moritz and Alan Taylor. 2012. “Credit booms gone bust.” American
Economic Review 102 (2):1029–1069.
Schumpeter, Josef. 1912. Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Berlin: Duncker
& Humblot, 1964 ed.
Seidler, Jakub and Adam Gersl. 2011. “Credit growth and capital buffers: Empirical
evidence from Central and Eastern European countries.” Czech National Bank,
Research and Policy Note No. 2/2011 .
Sengupta, Rajdeep. 2007. “Foreign entry and bank competition.” Journal of Finan-
cial Economics 84 (2):502–528.
Shaw, Edward. 1973. Financial deepening and economic development. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Solvabilita¨tsverordnung. 2006. Verordnung u¨ber die angemessene Eigenmittelausstat-
tung von Instituten, Institutsgruppen und Finanzholding-Gruppen. Berlin, Ger-
many: Bundesministerium fu¨r Finanzen.
238
Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe. 2004. Mustersatzung fu¨r die Sparkassenstu¨tzungsfonds
der Regionalverba¨nde. Berlin: Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband. Online:
http://www.sparkasse.de [02.01.2013].
———. 2010. Gescha¨ftsbericht 2010. Berlin: Deutscher Sparkassen- und Girover-
band. Online: http://www.dsgv.de [02.01.2013].
Stein, Jeremy. 2002. “Information production and capital allocation: Decentralized
versus hierachical firms.” Journal of Finance 57 (5):1891–1921.
Stiglitz, Joseph. 1994. The role of the state in financial markets. Washington D.C.:
World Bank.
———. 2000. “Capital market liberalization, economic growth, and instability.”
World Development 28 (6):1075–1086.
Thakor, Anjan. 1996. “Capital requirements, monetary policy, and aggregate bank
lending: Theory and empirical evidence.” Journal of Finance 51 (1):279–324.
UNIDO Statistics Unit. 2011. “INDSTAT4 2011 ISIC Rev.3 User’s Guide.”
Unite, Angelo and Michael Sullivan. 2003. “The effect of foreign entry and ownership
structure on the Philippine domestic banking market.” Journal of Banking and
Finance 27 (12):2323–2345.
Vins, Oliver. 2008. “How politics influence state-owned banks - The case of German
savings banks.” Working Paper, University of Frankfurt.
Vives, Xavier. 2001. “Competition in the changing world of banking.” Oxford Review
of Economic Policy 17 (4):535–547.
Weller, Christian. 2001. “Financial crises after financial liberalization: Exceptional
circumstances or structural weakness?” ZEI Working Paper.
Williamson, John and Molly Mahar. 1998. “A Survey of Financial Liberalization.”
Princeton Essays in International Finance, No. 211.
World Bank. 2002. World Development Report 2002. Washington, D.C.: World
Bank.
239
Wurgler, Jeffrey. 2000. “Financial markets and the allocation of capital.” Journal of
Financial Economics 58 (1–2):187–214.
Yeyati, Eduardo and Ugo Panizza. 2011. “The elusive costs of sovereign defaults.”
Journal of Development Economics 94 (1):95–105.
240
